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Abstract
In recent years there has been a concerted eort to address many of the safety issues associated
with physical human-robot interaction (pHRI). However, a number of challenges remain. For
personal robots, and those intended to operate in unstructured environments, the problem of
safety is compounded. We believe that the safety issue is a primary factor in wide scale adoption
of personal robots, and until these issues are addressed, commercial enterprises will be unlikely
to invest heavily in their development.
In this thesis we argue that traditional system design techniques fail to capture the com-
plexities associated with dynamic environments. This is based on a careful analysis of current
design processes, which looks at how eectively they identify hazards that may arise in typical
environments that a personal robot may be required to operate in. Based on this investigation,
we show how the adoption of a hazard check list that highlights particular hazardous areas, can
be used to improve current hazard analysis techniques.
A novel safety-driven control system architecture is presented, which attempts to address
many of the weaknesses identied with the present designs found in the literature. The new
architecture design centres around safety, and the concept of a `safety policy' is introduced.
These safety policies are shown to be an eective way of describing safety systems as a set of
rules that dictate how the system should behave in potentially hazardous situations.
A safety analysis methodology is introduced, which integrates both our hazard analysis
technique and the implementation of the safety layer of our control system. This methodology
builds on traditional functional hazard analysis, with the addition of processes aimed to improve
the safety of personal robots. This is achieved with the use of a safety system, developed during
the hazard analysis stage. This safety system, called the safety protection system, is initially
used to verify that safety constraints, identied during hazard analysis, have been implemented
appropriately. Subsequently it serves as a high-level safety enforcer, by governing the actions of
the robot and preventing the control layer from performing unsafe operations.
To demonstrate the eectiveness of the design, a series of experiments have been conducted
using both simulation environments and physical hardware. These experiments demonstrate the
eectiveness of the safety-driven control system for performing tasks safely, while maintaining a
high level of availability.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Each decade since the 1970's it has been predicted that in 10 years time collaborative robots
would be common place in both industry and at home. Although the question of why this
hasn't happened yet is being continually asked, the answer has changed over the years. With
the development of new engineering techniques, miniaturisation of electronics and the increase of
computing power, designers are now at the stage where a robot system is capable of performing
useful cooperative tasks with human users. However, the problem which designers now face,
and for which the deployment of robot systems is being impeded, is that of safety. Safety
implications have always been a concern for robot designers and traditionally the solution has
been to prevent the user coming into contact with the robot by means of physical barriers. The
study of human-robot interaction (HRI) aims to remove these barriers and allow humans and
robots to work together cooperatively to perform useful tasks.
Personal robots have long been a desire for those who believe they would make daily tasks
easier. Despite the fact that many people would like a robot, compelling need is greatest for
those with disabilities or who would otherwise not be able to complete tasks without assistance.
Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that in an ageing population, personal care robots
may become essential, as there will not be enough people to provide the required care (Ogure
et al., 2009). Examples of the types of personal robots being considered in this thesis are shown
in Figure 1.1.
There are signicant challenges involved in taking robots out of manufacturing environments
and putting them in people's homes. Arguably the most dicult of these is dealing with the
unstructured and dynamic nature of non-industrial type environments. To operate in these
types of environment it is likely that more dynamic and exible safety methods will be required.
This in turn will require new methods to be developed to prove that the robot is t for purpose
and will behave safely in all conditions.
1.1 Safety Issues of Personal Robotic Systems
Generally speaking a robot system that could perform a HRI task would be considered a com-
plex safety-critical system, due to physical size, functionality, behaviour and potential to cause
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(a) PeopleBot. (b) Elumotion RT-1. (c) Care-O-bot 3.
Figure 1.1: Personal robots come in many dierent forms depending on their use. An interactive
mobile robot, such as MobileRobots PeopleBot (MobileRobots, 2011), may be used as a tour
guide, whereas a robot tted with precision manipulators, such as the Elumotion RT-1 (Lenz
et al., 2010), can be used for more complex tasks. Some of the most useful robots, for example
Care-O-bot 3 (Graf et al., 2009), are able to explore and manipulate their environment.
damage to surroundings (Bicchi et al., 2008). All industries, which require the development of
safety-critical systems, have strict processes and standards which must be followed before the
system can be put into service. However, as stated by Desantis et al. (2008) and Kulic and Croft
(2003), there are still no safety standards for complex robots for use in cooperative situations
with humans.
Although regulations and safety standards for personal and service robots are still not avail-
able, these types of robots are starting to become commercialised. As Kabe et al. (2010) dis-
cusses, the problem with producing these robots without safety regulations in place, is that if one
caused a serious accident with a human, all services robots could be categorised as a type of un-
reasonably dangerous product. This negative publicity could harm the emerging service robot
industry, and therefore is one argument towards accelerating the development of appropriate
safety regulations and standards.
Early research (Kulic and Croft, 2006) into the safety of personal robots suggested that in-
dustrial robots could be adapted and used to perform HRI tasks. However, as Alami et al. (2006)
discusses, it is not feasible to take a large rigid robot and adapt it to the delicate tasks necessary
for a personal robot. Furthermore, the latest research into the safety of HRI (Bensalem et al.,
2009; Alami et al., 2006; Dombre et al., 2001) argues that it is not possible to control a complex
robot system in a dynamic environment, using traditional safety control methods. Instead they
suggest a behavioural type system, which can react and adapt to changing conditions.
Until recently safety analysis and safe control of personal robots was a relatively understudied
area. Therefore, little practical data is available in the literature. Some of the best work in the
eld has come from the PHRIENDS project (Physical Human-Robot Interaction: Dependability
and Safety) (Alami et al., 2006), which undertook an in-depth study of pHRI. Other notable
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work has come out of Laboratoire d'Analyse et d'Architecture des Systmes (LAAS), where they
have been developing an architecture for autonomous systems (Bensalem et al., 2009). Research
of the use of personal robots in real human environments has also received little attention.
However, the DOMEO project (part of the Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) joint programme)
has recently conducted a series of 3 month eld tests of a mobile social robot in a number of
elderly people's homes (Toth et al., 2012).
1.1.1 Robots Behaving Like Humans
When thinking about robot safety it is likely that one would try and draw comparisons with
how humans behave. For many situations this would be unwise. For example, when walking
down a busy street it is likely that two or more humans will bump into each other. This could
be a minor collision when passing normally, or a more severe collision caused by avoiding the
rst collision. For humans this is an everyday and acceptable occurrence when in crowded areas.
However, if a robot was put into this situation, it would not be acceptable for a robot to collide
with a human. This example raises a number of interesting questions on what a robot should do
to remain safe. Should it stop and make the human navigate around it?, move out of the way?,
and if it gets knocked, should it try to steady itself risking further injury to other humans? or
simply fall over? This later case is particularly interesting, as it could be argued that if the
robot is knocked by a human and it falls, any subsequent safety event is the fault of the human.
However, if the robot moves to steady itself and subsequently injures a human, this could be
considered the fault of the robot.
It is equally important to consider human expectations of robots, in terms of both robot
behaviour and capability. It is likely that safety issues could arise if the human user becomes
accustom to how a robot behaves in certain circumstance, and then the behaviour of the robot
changes unexpectedly. Unlike humans, the robots behaviour could be changed signicantly by
means of system updates, or internal learning processes. These and similar issues demonstrate
the critical importance of considering human factors when developing personal robots.
1.2 Aim and Objectives
The main argument put forward in this thesis is that traditional development methods for
safety-critical systems are not applicable to complex HRI systems. This is due to the complexity
problem of dynamic robots, where it is not possible to explicitly determine all hazards and risks
at the time of design. This is particularly an issue with traditional functional hazard analysis
techniques, which, as will be shown in Chapter 5, fail to capture hazards associated with the
robots operating environment. Therefore, this research is motivated by the need for a coherent
design strategy for developing safe personal robots. More specically, techniques are required
which can identify and mitigate safety risks inherently associated with HRI. As will be discussed
in later chapters, the current approaches to personal robot safety are insucient, lacking well
dened methods that demonstrate the dependability of the robot design.
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Safety certication is another key motivation for this research. With the increasing advance-
ment of robotics technology, designers are close, if not presently able, to create viable robotic
systems capable of undertaking complex tasks cooperatively with humans. However, current
robotics safety standards are far from appropriate for developing personal robots in the ma-
jority of cases, although the ISO 13482 (ISO/FDIS 13482, 2013) safety standard, which is still
under development, is attempting to address some of the issues associated with personal and
domestic service robots.
The overall goal of this project is to develop a new robot development methodology, that
incorporates hazard analysis with the construction of a robot control system. This is based on
the argument that a more safety-centric design process should improve the safety, reliability and
dependability of complex robot system performing HRI tasks. Therefore, the research question
addressed in this thesis is:
To what extent can safety of personal robots be achieved by integration of functional
hazard analysis with a real-time protection system?
To investigate the proposed research question, it was important to also consider the following
secondary supporting question:
Can traditional hazard analysis techniques be adapted to encompass the added com-
plexities associated with developing personal robots?
These research questions address issues that are at the cutting edge of robotics research.
Therefore, it is believed that in answering them an important contribution to knowledge will be
made. Furthermore, this project aims to develop robot safety technologies that can be shared
with the robotics community.
1.3 Context and Scope of Research
In this thesis we present a novel approach for designing robotic systems. Our methodology sets
out a procedure for developing a safety system during the hazard analysis stage. This safety
system will serve a dual purpose. Firstly, it will be used to verify that safety constraints realised
during hazard analysis have been implemented appropriately and that no conicts are present.
Secondly, it will serve as a high-level safety enforcer, by governing the actions of the robot
and preventing the control layer from performing unsafe operations. To demonstrate the key
safety features of our safety-driven control system a series of experiments have been devised.
These experiments use both simulation and real hardware to demonstrate the eectiveness of
the research work.
This project was initially concerned with the safety of HRI. However, it was found that
environmental issues that arise from unstructured environments, were a major factor in the
safety of HRI. Therefore, the decision was made to perform a wider study of the safety of
personal robots. It is important to note that throughout this thesis the term human-robot
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interaction (HRI) is used to refer to both physical human-robot interaction (pHRI) and human-
computer interaction (HCI). HCI, although generally only applied to users of computer systems,
is considered in this thesis as a large part of interacting with a personal robot is done via a
computer user interface.
As has been discussed, this project is focused on personal robots. More specically, robots
that are capable of cooperatively exchanging objects with a human user. In addition, the
dimensions, mass and power of the robot should be such that it poses an inherent safety risk
to humans. Although it is noted that there are safety concerns with smaller robots, such as
the iRobot Roomba vacuum cleaning robot. The risks associated with these types of robot are
such that they can be addressed using the same safety criteria as other small electrical devices
(Wyrobek et al., 2008; Alami et al., 2006).
The intended application for this research, is for robot systems that are used in both industry
and the home, where the robot would be working on cooperative tasks with a human user. These
tasks could be anything from, cooking, cleaning, personal care, customer service or helping the
stocking of shop shelves. Particular focus will be made on multi-functional robots, which can
perform a variety of tasks, as it is thought that these types of robots would require all the safety
considerations of task-specic robots, with the addition of safety issues associated with their
generalised design.
There were many possible areas of focus for this PhD research, which would have been equally
valid for studying the safety of human-robot interaction. Indeed many other research questions
were considered. For example, `What is a an acceptable level of safety for a human-interactive
robot?' and `What is required to achieve this level of safety?'. There was also consideration
given to focusing entirely on the robot control system. This would have involved examining
ways in which the robot could identify and avoid hazards without any previous knowledge of
the environment.
1.4 Original Contributions
During this PhD four publications have been authored, including a recent paper published in
the International Journal of Robotics Research (IJRR) (Woodman et al., 2012). These works
have set out the original contributions to knowledge made during this project and have been
well received. Notably, during the 2011 TAROS conference, many researchers enquired about
the control software being developed and expressed interest in using it. The following is a list
of papers published during this project:
 Woodman, R., Wineld, A. F., Harper, C. and Fraser, M. (2012). Building safer robots:
Safety driven control, The International Journal of Robotics Research (IJRR), Special
Issue on `Autonomous Physical Human-Robot Interaction'. 31 (13), pp. 1603{1626.
 Harper, C., Giannaccini, M., Woodman, R., Dogramadzi, S., Pipe, T. and Wineld, A.
(2011). Challenges for the hazard identication process of autonomous mobile robots, 4th
Chapter 1. Introduction 6
Workshop on Human-Friendly Robotics (HFR 2011).
 Woodman, R., Wineld, A. F., Harper, C. and Fraser, M. (2011). Online hazard analysis
for autonomous robots, Proceedings of the 12th Conference Towards Autonomous Robotic
Systems (TAROS 2011). 6856, pp. 406{407.
 Woodman, R., Wineld, A., Harper, C. and Fraser, M. (2010). Safety control architecture
for personal robots: Behavioural suppression with deliberative control, The Seventh IARP
Workshop on Technical Challenges for Dependable Robots in Human Environments.
The main novel areas of this project are the techniques we have developed for capturing
safety requirements and encoding them in a form that can be used explicitly to form a safety
system. This safety system, named the safety protection system, forms the basis of a new type
of robot control system architecture. This control system aims to separate safety from control
and use the information held in the safety systems to drive decisions in the control layer.
A list of the original contributions to knowledge that will be discussed in this thesis are as
follows:
 Novel methodology for hazard analysis process (see Chapter 5)
 Hazard check list to aid system engineers to identify environmental hazards (see Sec-
tion 5.1.1)
 A technique for separating safety from control (see Chapter 6)
 Driving control system decisions using safety routines (see Chapter 6)
 A method for explicitly modelling requirements taken from safety standards (see Sec-
tion 5.3)
Although this project is mainly concerned with the safety of personal robots, it is anticipated
that the work could be used to improve the safety properties of a variety of other systems, be it
robotic, safety-critical or other.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The structure of this document has been organised into chapters which detail the main stages
of the project. The progression of the chapters broadly follows the sequence of events taken in
completion of this research.
The initial stage of the project involved a thorough review of the literature, this highlighted
the current state of the art and revealed where new research could be benecial to the robotics
community. From these ndings techniques for identifying robot safety requirements were con-
ceived, and a control system based on these requirements was developed and implemented.
Finally, experiments were conducted and results presented. The precise order of the chapters is
as follows:
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Chapter 2: Literature Review Examines the key technologies and principles related to this
research that have been developed in past works. Particular emphasis is placed on the
safety of personal robots.
Chapter 3: Technical Equipment and Methods Presents the hardware and software tools
used to demonstrate the controller implementation.
Chapter 4: Preliminary Research Discusses the initial practical research that was con-
ducted immediately after the literature review. A number of preliminary experiments
were conducted in order to better understand the current state of the art and as proof of
concept for early safety control system architecture designs.
Chapter 5: Robot Safety Requirements: Identifying and Organising Reviews traditi-
onal hazard analysis processes and suggests a number of potential improvements. These
improvements are evaluated using a number of real world robot tasks. From these ndings
a novel hazard check list is produced.
Chapter 6: Safety-Driven Control System Development Introduces a novel control sys-
tem which explicitly uses safety requirements in order to drive control decisions. This
chapter defends the development process and gives an overview of how the system will be
tested.
Chapter 7: Experiments and Results Presents results and ndings from the main experi-
ments that were conducted during this project. These experiments were used to evaluate
the methods and techniques presented in this thesis.
Chapter 8: Conclusions Summarises the work achieved in this project and assesses the im-
pact of the ndings, highlighting the main strengths and weaknesses.
Appendices To support the many arguments made in this thesis, a number of appendices have
been included. These consist of system diagrams, tables of results, and other supporting
documents generated during this research. Also included are details of the implementation
process for the safety-driven control system presented in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
In this chapter we discuss the main issues associated with designing and developing HRI robots
and highlight areas where improvements in safety could have a real impact on getting robots
into people's homes. Primarily, this project focuses on two main areas, hazard analysis and
control system design. The diagram of Figure 2.1 shows the main areas of interest covered in
this thesis. As the digram illustrates, all discussions will be made from a safety perspective,
although in a few circumstances, for example system availability, we will discuss the trade-o
between safety and the ability to complete tasks.
This project will be looking at an area of robotics, namely the safety of human-robot inter-
action, where comparatively few documents have been published. Therefore, the focus of this
review will consider the major research in engineering safety and look at how safety-critical sys-
tems are developed in both robotics and other industries, such as automotive, aviation, railway
and nuclear. Both traditional safety processes and the latest safety methods and techniques are
examined.
Complex robot systems, as with all safety critical machines, require thorough and detailed
analysis in order to demonstrate that the system is safe and t for purpose. Throughout each
stage of a system's life-cycle safety issues may arise, which must be addressed. The earlier safety
Figure 2.1: Relationships between the dierent areas that make up this thesis.
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issues are identied during the development process, the less work and less costly the solution
to the issue will be. Ultimately, as with the majority of products, the cost is what drives the
project. Therefore, a balance is generally taken between the cost of the time taken to identify
all the safety issues during development and the cost of xing faults when the system has been
deployed.
This review will rst discuss human-robot interaction and describe some of the challenges
that need to be overcome. This will be followed by a look at how industries develop safety-critical
systems. Finally, a discussion will be made on robotics safety and how the current research can
be applied to human-robot interactive tasks.
2.1 Human-Robot Interaction
Human-robot interaction, or HRI, is the study of robot systems intended to be used with or
by humans. The interaction can come in many forms depending on the intended application of
the robot. For example a robot tour guide may accept questions from a member of the public
and respond appropriately (Goodrich and Schultz, 2007), whereas a robot performing surgery
(Dombre et al., 2001) requires constant control and supervision from a trained expert user.
As discussed by Goodrich and Schultz (2007), the interaction in HRI can be separated into
two distinct categories. The rst is `remote interaction', where the human and the robot are in
separate locations, such as the Sojourner Mars Rover, which was controlled via a satellite link
(Mishkin, 2003). The second category, and the focus of this research, is `proximate interaction'.
In this situation both human and robot are co-located, meaning there is potential for contact
between the two.
Although it is apparent that robots coming into contact, or even close proximity to a human,
may have numerous safety implications, there also exist human factors which may not be as
obvious. An example of these human factors is given by Frith and Lovering (2002). In their
example they describe a doctor using a medical diagnostic system and highlight a case in a
UK hospital, where the failure to identify an erroneous display caused several misdiagnoses.
These types of problems occur when a human user, over-time, comes to rely on the machine
and inevitably takes less time in checking the results. Frith and Lovering (2002) refer to this as
`dependency creep', and can cause problems when a previously reliable system is changed via
an update, which introduces an error that is not noticed by the user.
When considering the safety of a user of a robot system, it is important to consider their
cognitive, psychological and physiological limitations. These limitations can reduce reaction
times, increase the chances of mistakes, and prevent the user from interacting fully with the
robot (Sternberg and Mio, 2009; Reason, 1990). This is an important issue for personal robot
systems, particularly those that are used for the care of the elderly or people with disabilities.
As well as making personal robots safe, it is also important to consider people's acceptability
of robots. As Salvini et al. (2010) discusses, this acceptability is not just a user specic issue,
but may originate from a number of perspectives. For example, there maybe a resistance to
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the use of personal or service robots from the worker level, as people have concerns over job
reductions; from the legal level, due to the lack of legal regulations; and nally, fear of robots
from the bystander level. This issue of acceptability also demonstrates an important factor in
HRI safety, which is that from the users perspective, the perceived safety of the robot is more
important than the actual safety. This means that the user will require evidence and assurance
that the robot is safe in terms that they can understand.
The following section will look at the generalities of developing safety-critical systems. This
will be followed by a discussion of safety in robotics, focusing on the safety of HRI.
2.2 Developing Safety-Critical Systems
Safety-critical systems are generally regarded as systems which have the potential to harm a
large number of people and the surrounding environment (Storey, 1996). Examples of these
types of systems can be found in industries such as nuclear, railway and aviation. The term
`safety-related system', is often used to encompass all types of systems that have the potential
to harm. These systems may range from simple electrical items, for example a toaster, to major
systems such as a nuclear power shutdown controller.
Safety-critical systems often use human operators to manage the control, and ultimately
the safety of the system. As Simpson and Stoker (2002) discuss, traditional system design
often overlooks the importance of the human operator. The human-centred approach to system
design is a modern technique, which considers the human operator as part of the system and
incorporates the human as a subsystem within the main design. The international standard ISO
9241-210 denes four basic principles behind a human-centred design approach, together with
guidance on their application (ISO 9241-210, 2010):
 Active involvement of users and a clear understanding of user and task requirements
 An appropriate allocation of function between users and technology
 The iteration of design solutions
 Multi-disciplinary design
These principles aim to mitigate the hazards that human users can introduce to a system.
The benet of a human-centred design, is that it avoids the addition of ad hoc safety measures
to solve safety requirements at a later date.
When developing a safety-critical system, designers must pay close attention to both reducing
the chance of a system fault and safely handling faults when they occur. The following shows
a concise list, from the motor industry, of the types of safety considerations made by system
designers (Jesty et al., 2006):
 The level of system inter-dependency
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 The degree of control that the system has on the safety of the system when it is not
working normally
 The number, and type of other system(s) available to mitigate the loss of control (caused
by the failure of the system of interest)
 The speed with which it is necessary for a vehicle occupant to react with the backup
system(s) in order to mitigate the loss of control
These design considerations demonstrate four key safety areas applicable to any safety-critical
system. These areas are, redundancy, fault tolerance, reliance on other systems and user control.
This section has looked at some of the key issues involved with the design of a safety-
critical system. The following sections will discuss the management of safety critical develop-
ment projects and highlight some of the techniques used to identify and reduce potential safety
weaknesses in a system.
2.2.1 Safety Assurance
Safety assurance is the practice of assessing a development project and providing clear direction
in order to minimise risk and maximise the overall safety of the nal system. As Storey (1996)
describes, the purpose of safety assurance is to build a safety case for the development project,
which demonstrates that all the safety requirements have been identied and implemented, prior
to the system being allowed into service. For large systems, many safety cases may be required in
order to separate distinct areas of the system. Every safety case has two main elements (Mayo,
2006):
 Evidence { conrmation of the properties of a system
 Argument { reasoning over the evidence
A recent standard notation for describing safety cases, named Goal Structuring Notation
(GSN), has emerged from the University of York (Kelly and Weaver, 2004). This notation
allows safety engineers to explicitly represent the individual elements of any safety argument.
This includes the requirements, claims, evidence and context, along with the relationships that
exist between these elements (Spriggs, 2012).
Safety assurance involves the management of a number of processes; these include risk as-
sessment and reduction, system testing and adhering to strict standards. A typical engineering
strategy for risk assessment and reduction is described in the safety standard `ISO 12100:2010
: Safety of machinery { General principles for design { Risk assessment and risk reduction'
(ISO 12100, 2010). This safety standard states that `to implement risk assessment and risk
reduction the designer shall take the following actions, in the order given (actions (a) to (d) are
related to risk assessment and (e) to risk reduction)':
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(a) determine the limits of the machinery, which include the intended use and any reasonably
foreseeable misuse thereof;
(b) identify the hazards and associated hazardous situations;
(c) estimate the risk for each identied hazard and hazardous situation;
(d) evaluate the risk and take decisions about the need for risk reduction;
(e) eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk associated with the hazard by means of protective
measures.
Throughout system development it is likely that changes to the system will be made and ad-
ditional safety requirements identied. Therefore, safety assurance should continue throughout
the system life cycle to make certain that the safety case remains valid. The following sections
examine the major processes involved in building a system's safety case.
2.2.2 Hazard Analysis
Hazard analysis involves identifying and evaluating potential hazards in a system, which may
cause or contribute to an undesirable or harmful event. When a hazard is identied it is anal-
ysed to determine what the consequences of the hazard occurring might be. The risk that these
consequences pose to both the system and the environment is then established. A safety require-
ment is subsequently devised with the aim of reducing the risk to an acceptably low level. For
safety-critical systems the term often used to describe this is `as low as reasonably practicable'
(ALARP). The safety requirements can specify many types of solution for reducing the risk of
the hazard, for example adding extra sensors, adding impact padding, changing how the system
behaves and, usually as a last resort, avoiding the hazard by removing the system function
altogether.
Functional hazards are directly related to how a system carries out an operation, and requires
analysis of the system functions. The system functions dene the operations that a system can
perform in order to accomplish its objectives (Ericson, 2005). These objectives satisfy the
functional requirements of the system as identied from the customer requirements. Conversely,
we use the term `non-functional hazards' to describe everything else, including hazards external
to the system such as the users or the environment. A number of hazard analysis techniques
exist, many of which evaluate a system using a methodology appropriate for a particular industry.
These techniques are generally considered as specialisations of one of the following (Storey, 1996):
 Failure Modes and Eects Analysis (FMEA)
 HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP)
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
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All of these methods use a systematic approach for analysing hazards. The rst step in
any hazard analysis technique, according to Bahr (1997), is to `understand the physical and
functional characteristics of the system under study'. This involves not only looking at the way
the system functions, but also the interrelationship of all subsystems and how they may impact
the system as a whole. This, as Bahr states, is often a problem area for engineers, who feel
they understand how a system works. This can result in an underestimation of how operating
conditions and environment can aect the system. This problem is likely to be much more
pronounced for autonomous robots.
Autonomous robots which work cooperatively in close contact with humans have many safety
risks not generally associated with industrial robots. Humans can work in ways very similar to
each other or can appear to behave unpredictably; in fact it has been observed that people
generally operate in patterns similar to other groups of people and rarely operate randomly
(Leveson, 1995). Furthermore, it has been shown that humans have a tendency to neglect safety
procedures in repetitive tasks (Ludtke and Pfeifer, 2007). This problem is exacerbated when
users don't clearly understand the hazards, or users choose to risk safety for more immediate
advantages, such as time saving. Another important issue unique to humans, is how they are
able to change the environment in signicant ways either intentionally or unintentionally. This
may be adjusting lighting, closing doors, adding something to the environment e.g. a toolbox,
or interfering with the robot.
A variety of analysis methods have been used for autonomous robots with varying levels of
success. ETA and FTA are often used for industrial robots (Yamada et al., 1999; Khodaban-
dehloo, 1996) where the environment is structured and HRI is minimal. For HRI situations,
Failure Modes, Eects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) has been shown to capture many of
the interactions between the system and the user (Guiochet and Baron, 2003). Research by
Martin-Guillerez et al. (2010) applied a modied version of the HAZOP technique to a per-
sonal robot. Their ndings showed that this technique was more eective than ETA and FTA
for identifying hazards associated with users. However, as Bohm and Gruber (2010) identify
HAZOP and FMECA usually start from a block diagram of the system, which is eective in
identifying hazards due to failing components, but lacks the coverage required for identifying
hazards associated with completing tasks. Their method was to divide hazard analysis into two
parts, `components view' and `operations view'. As the names suggest, the components view is
concerned with the robot hardware and the operations view with the actions associated with
task scenarios. Although their approach identied many of the hazards related to the actual
interaction between the human and robot, environmental factors, such as how the robot should
interact with other entities that may be present, were not taken into consideration.
A sample of a FMECA and HAZOP document is presented in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. These
gures illustrate the documentation process required for both hazard analysis techniques.
According to Ericson (2005), the major causal factors that can lead to a hazardous event, can
be categorised as: (1) hardware, (2) software, (3) humans, (4) interfaces, (5) functions, and (6)
the environment. As computers have been used for many decades, hazard analysis methods for
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Figure 2.2: Example of part of a FMECA worksheet (Kobbacy et al., 2008).
Figure 2.3: IEC 61882 HAZOP table extract (IEC 61882, 2001).
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hardware, software, interfaces, and functions are well established. Conversely, little attention has
been given to how to identify hazards associated with humans and the environment. Identifying
issues associated with the operating environment of a robot, has been identied as a major
failing of traditional hazard analysis; therefore this will be discussed throughout the thesis.
2.2.3 Safety Standards
Industries which require safety-critical systems have strict processes and standards which must
be followed before the system can be put into service. Designers of robotic systems, both indus-
trial and commercial, must consider a wide range of safety risks for their users, the environment
and the robot itself. Robotic systems therefore, as with all safety critical systems, require rig-
orous analysis at all parts of the design to ensure the system is safe. However, as stated by
Desantis et al. (2008) and Kulic and Croft (2003), there are still no safety standards for complex
robots which use HRI to complete tasks.
As the rst large scale user of robotic systems, the manufacturing industry has developed
many of the robotic design methods that are used today. These methods were adapted from
design principles and practices from other industrial sectors (Hagele et al., 2008). Incorporated
into the design process were proven techniques such as hazard analysis, failure analysis, rigorous
design and extensive inspection and testing. In addition to these, a number of safety standards
for industrial robotics have been developed; most notably ISO 10218-1 (ISO 10218-1, 2006) and
ANSI/RIA R15.06 (ANSI/RIA R15.06, 2009).
As discussed by Nokata et al. (2002) and Desantis et al. (2008), the methods currently
employed by robotic designers are not appropriate for designing safe robots operating in un-
structured environments. This is due to the high complexity associated with a system that must
adapt to changes in its environment and perform actions which cannot always be anticipated
during development.
In many industries, such as aviation and automotive manufacturing, safety-critical systems
must adhere to certain standards in order to be certied as safe. The requirement for certication
imposes strict constraints on how the system is designed and developed. Each industry has its
own working standards which are often regulated by independent authorities.
The industrial robot standard ISO 10218-1 (ISO 10218-1, 2006), gives a number of guidelines
for the safety of industrial robots. However, the only criterion, which is given as an exact
operational value, is the `slow speed control mode' of robot motion. This value is given as 
250 mm/sec, while operating under reduced speed control, although it can be overridden by a
deliberative action from the user (e.g. key switch on the robot control panel).
As Wyrobek et al. (2008) points out, \Although ISO suggest that parts of the current
standard, ISO 10218-1:2006, may be useful in non-industrial robotics applications, there are no
ISO or other regulations specically for service, rehabilitation or personal robots.". Wyrobek
et al. (2008) goes on to say that \safety in design is steered more by a code of ethics, as asserted
by the IEEE, than by formal guidelines".
The `Robots and robotic devices { Safety requirements for non-industrial robots { Non-
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medical personal care robot' standard ISO 13482 (ISO/FDIS 13482, 2013) is attempting to
address the lack of clear safety guidelines for robots used in human-robot interactive situations.
Although still in a preliminary review stage, the standards rationale, which is also echoed by
Wyrobek et al. (2008) and Dombre et al. (2001), classies human interactive robots based on
functionality and required safety criteria. In this way, it is argued that a set of clear formalised
standards can be established, which give specic criteria for each robot type and avoids broad
generalities applicable to all robots.
2.2.4 Testing Safety-Critical Systems
Testing is performed throughout all stages of a system development project. The testing activ-
ities can be divided into three main areas (Storey, 1996):
 Module testing
 System integration testing
 System validation testing
Module testing involves evaluating small parts of the hardware or software, usually indepen-
dently of the main system. System integration testing considers a group of modules and checks
that the interaction is correct. System validation testing compares the design requirements with
the system as a whole and seeks to demonstrate that the requirements have been satised.
As described by Swarup and Ramaiah (2009); Bahr (1997), \traditional testing techniques
such as unit testing are often ad hoc and informal". This refers to the way in which test cases
are usually designed after the system has been built. In addition, these types of tests do not
guarantee that a statement, which executes successfully as a part of a test case, will always
execute correctly.
Many safety-critical systems standards, such as DOD-STD-2167, IEC 61508 and RTCA DO-
178B (DOD-STD-2167, 1985; IEC 61508, 2000; RTCA DO-178B, 1992), specify that every line
of software code must be covered in at least one test routine. Although seemingly contradictory,
this can lead to reduced thoroughness and quality of the overall testing. This is due to an issue,
as discussed by Swarup and Ramaiah (2009), where the necessity of full coverage puts pressure
on system developers to write test cases that satisfy the coverage requirement, often with the
sacrice of test quality.
Complicated systems by their very nature are dicult to test, this is due to the huge amount
of functionality and interdependencies throughout the system. This problem is compounded
when software technology is used, as it makes complete test coverage impossible (Harper, 2004).
The `combinatorial problem' is the term given to this inability to fully test every parameter of a
system. An example of this problem is given by Cohen et al. (1997), \Suppose a system module
had 13 parameters, each of which can hold one of three values, say 0, 1, and 2. Then there
are 313 = 1,594,323 possible parameter combinations.". It is clear from this simple example
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that a complicated system, made up of thousands of functions each accepting parameters with
large values, would be infeasible to test fully. Therefore, a degree of uncertainty exists in every
complicated system, as even with the most thorough testing, there is a chance faults may still
remain.
2.2.5 System Verication Process
An important part of any system development process is to verify that the system implemen-
tation meets its specication (Bahr, 1997). Many diverse verication techniques have been
established over the last half century. The ones applicable to robot development are generally
associated with mechanical construction, hardware electronics and software code. Mechanical
construction will not be considered in this discussion, as we are only concerned with the safety
implications inherent in the close interaction between hardware and software.
A popular method used for designing electronic circuits, involves creating a computer model
of the circuit using a hardware description language (HDL). By modelling circuits in this way,
designers can use simulation to perform rigorous tests, which can be used in both validation,
to ensure the circuit operates as designed, and as verication that the design meets its speci-
cation (Storey, 1996). Similar techniques are used for software verication; these include auto
generating code, using modelling based techniques such as UML, and a variety of testing strate-
gies. These testing strategies can range from simply testing a few system inputs, to complete
coverage testing, which means writing test cases that execute every decisional part of the code.
One form of testing that aims to re-create common coding errors, is mutation testing (Outt,
1994). This type of testing, although computationally expensive, produces more `valuable' tests
compared to the brute force approach of complete coverage techniques. The decision on what
degree of testing is selected is generally based on the requirements of the safety standard being
used (Bahr, 1997).
The verication techniques discussed thus far are those generally used in the development
of safety-critical systems, be it robotic or otherwise. These methods tend to analyse the system
mechanisms and not the behaviour. In this context, the mechanisms can be thought of as the
individual functions of the system, whereas the behaviour describes the ways in which each
function interacts during system operation. A study by Swarup and Ramaiah (2009), observed
that analysis of system behaviour, in order to identify violations in safety constraints, will
become an increasingly important aspect of safety-critical system verication, as the complexity
of systems continue to increase.
The following section will focus on design considerations for the development of safe robots.
2.3 Designing Safe Robots
At present, the main method for making robots safe is to prevent people from stepping into the
working area of the robot. This approach, developed by manufacturing industries, maintains a
clear space around the robot. Access is prevented by means of physical barriers and proximity
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sensors, which halt the robot on activation (Ogorodnikova, 2008). It is clear that for HRI this
approach will not be possible, and therefore if robots are to interact directly with humans a new
approach to safety is needed.
Human behaviour is an important factor in the occurrence of certain robot accidents. There-
fore, it is essential that system designers take into consideration potential human actions during
the planning phase (Ogorodnikova, 2008). These types of behaviours, as described by Rahimi
and Kawowski (1992), can be both predictable and unpredictable. Broadly the classication
of human behaviours can be put into two categories; those based on experience and knowledge
of how a system operates; and those based on unexpected events or, previously unseen or un-
determined actions of the system. Both of these areas have their associated risk (Rahimi and
Kawowski, 1992). For example, experienced people may become complacent with long exposure
to a system, which may eventually lead to mistakes in an otherwise consistent routine. Whereas
new users may behave irrationally in previously unseen or emergency situations.
Another aspect of human behaviour that needs to be considered, is they way in which humans
create internal models to help them understand and remember how to complete tasks. These
internal models are described by Norman (1988) as `mental models' and are formed through
experience, training and instruction. Humans develop their mental models of a system based
on their perception of its actions and physical structure. As Norman (1988) discusses, if this
perceived model of a system is incoherent or inappropriate then the user may not be able to use
the system appropriately. However, if this model is incomplete or contradictory, then the user
could be at risk.
There are numerous approaches to designing robot systems and just as many theories on
how they should be applied. One interesting technique, borrowed from Psychology, is the study
of `human-robot proxemics' (Walters et al., 2009). This area of research aims to reduce the
probability of an accident occurring while a human works with, or in close proximity to a robot.
The thinking behind the technique is that people expect a robot, which resembles a human, i.e.
has arms and a head, to behave like a human. Therefore, safety can be improved by making the
robot behaviour dependant on the distance from the human user.
Another practical robot design, which aims to reduce the safety impact of robot collisions, is
described by De Luca and Ferrajoli (2008) and Haddadin et al. (2008). In their work they take
the view that with personal robots operating in a dynamic environment, collisions will occur.
Therefore, they propose that robots should be less reliant on vision systems and proximity
sensors to prevent collisions and instead use surface-collision sensors on the entire outer surface
of the robot. This approach relies on the robot reacting suciently fast when a collision occurs,
to avoid any damage caused by the collision. To achieve this a balance must be struck between
reaction time and the operating speed of the robot.
The nal area to be discussed, and one which every engineering design strives to achieve, is
that of intrinsic safety. Intrinsic safety is the property that a system cannot inherently cause
a hazard, even if it fails or malfunctions. In robotics there are a number of well established
intrinsic safety techniques (Wyrobek et al. (2008) and Dombre et al. (2001)):
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 Actuators with limited power/speed, which guarantee safe behaviour in case of a fault
 De-energised brakes, which halt the robot in the event of a power failure
 The use of a `dead man's switch', which must be engaged in order for the robot to operate
Although intrinsically safe devices are desirable for safety, complex problems generally require
complex solutions, which makes intrinsically safe designs dicult if not impossible. Therefore,
designs which are said to be intrinsically safe, are generally functionally and physically simple.
This section has highlighted some of the general approaches to robotic safety. The following
section will focus on robotic control architectures and highlight a number of examples, which
have dedicated safety processes as a central element of the design.
2.3.1 Safety of Autonomous Robotic Systems
Autonomous robots are a class of robot system which may have one or more of the following
properties: adaptation to changes in the environment; planning for future events; learning new
tasks; and making informed decisions without human intervention. Although commercially
available autonomous robots are still few, Goodrich and Schultz (2007) report that there is
increasing demand for both personal robots for the home and service robots for industry.
At present, much of the research into robotic safety is looking at improving safety of specic
interactive situations, in particular collision avoidance or failure prevention. Collision avoidance
techniques, as the name suggests, aim to prevent robots from coming into contact with sur-
rounding objects. It has been demonstrated that contact avoidance with humans, especially in
cooperative situations, requires a higher level of perception compared to other static or dynamic
entities (Kulic and Croft, 2003; Heinzmann and Zelinsky, 2003). This has led researchers to
suggest that safety of human-robot interaction requires both high-precision sensory information
and fast reaction times, in order to work with and around humans (Giuliani et al., 2010; Kulic
and Croft, 2007). Work by Alexander et al. (2009) suggests that for autonomous systems to
support humans as peers, while maintaining safety, robot actions may need to be restricted,
preventing optimum exibility and performance. In addition to collision avoidance, strategies
have been developed to integrate post-contact mitigation into the avoidance scheme. Work by
Ikuta et al. (2003) has shown that in robot development, while designing the control system, it
is important to consider safety implications involved with moving external parts of the robot.
Among the requirements of autonomous robots, such as those being discussed in this research,
is a certain degree of robustness. This means being able to handle errors and to continue
operation during abnormal conditions. To achieve this it is important that the system should be
able to support changes to its task specication (Bonasso and Kortenkamp, 1996). These changes
are necessary as, in a dynamic environment, the robot will frequently nd itself in a wide range
of previously unseen situations. To date, the majority of research in this area has addressed
this issue by using learning algorithms, often implemented as articial neural networks (ANNs)
(Nehmzow, 1995; Larsen and Hansen, 2005). However, as Nehmzow et al. (2004) identify, these
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implementations, although seemingly eective, are dicult to analyse due to the inherent opacity
of connection based algorithms. This means that it is dicult to produce an intelligible model
of the system structure that could be used in safety analysis. Work by Kurd et al. (2006)
seeks to address this issue using a hybrid ANN, which is designed to represent knowledge in an
interpretable and understandable form.
A report by Alami et al. (2006), identies a number of European robotic manufactures that
have recently included software modules to monitor, through external sensing, the space around
the robot for any potential dangers. This type of additional monitoring system is known as a
`safety protection system' (Fuller and Vassie, 2004). A practical example of this, for managing a
high-powered laser, has been implemented by Wozniak et al. (2007). Their research found that
an architecture which separated safety from control allowed them to more easily congure and
extend the safety parameters to meet the requirements of future changes.
It is clear from the literature that little research has been done on the day-to-day operation
of personal robots, and all the safety risks associated with this. One reason why this may be
the case, is that currently personal robots are only tested in `mock' home conditions that have
been heavily structured and the majority of real world hazards removed. Therefore, there has
been no need to conduct a survey of many of the real environments that personal robots may be
required to operate in. In fact only one trial of a personal robot used in real home environments
has been found in the literature. This trial was carried out as part of the DOMEO project (Toth
et al., 2012), and involved a series of 3 month eld tests of a mobile social robot in a number
of elderly people's homes. It is important to note that this robot did not have a manipulator,
therefore there were no safety issues associated with manipulating the environment or passing
objects between robot and human.
2.3.2 Safety Control Architectures
In the context of this thesis, safety control architectures are an abstract model of a controller,
specically a robot controller, which has safety processes as a main part of the design.
Research by Marzwell et al. (1994), reveals two classes of potential hazards that can exist in
robot controllers. These are `system level' failures, caused by the controller itself, and `task level'
failures, which are caused by valid commands to the controller that result in an unsafe event i.e.
collision, unbalancing or other hazards. To alleviate some of the issues associated with traditional
controller designs, a number of new approaches have been developed. The most popular of
which is to modularise a system into a group of interconnected units that can be developed
and tested in isolation. As Laibinis and Troubitsyna (2005) identify, \Traditionally abstraction,
modularisation and layered architecture are recognised to be eective ways to manage system
complexity.". The remainder of this section will look at modular hierarchical based control
architectures.
Robot control architectures can be broadly divided into one of three categories: deliberative;
reactive and hybrid (Bryson, 2002). A deliberative controller uses the sense-plan-act method for
completing tasks. This involves reasoning about the perceived world and acting appropriately.
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Figure 2.4: Three-tier control architecture (Narayan et al., 2007).
This contrasts with reactive controllers, which employ a sense-act approach. This approach
avoids processing and storage overheads, often associated with reasoning about the state of the
world, both internal and external to the robot. The nal type of robot controller, the hybrid
controller, is a combination of both the deliberative and reactive controller types.
Many argue that a hybrid controller type provides the only way to control a robot performing
complex tasks in a dynamic environment (Proetzsch et al., 2010; Nordin and Nordahl, 1999). As
Bonasso and Kortenkamp (1996) discuss, a control architecture is needed which can accept new
tasks and information and react to the world at any time; \We do not want an architecture that
requires a robot to be reprogrammed each time its goal changes." (Bonasso and Kortenkamp,
1996). Equally robot controllers that are purely reactive are not able to complete complex
tasks which require coordination and planning. As Proetzsch et al. (2010) states, \the problem
of controlling complex robotic systems is not solved by the behaviour-based paradigm alone.
Rather, while helping with some common problems, behaviour-based architectures introduce
new diculties."
Hybrid robot control architectures generally divide the controlling task into reactive and
deliberative modules, with a communication layer in-between to organise control events. The
diagram in Figure 2.4 is a typical representation of a hybrid control architecture.
The majority of robot control architectures (Bensalem et al., 2009; Nordin and Nordahl, 1999;
Bonasso and Kortenkamp, 1996), which have separate safety modules, use deliberative control
modules for completing tasks, and reactive safety modules to monitor the behaviour of the robot
and prevent any unsafe actions. An alternative style architecture is the Sensor Fusion Eects
(SFX) architecture, developed by Murphy and Arkin (1992). This uses a layered approach,
with a low-level behavioural task-layer providing the functionality, and a top-level deliberative
safety-layer, which monitors the actions of the robot and prevents any unsafe events. As Murphy
(1997) discusses, one benet of a reasoning safety layer, is that the task of the controller can be
readily customised without impacting predened safety routines.
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2.3.2.1 Knowledge-Based Systems
Knowledge-based systems are a particular type of system design that are fundamentally built for
handling information. Compared to conventional system software, where control routines and
the information they use to make decisions are integrated, in knowledge-based systems these
two aspects are explicitly separate. At their core are mechanisms for acquiring, reasoning and
representing knowledge. Inference is an important part of the reasoning mechanism. This is
the process of deducing new knowledge, based on known information or assumptions based on
probability. The main components of a knowledge-based system are shown in Figure 2.5.
There are a number of dierent types of knowledge-based systems, the most widely used of
which is the expert system. Other types include rule-based systems and case-based systems.
However, authors are divided over whether neural networks and genetic algorithms should be
considered as knowledge-based systems. Hopgood (2001) puts the argument forward that as
knowledge is not explicitly represented in these types of system, they can't legitimately be
classed as knowledge-based systems. In contrast Kendal and Creen (2007) argue that these
systems can be dened as a type of knowledge-based system, as they are capable of representing
knowledge as part of their structure.
As stated, expert systems are the most widely used type of knowledge-based system. They
are generally used to replicate a human experts decision process. A well known example used
for medical diagnosis is the MYCIN system (Jackson, 1996). The goal of MYCIN was to help
diagnose and treat bacterial infections of the blood. It was developed using specialist knowledge
to determine the relationship between the types of organism identied in the blood and the
treatment required. This type of problem, where there is a relationship between initial states and
a goal state, is what knowledge-based systems are primarily used for. It is important to note that
these relationships can be both simple one-to-one (cause and eect), or much more convoluted.
The term `data-mining' is sometimes used to refer to the process of identifying relationships
between data, which are dicult to nd manually and often not possible without automation
(Leondes, 2005). Although the research material shows that knowledge-based systems are rarely
used in robotics, a discussion is presented here, as many of the principles of knowledge-based
systems were found to be extremely useful during this project.
In its simplest form there are three groups of people that interact with knowledge-based
systems, these are the domain experts, the knowledge engineers and the end users. The diagram
in Figure 2.6 illustrates the relationships between these persons and the system. The domain
experts work closely with the knowledge engineers to build a knowledge base containing details
of everything the system is required to know, and the relationships between information. The
end user is the person who actually uses the system and would provide feedback to the knowledge
engineer about system correctness, functionality and performance.
Fuzzy control systems, as with knowledge-based systems, are constructed of sets of logic
rules, referred to as fuzzy logic (Passino and Yurkovich, 1997). These sets are made up of
individual rules, each of which is called a `fuzzy rule'. An example of a fuzzy rule used for a
vehicle management system is as follows: `IF brake temperature is warm AND speed is not very
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Figure 2.5: The main components of a knowledge-based system (Hopgood, 2005).
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Figure 2.6: Example knowledge-based system structure (Edwards, 1991).
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fast THEN brake pressure is slightly decreased' (Klein, 2004). Fuzzy systems are fundamentally
dierent to knowledge-based systems, as fuzzy logic produces approximate results rather than
xed binary values. As the example shows, designers can specify rules in ambiguous terms,
therefore the rule parameter `not very fast' can be thought of as a value less than `fast' and
greater than `slow'. This makes fuzzy systems suitable for applications, such as controlling the
temperature of heating systems, where the output(s) is variable, and based on approximate
interpretations of the input values (Passino and Yurkovich, 1997).
2.4 Summary
This chapter has presented a review of the literature relevant to this project. The aim of this
chapter is to provide essential background information for the reader and identify where the
project ts in with the current research into personal robot safety. It must be noted that this
review represents a small proportion of the literature examined during this project.
The literature review has revealed that much of the focus of robot safety, especially that which
involves HRI, is concerned with specic problems such as collision avoidance and path planning.
In contrast, little research has been conducted in looking at ways that safety requirements,
identied during hazard analysis, can be implemented in a control system and demonstrated to
operate as designed. It could be argued that this is a more important issue than other safety
issues such as collision avoidance, as it is likely that this will be reduced over time as sensor
technology and processing speeds increase.
Further to the research question proposed in the introduction, a number of other specic
questions have been raised by this literature review. These questions will not be answered
directly in the thesis, but instead serve as guidance to what was being considered throughout
this project. These questions, all of which support the main research question, are as follows:
 Is it possible to identify all potential hazards in unstructured environments?
 Can safety requirements be described in a structured way?
 Can active safety processes be used to model the environment?
 Can a robotic system be designed which can learn how to complete tasks safely?
The following chapter will discuss the equipment and methods used during this project. A
number of hardware and software solutions are considered and a justication for those selected
is given.
CHAPTER 3
Technical Equipment and Methods
From the outset of this project the aim has been to develop safety processes that can be imple-
mented on a variety of robot platforms. This chapter presents the hardware and software that
was chosen to verify the eectiveness of these safety processes.
To evaluate dierent system control architectures it was crucial for each to be implemented
and analysed in such a way that a comparison could be made. As there were a large number
of architecture designs, it was decided that the best research method would be to perform
experiments, rst in simulation and then on a real robot. Using this approach, architecture
designs were initially trialled in simulation, where they could be continually revised and re-
evaluated. Any designs that were found to not perform as expected, or failed in terms of the
required safety criteria were not tested on real hardware.
A risk analysis was performed at the beginning of the project. From this it was conrmed
that, as with the majority of research projects, nance was limited. This had an impact on
the equipment used as there were no guarantees that hardware could be replaced or repaired
if it were to fail. However, this impact was minimised by a careful survey of the available
equipment and how it could be exploited to get the most use from it. One benet of using
low-cost equipment is that the majority of experiments discussed in this thesis can be recreated
by other researches at little expense.
3.1 Robot Hardware
An essential part of this project was to examine the eects of dierent safety processes on
a diverse selection of hardware. This involved choosing a number of sensors, actuators and
controllers that could be made compatible with our control architecture. No restriction was
made on the operating system used, with Microsoft Windows, Linux and Lego NXT OS all
being developed for.
One of the ndings of the literature review, was that the consensus between researchers is
that an important part of a `safe robot' is a rich set of sensory inputs. This does not necessarily
refer to the number of sensors, but the way in which the sensors are used to maximise the
amount and quality of data. Therefore, when selecting sensors for this project it was vital to
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consider how each sensor could be used either in isolation or in conjunction with other sensors
in order to glean as much information about the robot's environment as possible.
At the time this research was conducted, the most sophisticated personal robot commercially
available was the Willow Garage PR2 robot (Figure 3.1). The PR2 robot, costing $400,000
(Willow Garage, 2011), is equipped with two high precision arms, is fully autonomous and can
build 3D maps of its environment (Hornung et al., 2012). Although this robot was unavailable
for the project, it did inspire many of the hardware choices. For example, one of the technologies
that could be used from the PR2 SE Robot System, was the Microsoft Kinect. In addition to
the PR2 robot, a number of notable personal robots currently being used for HRI research have
been examined. Details of these robots are presented in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Willow Garage PR2 robot.
The remainder of this section discusses the main hardware and equipment used. In a number
of cases novel uses of the hardware is demonstrated and a comparison with other alternatives
are made.
3.1.1 BERT Humanoid Robot
The original hardware made available for the project was the BERT (Bristol Elumotion Robot
Torso) robot, also referred to as Elumotion RT-1 (Figure 3.2) (Lenz et al., 2010). The BERT
robot is a highly articulated humanoid, with high procession actuators and fast response time.
Based on the specication and abilities of the BERT robot, it was initially concluded that it
would be an appropriate platform for real robot experiments. A few of the key features are the
multiple degrees of freedom (DoF) appendages and the grasping-hands, which are able to lift
small objects. In addition, the structure of the BERT Robot is made up of simple cylinder-style
joints, which meant a close representative model could be constructed in simulation.
However, after setting out what was to be achieved by the project, it was decided that this
type of robot would not be appropriate. This was due to the robot having no inbuilt collision
sensors, meaning that there was no way of sensing contact that occurred between the robot and
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Key Details
PR2 (by Willow Garage) (Willow Garage, 2011)
 Wheeled mobile robot (omnidirectional mobile base)
 Variable height: 1330 mm to 1645 mm
 Two arms + grippers (payload: 1.8 kg)
 2 x onboard Xeon servers (each server: 8 cores i7, 24 GB
RAM, 2 TB disk)
ASIMO (by Honda) (Honda, 2013)
 Humanoid bipedal mobile robot
 Height: 130 cm, weight: 54 kg
 34 degrees of freedom
 Powered by a rechargeable 51.8V Lithium Ion Battery
 1 hour operating time
Care-O-bot 3 (by Fraunhofer IPA) (Reiser et al., 2009)
 Wheeled mobile robot (omnidirectional mobile base)
 Dimensions (L/W/H): 750/550/1450 mm
 Light-weight-arm + 3 nger gripper (payload: 1.8 kg)
 Flexible interaction tray that can be used to safely pass
objects between the human and the robot
Kompa (by Robosoft) (Robosoft, 2013)
 Wheeled mobile robot (dierential drive steering)
 Dimensions (L/W/H): 450/400/1400 mm
 Max speed: 1 m/s
 Touchscreen user interface
 Open source software / open hardware architecture
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Key Details
Roomba (by iRobot)
(Tribelhorn and Dodds, 2007)
 Robot vacuum cleaner (fully autonomous)
 Diameter: 340 mm, height: 92 mm
 Infrared sensors to detect obstacles
 iRobot `Create' model designed for research
purposes
Paro (by PARO Robots)
(Wada and Shibata, 2008)
 Therapeutic robot (designed as a human
companion)
 Dimensions (L/W/H): 570/350/160 mm
 7 actuators (eyelids, neck, ippers)
 Tactile and non-contact sensors
Table 3.1: A selection of notable service, domestic and social personal robots.
other objects. This functionality would have been needed in order to maintain the safety of the
robot and its surrounding environment. It was thought that cameras could be used to sense
the location of objects/hazards and anticipate any possible collisions. However, this would have
involved building a model of the robot joints and tracking them in real-time. This additional
work would have taken a considerable amount of time and negatively impacted the project.
Although the BERT robot was not used in this project, its technical specication was used
to form the basis of a simulated humanoid robot. This will be discussed further in Section 3.2.1.
3.1.2 MobileRobots PeopleBot
The most fully featured robot used in this project was the PeopleBot created by MobileRobots.
The PeopleBot, shown in Figure 3.3, is a two-wheel drive upright autonomous robot. Typical
applications for this type of robot is as a tour guide or a security guard, although as with the
majority of personal robots they are generally only used for research purposes.
The PeopleBot is equipped with a rich array of sensors and peripherals that are connected to
an on-board computer located in the base of the robot. This computer was not suciently pow-
Chapter 3. Technical Equipment and Methods 30
Figure 3.2: BRL BERT humanoid robot.
erful to run the software developed as part of this project. Therefore a more modern computer
connected to the robot was used. A full list of the robot features is given in Table 3.2.
In addition to the equipment that came tted with the PeopleBot, a number of other pieces
of hardware were required in order to improve sensor redundancy and demonstrate the number
of sensory inputs the robot controller could handle. The following is a list of the additional
equipment tted to the PeopleBot:
 External Laptop (Intel i5 2.3 GHz dual core processor, running 64-bit Windows 7)
 Microsoft Kinect
 Nintendo Wii remote
 High denition USB camera
 Microphone
Supplied with the PeopleBot is the MobileRobots' Advanced Robot Interface for Applications
(ARIA) software library. This library, written in C++, allows developers to access the robot's
sensors and actuators in order to create bespoke software for controlling the robot. Developers
can choose to either run their software on the on-board computer or on an external pc connected
using a serial or Ethernet cable. Running the demonstration programs that came with the
ARIA software library worked without error on the on-board computer. However, executing the
programs from an external pc could not be made to work without the robot disconnecting after
Chapter 3. Technical Equipment and Methods 31
2 DoF
gripper with
horizontal
break beam
IR table
sensors
Sonar array
Collision 
sensors
Speakers
Microphone
Microsoft
Kinect
Nintendo
Wii remote
Non-contact
thermal sensor
Cameras
Laptop
(Intel i5
2.3 GHz)
Temperature
sensor
Figure 3.3: MobileRobots PeopleBot (Shown with additional equipment, including: Microsoft
Kinect, Nintendo Wii remote, cameras, speakers, microphone and laptop).
a few seconds of operation, meaning the ARIA library could not be used. To overcome this issue,
a new software library was written for the robot, which used the in-built remote shell service
(secure shell (SSH)). This communication service allowed commands to be sent directly to the
robot, overcoming the issues associated with the ARIA library. However, one drawback of this
approach was that the laser range nder could not be used. Fortunately this was not a problem
as a Microsoft Kinect was made available which, in addition to providing all the functionality of
the laser range nder, also came with a collection of software libraries for augmenting the range
data.
3.1.3 Lego Mindstorms NXT
The Lego Mindstorms NXT robotics kit, usually shortened to Lego NXT, is a highly congurable
programmable robot construction set that is compatible with all other Lego products. The main
component of the kit is the `Intelligent Brick', which houses a 32-bit microprocessor, takes 4
sensor inputs and can control 3 motors. Programs are generally written to be executed on
the Intelligent Brick itself. However, using 3rd party programming tools it is possible to write
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PeopleBot Specication
{ Robot dimensions: 284.5 cm x 104.1 cm x 124.5 cm
{ 32-bit Hitachi SH RISC CPU
{ 10 inch touchscreen
{ Canon VC-C4 camera, 10x zoom, with pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ)
{ 24 sonar sensors (8 front, 8 rear and 8 top-deck)
{ 10 bump sensors (5 front and 5 rear)
{ SICK LMS-200 laser range nder
{ Infrared table sensors (detect when approaching a table)
{ 2-DoF gripper
{ Twin break beams between gripper paddles
{ Bump sensors inside each gripper
{ Grippers part to 19.2 cm and have 2.5 kg lift capability
Table 3.2: MobileRobots PeopleBot technical specication (MobileRobots, 2011).
software that can interact with the Lego NXT from a PC via either USB or Bluetooth.
As this project was interested in physical human-robot interaction it was important to look
at certain parts of a robot in isolation. This meant essentially separating the robot arm and
gripper, which is used to manipulate dierent objects, from the mobile base, which allows the
robot to move around its environment.
3.1.3.1 Gripper and Arm
Two types of arm and gripper were constructed for this project (see Figure 3.4). The rst
used mainly for preliminary experiments, picked up items by raising the gripper vertically and
`hooking' the object until it was rmly grasped. The second type of gripper used the more
traditional clamping method. This was developed as it better reected the majority of grippers
found to be used by researchers. Both types of gripper were mounted to a xed base and could
rotate 90 in either direction from its forward starting position.
To provide more sensory data from the arm and gripper setup, a number of additional sensors
were used. These include a non-contact thermal sensor made by Phidgets, Inc., a high denition
camera and a microphone. All these sensors were connected using USB.
3.1.3.2 Mobile Robot
One of the main diculties for the safety of personal robots is navigating an unstructured
environment. Therefore in order to perform repeatable experiments it was found that a small
mobile robot was more appropriate compared to a larger robot in a number of scenarios. The
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(a) Hook type gripper. (b) Clamp type gripper.
Figure 3.4: Lego NXT robot arm.
main reason for this is that it is much simpler to locate the absolute position of a smaller robot
in its environment. This was achieved in our experimental setup by placing a unique marker,
as shown in Figure 3.5, on top of the robot in order to track its position with an overhead
camera. This novel technology was developed during this project and is discussed further in
Section 3.2.3.2.
The mobile robot has two large drive wheels and one smaller free-spinning wheel. This
allowed the robot to rotate in a 0 turning circle. As Figure 3.5 shows, the robot has the option
of carrying the clamp type gripper presented in Section 3.1.3.1. A Nintendo Wii remote was
also integrated into the design, allowing the robot to sense acceleration and rotation along three
axes. This novel use of a games controller is discussed further in the section that follows.
For initial test scenarios the use of the Lego NXT in its unmodied form would have been ad-
equate. However, with a few modications and additional sensors, we were able to dramatically
improve the capabilities of the Lego NXT mobile robot, making it comparable to the PeopleBot
in terms of functionality. There were two main reasons for doing this. The rst being that
we could run desktop experiments, which were more convenient and had less impact on other
people working in the lab. And the second, was the low-cost, as there was no guarantee that
the PeopleBot could be repaired or replaced if it broke down.
3.1.4 Nintendo Wii Remote
The Nintendo Wii remote, also known as the Wiimote, is a remote control designed for use
with the Nintendo Wii games console. The Wii remote, shown in Figure 3.6, is wireless and
contains a number of sensors which allow it to sense dierent types of gestures. The device can
also be used in conjunction with a sensor bar that tracks its position in space. This sensor bar,
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(a) Equipped with gripper. (b) Without gripper, Nintendo
Wii remote visible.
Figure 3.5: Lego NXT mobile robot.
usually placed on top of a television, contains a number of infra-red lights which can be detected
by the remote. The body of the remote is made of a durable plastic and houses the batteries,
an accelerometer, a speaker, an optical sensor and a Bluetooth receiver/transmitter (Nintendo,
2010). Using the in-built accelerometer the Wii remote can sense acceleration along three axes.
Figure 3.6: Nintendo Wii remote.
A novel use for the Wii remote was conceived while constructing the Lego NXT mobile robot,
to overcome the Lego NXT limitation of only being able to handle 4 sensor devices. As was
shown in Section 3.1.3.2 the remote was integrated into the body of the robot and positioned
so that it lies horizontally. This allowed the mobile robot to identify any change in angle and
acceleration. In addition, by placing the infra-red sensor bar in a xed location, distance could
be calculated using triangulation.
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An open source library was used to communicate with the Wii remote called `wiimotelib'
(Peek, 2009). This library allows developers to connect to up to four Wii remotes and read
sensory data in real-time.
3.1.5 Microsoft Kinect
The Microsoft Kinect is a motion sensing input device, released commercially during Year 2 of
this project. It comprises two low resolution cameras, an infrared projector, a microphone array
and a motorised base for adjusting the sensor angle (see Figure 3.7). Using the ocial Microsoft
software development package, the Kinect is capable of skeletal tracking of two active people
from a distance of approximately 1.2 to 3.5 metres (about 4 to 11 feet) (Microsoft Corporation,
2011).
3D Depth Sensors
Motorised Tilt BaseMulti-Array Microphone
RGB Camera
Figure 3.7: Microsoft Kinect motion sensing input device.
In order to identify and track people the Kinect must be positioned at a minimum distance
of 1.2 metres. Therefore, for desktop experiments, such as those conducted with the Lego NXT
robots, the Kinect was not always appropriate. In these situations, a high-denition camera was
used as an alternative. However, over larger distances the Kinect produced readings that were
much more precise than many of the other sensors used. This was important when comparing
the belief value for sensor readings taken from dierent sensor types.
3.2 Robot Software
A number of software packages were used during this project. These tools were carefully selected
to ensure that they would be appropriate for the required need. Where possible open source
software was used, as this eliminated any licensing issues that may have arisen from migrating
between dierent computers.
In addition to pre-existing software, a number of new tools were developed during this
project. These were required as either the software available was not appropriate or it did not
exist.
During this project the robot software framework ROS (robot operating system) (Quigley
et al., 2009) has become popular for those researchers wanting to develop robot software. How-
ever, at the beginning of this project ROS was still in an early development stage. Although
ROS has become popular over the last few years, it still has no established libraries for the
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MobileRobots PeopleBot, or the simulation environment chosen for this project (see following
section for details). It is important to note that as ROS provides a exible development envi-
ronment, there are no technical reasons why it could not be used to implement the robot control
architecture presented in this thesis.
The remainder of this section discusses the key software packages used and justies why they
were selected. In some cases alternatives are presented and a comparison made.
3.2.1 3D Simulation Environment
As has been discussed, a simulation environment was a vital evaluation tool for performing
experiments. Using simulation software it is possible to construct robots and environments
of varying conguration. In addition, it is possible to adjust environmental conditions, such as
surface friction, mass and restitution, which allows for dierent types of material to be simulated.
Learning how to use a large piece of software such as a simulation environment is extremely
time intensive. Therefore it was crucial that the most appropriate one was chosen. The following
list summarises what was required from the simulation software:
 Operate in a simulated physical world
 Creation of linked manoeuvrable joints
 Creation of sensors
 Integration with hardware
 Capture and share events, i.e. collision detection
A number of simulation environments were tested, including Webots, Player/Stage and
Breve. Finally Microsoft Robotics Developer Studio 2008 Revision 3 (MRDS) was chosen, as
it had all the required features and in addition, as a .NET product, it also has the benet of
supporting any .NET programming language (Johns and Taylor, 2008).
One of the main concepts of MRDS is that all simulated processes run as a service. Each
service can initialise other services and exchange data using a common communication protocol.
There are a wide range of predened services available, all of which can be extended and adapted
to suit any purpose. Some of the most notable are the collision detection, laser range nder,
and camera services.
The simulation environment was used to simulate robots, humans and a number of inanimate
entities. The rst robot constructed was modelled on the BRL BERT humanoid robot. This
can be seen in Figure 3.8 alongside a table with an object placed on top. In addition to these
entities, a camera and laser sensor have been adapted from the MRDS standard components
and integrated into the body of the robot. The most used simulated robot for experimentation
was the MobileRobots PeopleBot, which was adapted from the MobileRobots Pioneer P3DX
robot that comes as one of the few standard robots with MRDS.
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Figure 3.8: MRDS simulation depicting robot, table and object.
There are presently no tools available for quickly constructing objects in MRDS. Instead the
developer is required to enter the dimensions and a number of other attributes for each entity of
an object. This process is exacerbated when two or more objects need to be connected. To aid
in this process, the `Simulated Entity Creator' was developed, a screen shot of which is shown
in Figure 3.9. This tool allows objects to be constructed out of a number of simple shapes, each
with dened physical characteristics such as dimension, mass and shape type. Appendix A shows
two further entities created using the creator tool. Although, this has been a large undertaking,
it was decided that the initial eort would save time overall and add much exibility for future
design changes.
3.2.2 2D Robot Arm Simulation
For preliminary experiments a 2D simulation of a robot arm was developed. Using the Python
coding language and a number of imaging libraries a basic gripping arm was simulated. The
simulation, built during this project, used basic physical properties allowing the gripper to pick
up and push items around the environment.
Although the simulation environment was relatively simple, it could be used to compare
dierent types of robot controller. A more detailed discussion of the use of the simulator is
presented in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.9: Simulated entity creator { Showing the BERT humanoid robot.
3.2.3 Other Software Tools
Where appropriate a number of software packages and libraries have been used to support this
project work. The following sections discuss the most important of these software tools.
3.2.3.1 Microsoft Automatic Graph Layout
Microsoft Automatic Graph Layout (MSAGL) is a tool for laying out and visualising directed
graphs. It was integrated into the control system user interface for visualising the interactions
between safety processes, sensors and actuators. The fast refresh rate and relatively low process-
ing needs of the graphs meant these interactions could be viewed in real-time. The image shown
in Figure 3.10 demonstrates how a user can select dierent nodes in a graph, which makes all
the connected nodes become highlighted. This allows the user to visualise how dierent safety
processes relate to the actuators and sensors. This highlighting is achieved by hovering over any
node in the graph and is one of the large number of features that are available with MSAGL.
3.2.3.2 Computer Vision Library
To process the images captured by the cameras, a computer vision library was required. As the
C# language had already been selected for coding the software, the obvious choice of library was
Emgu CV (Emgu CV, 2010). Emgu CV is a C# wrapper for the most widely used computer
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(a) Highlighted path between sensors and actuators.
(b) No highlighting.
Figure 3.10: Microsoft Automatic Graph Layout { Representation of safety system.
vision library, OpenCV. OpenCV was originally released by Intel in 1999, and is now being
supported by Willow Garage (Pisarevsky, 2010).
Three types of algorithm were developed for processing the images captured from the cam-
eras. These were, face recognition, movement detection and surface feature recognition. Face
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recognition involved matching known characteristics of human faces, with features identied
from captured images. To detect movement, a technique called optical ow was used. This is
essentially a measurement of the way sections of the image (groups of pixels) move from one
image frame to another. Finally, a technique for surface feature recognition was developed,
which used the same principle as face recognition, but instead of a list of human characteristics,
a unique pattern image (see Figure 3.11a) is used that can be identied within the image. As
the size of the pattern image is known, it is possible to determine the distance, orientation and
position of the pattern within the image captured by the camera.
(a) Position detection marker. (b) Screen shot of surface feature detection in use.
Figure 3.11: Robot position using surface features.
One of the useful applications of vision processing developed during this project, was to
use surface feature recognition to track the absolute position and rotation of a mobile robot.
Figure 3.11b shows a unique marker the size of a playing card attached to the top of a mobile
robot. This marker, an image of which is stored in the computer, can then be tracked using
an ordinary camera positioned overhead. Using either a xed location or a second marker the
robot can calculate its relative position to other objects and the rotation required to face those
objects. This was required for experimentation, as it was essential to accurately know the robot's
position relative to other objects.
3.3 Summary
This chapter has discussed the choice of hardware and software selected for this project. As
has been argued, all testing could have been done in simulation. However, it was felt that a
more credible argument for the eectiveness of the nal system could be made if experiments
were conducted on physical robot hardware. There were of course economic restrictions on the
hardware selection. However, using novel ways of integrating low-cost hardware, we were able
to produce hardware solutions with the capabilities of considerably more expensive robots.
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CHAPTER 4
Preliminary Research
From the literature review a number of areas of robot safety that merited further investigation
were revealed. These broadly fell in two categories, the rst was how hazards that may aect
the robot are identied; and the second was how hazard analysis could be integrated into a
robot control system. It was decided that the most appropriate way of examining hazard iden-
tication methods, was to rst develop and experiment with a real robot controller. This, it
was reasoned, would give practical experience that may reveal areas of robot development that
require particular safety engineering eort.
The review of literature identied a number of key principles that a safe robot controller
should have. Using these as a starting point, a number of safety system design ideas were
conceived. This chapter details the development and evaluation of a selection of these initial
concepts.
This chapter presents the preliminary research and experimentation that was conducted in
the rst year of this project. This initial research was used to evaluate the research questions and
make certain that they were worth investigating. Findings from the preliminary experiments,
although not necessarily novel, did help to raise further questions that were not revealed during
the literature review.
4.1 Developing a Safety Control Architecture
This section examines robot control architectures from a safety perspective; this builds on the
discussion presented in Section 2.3.2.
Safety critical systems in the past have been developed to solve specic large-scale safety
related problems. These types of system are designed for a single application, where the required
tasks are both known and are not likely to change over the life of the system. HRI robots will
require dierent design considerations compared to these traditional systems. This is due to
both the operating conditions of the robot and the variety of tasks the robot will be expected
to perform. This view point is summed up by Desantis et al. (2008), `Dependability of the
robot control software for pHRI calls for a modular and hierarchical architecture, which is also
advantageous for testing the single components and isolating possible faults so as to achieve
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operating robustness'.
Recent research by Bensalem et al. (2009); Lussier et al. (2007), has shown that a hierarchical
approach to system safety, with dierent control layers providing planning, task execution and
safety supervision, can improve the reliability and dependability of an autonomous robot system.
This research is broadly based on the behaviour-based techniques developed by Rodney Brooks.
In Brooks' work he introduced a subsumption architecture (Toal et al., 1996; Brooks, 1999),
which demonstrates how dierent simple behaviours can be combined to produce new complex
behaviours. Furthermore, the abstraction of the functional elements of the robot control software
allows for modules to be added, removed and amended while retaining control functionality of
the robot. Both the subsumption type architecture and `three layer' control architecture can be
seen in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Subsumption architecture and `three layer' control architecture (Lussier et al., 2004).
A notable architecture using the three layer approach is the LAAS architecture (Bensalem
et al., 2009) shown in Figure 4.2. This architecture divides the software controlling the robot
into three levels: decisional, execution and functional. The distinct feature of the LAAS archi-
tecture is the functional level, which encapsulates groups of sensors into modules, which can
communicate with other modules via a service link; these modules can be added, removed and
amended as necessary. One of the key safety features of this architecture is the execution control
level (Ingrand and Py., 2002). This level is executed synchronously with the decisional level and
is responsible for detecting faults that may occur as a result of a decision being executed. If a
potential fault is detected then this decision is prevented from being passed to the functional
level.
The control system architectures discussed in this section are designed to divide the system
processes into distinct modules. This separation can be of the decisional, execution and func-
tional processes, as with `three layer' type architectures; or modules which dene specic system
behaviour, as with subsumption type architectures. No separation of safety processes exist in
these architectures, although as stated, the LAAS architecture provides a method for detecting
faults. The section that follows builds on the concept of hierarchical modular control architec-
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Figure 4.2: LAAS architecture (Bensalem et al., 2009).
tures and discusses how it could be adapted for use as a safety control architecture for HRI
robots. This will involve extending the current modular approach, so that not only decisional
and execution parts of the control system are modularised, but also processes associated with
safety.
4.1.1 Safety Architecture Design
At this point a number of dierent types of control architecture have been discussed. Compar-
isons have been made and possible strengths and weaknesses have been addressed. This analysis
has produced a number of design factors that would be important when considering safety in
robot control architectures. A list of these factors are as follows:
 Hierarchical structure, with separate safety and control modules
 Safety modules designed to maximise re-usability and minimise re-testing
 Safety modules should be independent of task modules, allowing for the task specications
to be changed, without compromising the safety of the robot
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 Compatibility with any controller type, i.e. PID, neural network, fuzzy logic
 Appropriate for any robot hardware comprised of sensors and actuators
Taking these consideration into account, a number of new architecture designs have been
created. A full list of these architecture designs can be seen in Appendix B. Each iteration of the
architecture design, aims to both maximise the interaction between individual layers within the
control system, while maintaining a separation from elements that could aect the independent
safety processes. A number of these architecture designs were ultimately rejected as they did not
allow for safety processes to execute in parallel. This was reasoned to be an important part of
the design of the safety control architecture, as it was anticipated that a personal robot system
would require a large number of safety modules. Therefore, if they could not be executed in
parallel, the system would become slower with each additional safety module.
The nal system architecture design, prior to the initial implementation phase, is shown in
Figure 4.3. The main characteristics of the design are as follows:
Safety and task layers are separated: The main dierence between the proposed architec-
ture designs and the current established hierarchical architectures, is that the safety pro-
cesses and task / control processes will be separated into layers. The principle reason for
this is to enable designers to construct a safety system independent to the control system.
This concept will be developed in stages throughout this thesis.
Multiple safety and task modules: Each safety and task layer will be made up of a number
of modules. This will allow for new system elements to be added and existing modules to
be removed or amended.
All layers have access to sensor data: All layers will have access to all sensor data. This
is required so each layer can make independent decisions based on the state of the envi-
ronment.
Hierarchical structure, with safety layers having highest priority: A hierarchical struc-
ture will be used to organise the layers that should have priority over others. As safety is
the primary concern of this architecture design, these layers will have priority over control
layers.
Ability to suppress actions of lower layers: The actions of lower layers can be suppressed
by higher priority layers (behaviour arbitration). Although this does mean that higher
priority task layers will be able to suppress lower level task layers, it will be used primarily
to allow safety layers to suppress the actions of task layers.
Layers are prohibited from altering data or injecting commands into other layers:
One design principle of Brooks' subsumption architecture (Toal et al., 1996) is that lower
layers can alter higher layers by injecting commands. This is not appropriate for our safety
Chapter 4. Preliminary Research 46
architecture design as this would make layers behave dierently from how they would be-
have when tested independently. For example if the safety layer outputs information that
a human is in close proximity, another layer cannot alter this information.
A lower priority layer cannot aect a higher priority layer: In no circumstance will a
lower priority layer be able to aect the actions of a higher priority layer. This is dierent
to the previous point, as it covers interactions other than altering data and injecting
commands. For example suppressing actions, which can only be done by higher priority
layers.
Event information is available to all layers: A criticism made of other robot control ar-
chitectures is that only limited information is passed between layers. To allow the system
to make informed decisions, information such as suppression details, warnings, advisory
details, will be made available to all layers. This information channel will be used primarily
by the task layers to check if and why actions have been suppressed.
Event information can be used for learning and adaptation: If the control system is to
adapt to new situations and learn from past experiences, it seems likely that it will need
access to all the event history that was used in making decisions. Although beyond the
scope of this project, allowances will be made in the architecture to provide easy access to
all event and timing information. This access will be read only to prevent any alterations
of the data by the control layer.
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Figure 4.3: Safety control architecture.
As has been discussed, the rationale behind the separation of safety and control systems is
to add exibility to the design and implementation of the robot system. This modular approach
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will allow for parts of the system to be designed and implemented independently, and provide a
logical way of distributing the computer processing across multiple hardware systems.
As the research into personal robot safety progressed during this study, these preliminary
architecture designs needed further development. This development was based on additional
requirements identied during preliminary experimentation and analysis of personal robots in
real world scenarios. The main changes made to the architecture design, was a technique for
handling sensor data and a method for modularising safety processes. The nal architecture
design, discussed in Chapter 6, was used for the main experiments presented in Chapter 7.
The section that follows discusses a series of evaluating experiments that were conducted to
help further develop and rene the architecture designs.
4.2 Preliminary Experimentation
This section presents an initial set of experiments that were conducted to evaluate how safety
processes could be organised in a personal robot control architecture. The goal of these experi-
ments was to identify to what extent safety could be separated from control. These preliminary
experiments were generally treated as preparation for more thorough experiments (presented in
Chapter 7). The ultimate aim was to establish the general principles of the project and identify
the direction that further research should take.
4.2.1 Task Design
In order to evaluate the design of each safety architecture, it was necessary to consider how
real-world tasks would be performed by a personal robot. The design of these tasks should cover
a wide range of hazardous issues that may arise while working in close proximity to a robot.
Theoretically robots could be used to perform a huge variety of tasks depending on their
capabilities. These tasks could be ones which are currently performed everyday by humans,
more hazardous types or even ones that cannot be performed by humans as the risk is too great.
For this project only everyday tasks traditionally performed by humans are considered.
As throughout this thesis, here we are only considering complex robots, whose dimensions,
mass and power are such that they pose an inherent safety risk to humans, for example the
MobileRobots PeopleBot or the Willow Garage PR2. However, it is interesting to note that
smaller robots, such as the iRobot Roomba robot vacuum cleaner, which do not pose a high
safety risk based on their size, might if they were larger. As these robots are signicantly limited
to how much detritus they can pick up and therefore are not really t for purpose, it is likely
that the manufactures were unable to produce a larger robot that could be certied as safe to
be sold to the general public. Although no statement conrming this by any manufacturers of
robot vacuum cleaners has been found.
As a starting point, the research by Wyrobek et al. (2008) presents a number of tasks that
have been specied for the development of a robotics development platform for personal robots.
The following is a list of these tasks:
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 Around the House: doing the dishes, tidying up, handling laundry, cleaning
 Ageing Populations: carrying heavy things, remembering where things are, retrieving
items, preparing food, cleaning
 Assisting People with Disabilities: telemanipulation, feeding, doing chores, monitoring
health and activity
 Operations: Behind-the-counter food service, pick and pack tasks, stocking grocery stores,
tracking inventory, retrieving items, maintaining a searchable physical le system
A methodical analysis of how a personal robot could carry out these types of tasks revealed
a number of hazards that may impact safety (details of the methodology used is presented in
Section 5.1.2). It was found that these hazards could be broadly categorised as either `direct' or
`indirect'. Direct hazards are attributed to events that are directly associated with the robot.
Indirect hazards are those that occur as a secondary eect of an action taken by the robot, either
actively or associated with the robot passively. A passive hazard is one that occurs without the
robot taking action, for example a user tripping over the robot's wheels. The main hazards
which were identied are described in Table 4.1.
Direct Hazards
Collision with human user
Collision with surrounding objects
Collision with other humans (non-user)
Dropping an object
Burning caused by prolonged application of heat, i.e. while ironing
Indirect Hazards
Dropping or moving an object (which subsequently causes a hazard)
Causing a human to move into a dangerous situation
Spillage while moving an object
Obstructing a walkway or safety device, i.e. emergency exit; re extinguisher
Table 4.1: Types of hazards that may aect personal robots.
To evaluate a robot's ability to deal with hazards, it is important that the task selected for
the experiments, covers one or more of the hazard types. However, it was assumed that further,
possibly more pertinent issues, would be identied during experimentation. These issues were
recorded and are discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.
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4.2.2 Task Selection
In the early stages of the project, two relatively simple robot tasks were selected for trialling the
safety architecture designs. The diagrams in Figure 4.4 shows a plan view of the setup of these
tasks. The rst task (Figure 4.4a) uses an autonomous mobile robot, to follow a predened
path, stopping at specic location while avoiding collisions. This type of low-functioning robot
is generally referred to as an automated guided vehicle (AGV). The second task (Figure 4.4b)
required a xed robot arm to pick up an object and carry it to a human user, where it is then
deposited. The ow charts in Figure 4.5 describes the decision process that the robot controller
uses to orchestrate each element of the task.
(a) Automated guided vehicle (AGV). (b) Robot arm xed to a table.
Figure 4.4: Robot tasks explanatory diagrams.
The basis of both the tasks presented here were inspired by watching actual robots being used.
At the Xerox manufacturing plant an AGV was observed carrying parts from one manufacturing
bay to another, by following a metal cable located beneath the oor of the building. Although
the HRI was minimal, it did demonstrate one of the important safety principles identied in
the literature, which is avoiding human collisions. Although, it must be noted that the robots
were unable to discriminate between humans and other objects. The inspiration of the robot
arm task came from observing the Barrett WAM (Whole-Arm Manipulation) robotic arm that
is located in the Bristol Robotics Laboratory (BRL). The WAM arm is equipped with powerful
motors, which allow it to carry a payload of up to 4 kg and extend its arm up to 2 metres from
the base (Rooks, 2006). It was immediately apparent watching the robot move an item from
one location to another that its technical capabilities meant it would be able to carry out many
types of HRI tasks. However, the attributes of the robot, which made it good for HRI, also gave
it the potential for causing serious harm.
It is important to note that tasks outlined here and the tools available to conduct the
experiments were not completely compatible. The tasks could have been re-written so that an
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Stop robot
Wait for set time
Follow circuit
Is `stop’ marker
detected?
No
Yes
(a) AGV following pre-
predened path.
?
(b) Robot arm picking up and passing object to human.
Figure 4.5: Robot tasks ow diagrams.
exact correspondence between task and tools was made. However, this would have resulted in
disjointed task process that was dicult to understand. Instead, all the elements of the task
are represented in the experiments, but are not necessarily conducted as a single process. To
accomplish this, experiments were conducted in both simulation and with real hardware. This
is discussed further in the sections that follows.
4.2.3 2D Simulation Environment
To evaluate the dierent types of control architecture discussed in this chapter, a 2D simulation
environment was used. This simulation environment, created during this project (see Chapter 3
for details), implements a simple robot arm that can move up, down, left and right. The arm,
shown in Figure 4.6, also includes a gripper that can be opened and closed around an object.
The simulator was used exclusively for the robot arm task, prior to any hardware being used.
When hardware was made available, further trials were conducted.
The arm controller has been designed to pick up an object from table 1 and move the object
to table 2. As Figure 4.7 shows, the arm follows a simple path, rst horizontally until table 2 is
reached and then vertically to the nal destination.
In the presence of a hazard the safety-layer suppresses the arm controller in the direction
of the hazard. This suppression happens only when the arm comes into close proximity to the
hazard and the suppression is removed when a safe distance has been reached. This is illustrated
by Figure 4.8, where it can be seen that the robot has taken a path around the hazard.
Although this simulation proved useful and had much potential to be extended to enable
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Figure 4.6: 2D simulator { Collect object from table 1.
further experimentation, it was decided that the time required would be better used for experi-
menting with a 3D environment.
4.2.4 Hardware Setup
As was discussed in Section 4.2.2, the tasks selected for these experiments were based on high-
end robotic equipment. Although budgetary restraints prevented the use of those robots, careful
consideration of how the available equipment could be used yielded good alternatives.
Both the robotic arm and the mobile robot were created using the Lego NXT construction
set, with a number of additional sensors. Further details of the development of these robots are
discussed in Chapter 3.
Prior to the initial implementation phase it was decided that the robot controllers should
be developed to interface with both the simulated robot and the real physical robot. This was
important, as if the identical control code was not used for each platform, then testing results
could not be deemed reliable. The simplied diagram in Figure 4.9 illustrates how interfacing
between hardware and simulation is organised.
At this stage of the research, the tasks were relatively simple, which meant that the controllers
could be developed using traditional control routines. These routines essentially compared
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Figure 4.7: 2D simulator { Move object to table 2.
predened trigger values with sensor reading values, which produced events that activated the
actuators. These controllers were subsequently integrated into the safety control architecture
implementations.
4.2.5 Experimental Findings
In order to compare the architecture designs it was thought necessary to record a number of
metrics. These could then be used to make an evaluation based on the eectiveness of the design
in controlling the robot safely, while completing each task in a satisfactory time frame. This
process would yield a score rating for each controller, which could then be used in a comparison
to nd the most eective architecture design. Elements of the implemented system, which were
to be recorded are as follows:
 Task completion time
 Number of direct safety issues
 Number of indirect safety issues
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Figure 4.8: 2D simulator { Moving around hazard.
Robot 
Controller
Hardware
Robot
Interface
Simulated
Robot
Interface
Figure 4.9: Interfacing with physical and simulated robot.
However, it was found that quantitative comparisons of the type discussed, revealed little
about the strengths and weaknesses of the architecture designs. Instead they highlighted de-
ciencies in the implementation. This is not to say that the architectures were implemented
incorrectly, but that the control systems could be constructed in such a way that each design
could be made to complete the task in a similar time frame, with the same number of safety
issues. Although these were not the expected results of the trials, it did reveal that the ac-
tual controller was not necessarily the driving factor in maintaining safety. Instead it was the
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information from the sensors and how they were being used in the safety processes that was
important.
These initial experiments highlighted a number of the strengths and weaknesses of the various
architecture designs. This led to the modularisation of the safety processes to better organise
them within the safety layer. The example in Figure 4.10 shows the safety layer made up of two
safety modules, which monitors the robot arm, wheel and gripper. As the diagram illustrates,
both safety modules monitor the gripper. Therefore, if either (but not both) modules fail, safety
is maintained for the gripper. In addition, as the sensor input of each module is slightly dierent,
a number of sensors (cam 2, sonar 1 or sonar 2) can fail, without compromising safety.
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Figure 4.10: Safety control architecture { Diverse safety modules with redundancy.
The example of Figure 4.10 illustrates that redundancy can be conveniently added to a
system, by simply adding additional safety modules. One of the benets of this technique is
that safety modules can be designed for a sensor and actuator combination, regardless of the type
of system (robot or otherwise), and then added to another system as a pre-tested and proven
safety unit. However, it is anticipated that the safety unit would require a level of customisation
dependent on the dynamics of the target system.
Implementing this modied architecture design revealed that although many of the design
consideration are similar to the Brooks' Subsumption Architecture (Brooks, 1999), the ability
for lower layers to change upper layers must not be allowed. This was due to an issue that
was identied that if a safety module was proven to be safe, then allowing lower layers to make
changes would invalidate the overall safety of that particular module. This was demonstrated by
having the control layer alter the `allowed distance' value in the `maintain safe distance' safety
module, which resulted in a collision.
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4.3 Environmental Survey
During the initial stages of this project an environmental survey was conducted to help under-
stand the types of hazards that a personal robot may encounter during its day-to-day activities.
This involved visiting a number of locations that a personal robot may be required to operate
in the future. These were: a home, a cafe and an electronics factory shop oor. These locations
were chosen based on their diversity in both environmental conditions and the number of people
that would normally be present. Although these surveys are focused on safety, they are by
no means to be used as a record of any health and safety issues with the particular locations.
For this reason the precise identity of the locations (i.e. the address or company name) has
been omitted from the thesis. Although careful consideration was given to the selection of the
locations, it is likely that the ndings would be improved by additional surveys.
The ndings from the environmental survey are presented in Appendix C, an extract of which
is provided in Table 4.2. The importance of these ndings are not so much the specic types
of hazards that were identied, but instead the large number and concentration of potential
hazards in relatively small environments.
Of the environments surveyed, the electronics factory shop oor contained the fewest poten-
tial hazards and the lowest risk to humans from the perspective of a personal robot. However,
as it was a commercial environment containing dangerous machinery, it was both heavily struc-
tured and had the most restrictions on people and objects that were allowed in the environment.
In comparison the cafe had less restrictions and structuring, but posed a higher risks to humans
from the addition of a personal robot. This is due to the volume of humans, the narrow walkways
and the fast pace of both customers and employees. Both the cafe and the home environment
some structure, but as tables and chairs took up a large part of the oor area, the structure
could be changed very quickly. The results of the environmental survey give a clear picture of
the safety challenge that unstructured environments present for personal robot systems.
The main observation of the survey, which was not anticipated from the initial cursory
environment assessment, was that practically every object that a robot could potentially come
into contact with, could be considered hazardous. Additionally, the safety risks associated with
humans were known to some extent, but no consideration was given to any benet. For example,
the more humans that are present, the more chance that a person would raise an alarm if the
robot presented a problem. However, this benet may be argued to be inconsequential compared
to the added risk associated with the presence of additional people.
Although the environmental survey identied a large number of potential hazards, the risk
associated with each varies greatly. Two of the more signicant safety risks that a personal
robot would likely be faced with, is falling down one or more steps and spreading re (re could
be caused by the robot, i.e. electrical fault, or the robot passing a re source and either itself
or something it's carrying catching re). Both these safety events could easily lead to severe
damage to humans the environment and the robot. Preventing these events occurring is of
course part of the hazard analysis process. However, from this survey it is recommended that
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Home (Living Room)
Hot drink on small table
Glass aquarium
Large rug (7 mm step)
Cafe (Seating Area)
Steps down from seating area to entrance
20+ hot drinks, milk jugs
People's ages ranged from very young (months old) to elderly
Electronics Factory (Shop Floor)
Areas restricted by signs (both on the walls and the oor)
Noisy environment (fans and machinery)
No windows, all lighting from orescent strip-lights
Table 4.2: Extract of the environmental survey (see Appendix C).
all personal robots should be tted with sensors to detect steps and to detect re.
The problem of a robot falling down steps is a good example of how one safety issue can
aect the design of a system or require an environment to be structured. As the consequence
of this safety event could cause serious injury or potentially death to one or more humans, the
event must not be allowed to occur. Therefore, the sensors used to detect stairs, must be reliable,
and the robot must not travel faster than the sensors can be processed. Although it may be
relatively simple to identify stairs when the robot is in close proximity, it may be dangerous
to allow a robot to get that close, especially if people are using the stairs. This demonstrates
another issue revealed by the environmental survey, which is that in some environments, such
as that witnessed at the cafe, the number of humans can vary signicantly. This causes all sorts
of issues, for example a robot stopping at the top of a ight of stairs may not be an issue when
there are only a couple of humans present, but as the number using the stairs increases, the
probability that the crowd causes the robot to fall down the stairs also increases.
While conducting the environmental survey at the cafe, it was observed how humans cope
with other humans when space is limited, and the safety events that often occur. The following
list outlines these observations:
 knocking people's chairs when passing
 Steadying themselves on tables, chairs and other people
 Colliding with people
 Spilling drinks
 Dropping food and other items
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 Children carried from point to point
The majority of these issues seemed to be caused by lack of space. It was clearly apparent
from observing the interactions between people, that if humans required contact to move around
the environment then a robot would not be able to operate safely. Furthermore, the time when
the robot could operate without a high chance of collision would be so low as to render the robot
eectively immobile. This is an extremely important observation, as it means that one of the
following conditions must be met if a personal robot is to operate in a busy environment with
restricted space:
 Environment restructuring
 Restricting robot to only certain areas (or in a xed position)
 Allowing the robot to come into contact with humans
Allowing robots to come into contact with humans raises a number of issues, which are
beyond this scope of this project. However, based on the environmental survey of the cafe
and other similar environments, it seems that allowing contact between robots and humans
may be the only way for personal robots to operate in certain environments without extensive
restructuring.
The environmental surveys proved invaluable for helping to think more about what in an
environment could potentially be a hazard. Although only three environmental surveys were
formally recorded during this project, many other locations were considered. This initial work
proved valuable for dening the scope and direction of the research. The ndings of this section
form the basis of a technique for aiding the hazard analysis process. This is discussed in-depth
in Section 5.1.1.
Many of the hazardous situations described in this section can be thought of as `worst case
scenarios', which as the phrase suggests, are highly undesirable and must be avoided. The section
that follows discusses worst case scenarios in more detail, and argues why this is of particular
importance to personal robots.
4.3.1 Worst Case Reasoning
Considering worst case scenarios is something regularly done by safety personnel of all industries.
In the aviation industry safety engineers must consider all scenarios that may compromise the
safety of the aircraft, if there is even a remote chance that they may occur. For personal robots
operating in unstructured environments the number of worst case scenarios is considerable. This
is due to the number of potentially dangerous objects in the environment, and the proximity of
the robot to humans. For other safety critical systems, humans are usually isolated from danger
or the environment heavily structured.
In the previous section an example hazardous scenario was described, where a robot fails to
identify a set of steps and falls down the steps causing injury to one or more humans. As steps
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are a feature of many indoor and outdoor environments, it is clear from this example that the
robot must be capable of avoiding this hazard.
Another important dierence between current safety critical systems and personal robots,
is that they are likely to be exposed to people of all ages. Although this point was alluded
to in the previous section, it is of such critical importance it is worth exploring further here.
This concerns the safety of babies, children and the elderly, all of whom have varying levels of
dependency. For babies, they are completely reliant on their care givers, and therefore unable
to avoid any dangerous situations. If we consider the following worst case scenario. A robot
is delivering a hot drink to a table where there is a baby in a bassinet on a chair next to its
parent. The risk to the baby in this example is clearly evident. If a human was delivering the
drink it would most likely identify the baby as something that it must take extra care around
and therefore would not place the drink in its vicinity. However, the only way a robot could
make a similar decision, was if it could recognise that there was a baby present, and that the
baby required extra precaution.
It is clear from this example that if the robot cannot make distinctions between dierent
hazardous situations, then for it to be considered safe, it must logically have to always operate
in a `worst case scenario' mode.
This discussion of worst case scenarios and environmental hazards will be continued in Sec-
tion 5.1.
4.4 Research Questions
This preliminary work completed in the early stages of the project proved essential for un-
derstanding how robot control architectures are designed, developed and implemented. Fur-
thermore, it demonstrated the diculty of identifying what safety issues a personal robot may
encounter, and how these issues could be both understood by the robot and handled appropri-
ately.
Therefore, based on the review of current research and the preliminary experimentations,
the following supporting questions to this research have been formulated:
 How can one identify all the safety issues that a robot may encounter during operation?
(see Section 5.1)
 Can safety processes and control routines be separated in a robot control system? (see
Chapter 6)
 Can the safety layer be entirely responsible for controlling the robot safety, with the control
layer taking a secondary role, solely responsible for task orchestration and completion? (see
Chapter 6)
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4.5 Summary
From this preliminary investigation it has been found that it is possible to split a robot controller
into two parts, one which handles safety and one which controls the robot in carrying out its
tasks. Although this was mooted in Section 2.3.2, the degree to which safety and control could
be separated, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied. The ability to separate safety
routines from control routines opens up many possibilities on how a system is developed. This
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
The environmental surveys, conducted during this preliminary research stage, revealed the
diculty of identifying all safety issues associated with a robot system operating in a human
environment. This initial work proved key in deciding the focus of the research. The following
chapter builds on the environmental survey ndings (Section 4.3) and examines methods for
conducting hazard analysis for personal robots. This is followed by a discussion of a technique
for identifying and recording safety requirements.
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CHAPTER 5
Robot Safety Requirements: Identifying and
Organising
This chapter discusses dierent approaches for identifying safety requirements for personal
robots. Initially traditional techniques are considered and the strengths and weaknesses of
each are presented. This analysis is used to identify areas that could be improved or combined
to aid developers in identifying safety requirements more reliably.
The work builds on the ndings of Chapter 4, focusing on how robot safety can be described
in general terms that are applicable for a wide range of robots, tasks and environments. Two
novel approaches for aiding in the identication and subsequent organisation of safety policies
are presented. These and other techniques form the basis of a new methodology for capturing
safety requirements and subsequently integrating them into a control system.
The chapter that follows discusses a novel control system architecture, which makes extensive
use of the techniques for organising safety requirements introduced in this chapter. These two
chapters are so closely linked, that it is essential that a brief outline of this control system is
given in this chapter (Section 5.2). This should aid in the understanding of why certain decisions
were made in the way safety requirements are both captured and organised.
5.1 Hazard Analysis of Personal Robots
As discussed previously, hazard analysis involves assessing the system requirements with the aim
of identifying potential hazards associated with system operation. Before hazard analysis can
take place, the system specication must be produced. This involves rst outlining the customer
requirements, which can then be used to perform task analysis. These complementary processes
result in a document specifying exactly what the system should do and how it will do it. From
this document the functional requirements are identied. These requirements relate to the way
in which tasks will be performed by the system, and the transformation from system input to
system output. Once a requirement specication is available hazard analysis can take place,
although as with many development methodologies requirements may be revised at any time.
In the literature review (Section 2.2.2) we established that there are currently no hazard
analysis techniques designed specically for personal robots. Furthermore, it was seen that
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Num. Description Severity
HN4 Fall of the patient without alarm or with a late alarm. Severe
HN5
Physiological problem of the patient without alarm or with 
a late alarm.
Severe
HN6 Fall of the patient caused by the robot. Severe
HN7
Failure to switch to safe mode when a problem is 
detected. The robot keeps moving.
Severe
HN1 Incorrect position of the patient during robot use. Serious
HN2 Fall of the patient during robot use. Serious
HN3 Robot shutdown during its use. Serious
HN8 Robot parts catching patient or clothes Serious
HN9
Collision between the robot (or robot part) and the 
patient.
Serious
HN10
Collision between the robot and a person other than the 
patient.
Serious
HN11 Disturbance of medical staff during an intervention Moderate
HN12 Patient loses her balance due to the robot Moderate
HN13 Patient fatigue Minor
Figure 5.1: MIRAS project hazard classes and their associated severities (Guiochet et al., 2010).
current hazard analysis techniques do not adequately identify hazards associated with a robot
operating in an unstructured environment. This is typied by the work of Do Hoang et al. (2012),
who present one of the few published attempts to perform hazard analysis for a personal robot.
Their work considers the MIRAS RobuWalker, which is a robotic assistant for helping people
rise from a seated position and support them while walking. The RobuWalker has automated
and user controlled modes. The user controlled mode is applied when the human is supported
by the robot in a standing position. The automated mode is used when the human is in a seated
position. When in this mode the user can request the robot to move from its stored position,
which could be anywhere in the room, to the location where the human making the request is
located. This involves the robot navigating itself through the environment with no assistance
from the user.
Hazard analysis was conducted for RobuWalker task and a number of hazard classes were
identied (see Figure 5.1) (Guiochet et al., 2010). These hazard classes represent the main areas
of risk associated with the robot in performing its task. As these results show, no consideration
has been given to risks outside the task scenario. Therefore, the hazard analysis has overlooked
hazards that may occur as a result of non-task related events. For example other humans in the
environment, dangerous items in the environment and humans deliberately interfering with the
robot. These and other similar issues will be discussed at length throughout this section.
Failure to consider safety risks outside the normal operating scenarios was also identied in
the only other two examples of hazard analysis of personal robots identied in the literature.
The rst example applied HAZOP to a therapeutic robot for disabled children (Bohm and
Gruber, 2010). The hazard analysis examined how the child and robot would interact and
considered the potential hazards. However, as with the previous example, no consideration is
given to the types of hazard that the robot may encounter outside the predened tasks. The
nal example, is based on the ndings of the PHRIENDS project (Alami et al., 2006; Martin-
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Guillerez et al., 2010). During this project they performed hazard analysis for a wheel-based
mobile robot with a manipulator arm that was designed to pick up and move objects around
the environment, and work collaboratively with a human user. The robot was designed to safely
navigate a dynamic environment that could contain multiple humans. This represents the largest
scale hazard analysis of a personal robot found in the literature. Their analysis considered the
safety risks of the robot from a number of positions, including the potential hazards of each
major component of the robot failing, the risks associated with human users, and the types and
severity of collisions that may occur. However, as with the other two examples, they did not
consider many of the complexities of the environment that would be outside the scope of the
robot task. For example humans behaving incorrectly on purpose, the robot catching re, or
changes in environmental conditions.
The following section further discusses the issues with hazard analysis raised in this section.
Potential solutions are given for addressing these issues and a number of methods are proposed.
These methods are designed to be complementary to the current established hazard analysis
processes. This is followed by a discussion of the hazard analysis conducted during this project.
5.1.1 Hazard Check List
Safety and domain experts are usually involved heavily with hazard analysis and throughout
the development process. This seems logical, as an experienced person would generally have
a better insight into specic problems that they have encountered previously. However, as all
people have dierent abilities, in knowledge retention, understanding and decision making, it is
vital that well dened processes are used to ensure consistency.
Hazard analyses require safety engineers to consider all of the possible interactions the sys-
tem may have with the environment. This process can be extremely time consuming and con-
sequently costly. To reduce the analysis eort, designers often opt to alter the environment,
rather than make extensive changes to the system. However, personal robots will be required
to operate in environments where structuring is undesirable or not possible. Therefore, new
methods for identifying all of the hazards associated with dynamic unstructured environments
are needed.
In this section we introduce a hazard check list as a tool to aid in the identication of
hazards associated with unstructured environments. The hazard check list (see Appendix D)
is composed of a number of points that robot designers should consider when making design
decisions. In particular, this involves consideration of non-mission tasks, which can be thought
of as any environmental interaction outside the intended operation of the robot. However, many
of the points are applicable to the whole robot life-cycle. This work builds on previous research
by Woodman et al. (2012).
An extract of the hazard check list is shown in Table 5.1. It was created after careful
examination of a number of typical environments that a personal robot could be required to
operate in. A combination of experience and brainstorming was used to analyse how a robot
may carry out tasks in these environments and what hazards it may encounter. This analysis
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process was formalised into a environmental survey methodology, which is discussed in detail
in Section 5.1.2. This examination of typical environments, or environmental surveys as it is
referred to in this thesis, was introduced in Section 4.3. The environments surveyed were: a
home, a cafe and an electronics factory shop oor. These environments are in no way exhaustive
and it is likely the check list will benet from additional examples added over time. Results of
the environmental surveys are included in Appendix C.
Although a robot was not used to perform tasks in these environments, we did consider the
dimensions and capabilities of the Care-O-bot 3 mobile robot (Graf et al., 2009). This robot
was selected over others such as the Willow Garage PR2 (Rooks, 2006), as it is narrower and its
manipulator can be stowed away, allowing it to navigate more cluttered environments with less
structuring required. An example robot was benecial, as it helped us understand how a robot
would operate within space limitations and in the presence of typical hazards.
Element Remark
Environmental Boundaries: Floor
Movable (grass, soil, gravel, rug) Wheel slippage
Transparent / translucent (glass walk ways) May cause issues with identication
Varying heights (major, minor) May make robot unstable
Environmental Boundaries: Working Area
Doorways (width, steps, change oor surface) Identify, traverse, drive over
Hot equipment (open res, boilers) Recognition, avoidance if necessary
Obstacles [exible] (curtains, table cloth) Identify, traverse, drive through
Users: General
Vandalism Break sensors / safety devices
Children (grabbing, climbing) May not understand safety instructions
Deaf (fully, partially) May not hear voice instructions
Table 5.1: Extract of the hazard check list (see Appendix D).
The hazard check list was rst conceived after performing hazard analysis on a number of
robot systems (see Section 5.1.3). After this formal hazard analysis process was complete, a
number of additional hazards were identied. These hazards were not found during the formal
hazard analysis process, but instead were found during group discussions on some of the practical
aspects of operating the robot in the real world. For example none of the systematic approaches
that were considered would have identied hazards associated with a human user having wet
clothes due to rain. Research by Martin-Guillerez et al. (2010) has sought to address this and
other issues by using modelling techniques such as UML `use case' diagrams to visualise the
interactions that can occur between the robot and humans. However, it is unclear how these
diagrams could improve the identication of hazards associated with the robot, humans and the
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environment.
It proved dicult to nd any examples of check lists of the type presented in this section used
in robotics. One example that was found for medical robots is presented in the Report of AAPM
TG 135: quality assurance for robotic radiosurgery (Dieterich et al., 2011). In this document a
check list is provided, which provides suggestions for a clinical medical physicist to help them
develop a quality assurance program for dealing with a medical robot device. Although this
document is looking at a dierent aspect of robot safety, it demonstrates how check lists can be
used as a tool to aid designers and safety engineers.
The section that follows presents the methodology developed for performing environmental
surveys for personal robot applications.
5.1.2 Environmental Survey Methodology
To perform rigorous environmental surveys it was important to develop a formal methodology.
Having a well dened methodology allowed us to perform consistent analysis and provides other
researchers with a process to follow. The methodology presented in this section builds on the
preliminary environmental survey work discussed in Section 4.2.1.
The purpose of the environmental surveys was to identify risks that a personal robot may
encounter while performing its duties. Therefore, it seemed logical to rst assess the environment
from the point of view of the robot. This involved analysis of how the robot would perform tasks,
what hazards it would encounter and the required types of human interaction.
The environmental survey methodology is shown in Figure 5.2. It incorporates concepts
from the Contextual Design process developed by Beyer and Holtzblatt (1998). Contextual
Design is a customer-centred process used for developing hardware and software systems. It
uses data gathered from and about customers as a base criteria for system development. This
involves not only asking the customer questions on how they perform tasks and what issues they
have, but making detail observations of how the customer actually performs the tasks. Making
observations of the system operating in context (i.e. in the environment it is being developed
for) is an essential part of Contextual Design, as Beyer et al. (2004) state, \Don't ask them to
talk about their work out of context. Go to their workplace and watch what they do, discussing
it with them. Represent their voice in the data and design to the data.".
There are three main actives that make up the environmental survey methodology, these
are: `requirements analysis'; `environmental analysis'; and `team analysis'. Throughout each of
these activities, one should be considering how the robot will perform in the environment and
what safety issues it will encounter.
Requirements analysis involves dening what the robot will be required to do and how it will
achieve its goals. To perform analysis of the robot's environment, it was important to dene
the robot's dimensions and capabilities. For the personal robot scenarios being studied for this
research, the robot's dimensions and capabilities could be dened in many dierent ways to suit
the tasks. Therefore, it was decided that a real personal robot should be used as a reference.
Using a real robot's characteristics helped with scenario development and for analysing how the
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Figure 5.2: Environmental survey methodology.
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robot would perform tasks in the real environment.
Environmental analysis involves assessing the environment for potential safety issues. Al-
though observations of the environment proved useful for identifying many risks, a number of
other risks were only identied while using role-playing. This involved navigating the environ-
ment and performing tasks in the same way as the robot would be required to do. The nal
part of the environmental analysis involves interviewing people who will be interacting with the
robot; in the methodology these have been identied as the stakeholders. This leads into the
nal activity of the methodology, which is team analysis. This again involves role-playing, but
in this case from the perspective of the various stakeholders. Finally group discussions should
be conducted in order to review the various analyses results.
The next section discusses the hazard analysis technique used during this project. This
involved using the hazard analysis check list in combination with more traditional techniques.
Particular focus is given to the safety requirements identied during the hazard analysis process.
The remainder of this chapter will then explore in more detail how safety requirements can be
described and organised.
5.1.3 Identifying Safety Requirements
To perform hazard analysis we chose to use elements of a variant of the HAZOP method called
SHARD (Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design) (Fenelon et al., 1994); along
with the hazard check list that we have devised (Appendix D). The SHARD process, as with
HAZOP, involves systematically analysing each system function using a set of key words to guide
the process. SHARD is a variant of HAZOP intended for use with software-based systems, and
employs keywords that are better suited to identication of software failure behaviour (Mcdermid
et al., 1995).
An example of a hazard analysis document that was produced during this research is given
in Appendix E. This document examines the hazards associated with an autonomous robot that
is tasked with picking up an object from one location and depositing it in another location. For
each hazard consequence that is deemed a risk, one or more safety requirements are proposed.
In this document the hazards that are identied as a result of using the hazard check list are
highlighted. This is explored in more detail in Section 7.1.
The ndings of both the environmental surveys and hazard analyses showed that the majority
of safety risks can be minimised or removed by stopping the robot from moving. However, in
some situations this may not always be the safest option. The main safety issue with the robot
stopping, is that it can pose a safety risk even in a static state. For example, if the robot stops
while helping somebody in a seated position, it may prevent that person standing up. It could
also be dangerous if the robot blocks walk ways or stops at the top of steps. There are also issue
with the robot stopping while carrying out manipulation tasks. For example, if the robot was
pouring a hot drink, it may be safer to retract its arm instead of simply stopping, risking the
user being burned. Although situations where it may not be safe for the robot to stop have been
identied, it is not clear what the impact for safety of the robot, not stopping to mitigate these
Chapter 5. Robot Safety Requirements: Identifying and Organising 68
Frequent
Probable
Occasional
Remote
Catastrophic Critical
Incredible
Improbable
NegligibleMarginal
Consequence
Frequency
I II
III
IV
I I I
I
I
II
II
II
III
IV IVIVIV
IV
IVIII
III III
III
III
Table 5.2: Risk classication table (based on table B1 of IEC 61508 (IEC 61508, 2000)).
specic risks, may have on other potential risks. If we consider the example of a robot pouring
a drink, then in some situations the robot retracting its arm may cause a safety risk, where the
risks would have been reduced if it simply stopped. Determining these consequential safety risks
would require a deep analysis of all the possible situations that the robot may be operating in.
Therefore, in the remainder of this thesis, we will be assuming that the safest course of action
for the robot is to stop all movement.
As discussed we believe there are currently no hazard analysis methods available that guar-
antee the identication of all hazards associated with a personal robot. Techniques have been
developed for manufacturing robots and other similar mechanical devices. However, as it has
been shown, these techniques fail to capture many of the hazards associated with personal
robots. Although the approach we have outlined does not completely solve this problem, it has
been shown to capture hazards that are not directly associated with the robot's task, which
were not captured using traditional hazard analysis techniques alone.
5.1.3.1 Assigning Risk Values to Safety Requirements
To assess the risk of each hazard consequence identied during hazard analysis, we used a qual-
itative risk classication matrix based on the example presented in the safety standard IEC
61508 `Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Sys-
tems' (IEC 61508, 2000). This classication matrix is presented in Table 5.2. The matrix is
organised into a series of columns, which dene the hazard consequence severity, and rows de-
noting the frequency that the hazard could occur. Where a row and column intersect determines
the risk class. Four risk classes are possible, from the most severe (Class I) to the least (Class
IV). These classes and a description of each are shown in Table 5.3.
The process of assigning risks classes involves examining each hazard identied during hazard
analysis and determining both the frequency with which the hazard is likely to occur and the
severity of the consequences associated with the hazard. If the risk class is found to be either
Class I (intolerable) or Class II (undesirable), then a safety requirement must be produced,
which details how the risk will be reduced to Class IV (negligible) or Class III (tolerable). In
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Class I Intolerable risk
Class II Undesirable risk, and tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if the
costs are grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained
Class III Tolerable risk if the cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement gained
Class IV Negligible risk
Table 5.3: Risk classes (see IEC 61508 (IEC 61508, 2000)).
Section 5.3.2 we discuss how these qualitative ndings can be interpreted into quantitative values
for use in safety functions.
Presently the risk classes are being identied using judgement and experience. This part
of the process requires further research, as the diculty in identifying the probability that a
specic hazard will occur rapidly increases with the complexity of the robot's environment.
Furthermore, rates of device failures are readily available from manufacturers and in the future
this data could be used, in part, to calculate the frequency of a particular hazard occurring.
The following section discusses a methodology created during this project that was devised
for developing personal robots. The design of the methodology incorporates hazard analysis,
using the techniques discussed in this section, with the development of the robot's control system.
5.2 Safety Development Methodology
During the initial stages of the project, it quickly became apparent that traditional hazard analy-
sis techniques capture safety recommendations, in the form of safety requirements, in a relatively
structured way (Woodman et al., 2011). Based on this observation we asked the question `can
this type of safety information be used directly by a robot system to help drive decisions?'. From
a review of the available literature, it was found that no research had considered the possibility
of developing a robot control system, which made direct use of safety processes built from safety
requirements. A further review of the literature identied a type of computer system, referred to
as a knowledge-based system (see Section 2.3.2.1), which takes a number of inputs and processes
the data using a set of rules to produce an output. This concept suitably tted the idea of using
safety requirements to drive decisions in a control system.
In the later stages of this project a development methodology for personal robots was con-
ceived. The aim of the methodology is to bring the development of a safety system, which forms
the basis of a control system, into the hazard analysis process. The main argument behind
this approach, is that it would allow verication that the safety schemes identied during haz-
ard analysis have been implemented appropriately. This sentiment is supported by the work
of Swarup and Ramaiah (2009), who state that the most eective way to ensure a system will
operate safely, is to build safety in from the start. The methodology is presented in this section,
as it clearly illustrates how the hazard analysis and control system design sections of this thesis
are interrelated.
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An overview of the development methodology is shown in Figure 5.3. As can be seen, the
methodology starts by analysing the customer requirements in order to determine the individual
tasks that the robot is required to perform. These are subsequently decomposed to identify all
subtasks. The method used for this process is hierarchical task analysis, which is discussed in
detail in Section 7.1.1. After this process, as with traditional hazard analysis, the next stage is
to identify any potential hazards in the system functionality which could lead to an unsafe event.
Each hazard is assessed and the potential consequences of the hazard occurring are identied.
Based on the severity of these consequences and the probability of the hazard occurring, a risk
value is produced. Finally, a safety requirement is dened, which species how the hazard can
be either avoided or the risk reduced to an acceptable level. If this is not possible then it may
be necessary to re-design part of the system in order to avoid the hazard entirely.
Creating safety requirements involves designers utilising their own experience, adapting solu-
tions from previous projects and following safety standards. To make specifying safety require-
ments less complicated and easier to verify, we have come up with a standard way of describing
them (see Section 5.3.1). This we believe is a necessary rst step for managing the large number
of hazards associated with autonomous robots.
As stated at the beginning of this section, the method combines both hazard analysis with the
development of a robot control system. This novel control system, which is discussed in detail in
Chapter 6, has been designed from the ground up to make full use of safety information identied
during hazard analysis. This safety information is primarily derived from safety requirements,
but can come from any source as long as the safety information can be expresses as a conditional
statement. The control system is separated into two main parts. A safety layer, which is
essentially implemented as a stand-alone safety system, and a control layer, which is reliant on
the safety layer to operate. The aim of this design is to separate safety and control, so that the
safety part of the control system can be developed, tested and evaluated in isolation. This will
also have the aect of simplifying the control layer. The remainder of this thesis will discuss
every aspect of the control system development and examine how successful this design paradigm
has been.
The methodology can be considered novel in respect to how safety requirements are writ-
ten, veried and nally implemented as a safety system within the robot control system. The
remainder of this chapter examines our method of encoding safety requirements and details the
advantages of the approach. This will involve discussing how and why the safety system is
built from the safety requirements. This point will be explored in more depth in Chapter 6.
Actual results of safety requirements, and their encoded form, identied for a real robot task
are presented in Section 7.1.2.
5.3 Encoding Safety Requirements
In this section a method for encoding safety requirements identied during hazard analysis is
presented. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the motivation behind developing this
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Figure 5.3: Methodology for developing a novel control system driven by safety processes.
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encoding scheme, is so that safety requirements can be more easily organised and turned into
safety processes that can be implemented in a robot control system. To achieve this, a structural
convention has been conceived for describing a safety requirement, which we have termed a
`safety policy'. These safety policies are made up of a set of conditional statements that specify
what the system should do in the presence of a particular hazardous situation (Woodman et al.,
2012).
In order to discuss the safety policies faithfully in this section, it is important to establish
how sensor data is handled within the control system (introduced in the previous section). A
structured method for handling sensor data was required, as without it, it would not be possible
to create a generic safety policy structure. Therefore, a common method for handling sensor
data was developed called a `sensor function' (see Section 6.3). A sensor function combines
one or more sensors with the programming code required to process the sensor data to produce
a specic result. The sensor functions can be made to combine sensor data to create new
information, produce an averaged output of a single sensor's data or output sensor data in its
raw form. In addition to the sensor value, a belief value, referred to as a `condence level', is
also produced (see Section 5.3.2 and Section 6.3.1). As the name suggests, this condence level
gives an indication of how reliable the sensor function output is believed to be. The sensor
function structure and data processing method has been designed specically so that it can be
used directly with a safety policy. Therefore, any safety policy which uses sensor data as part
of the decision process must use one or more sensor functions.
5.3.1 Safety Policies
In the context of this research, a safety policy can be thought of as an interlock implemented in
software. These software interlocks, or safety policies, aim to prevent the robot from generating
unsafe actions, by means of intervention between the control layer and the actuators.
The initial purpose of developing the safety policies was to create a standard approach for
describing and implementing dierent types of safety requirements. The only restriction being
that the safety requirement must be implementable in software. As this required a exible
implementation method, it transpired that not only safety requirements, but a wide range of
safety processes could be dened using the same method. The remainder of this section gives
details of the implementation method and examines a number of examples.
We have chosen to present safety policies as independent rules, which use facts derived from
perception data to impose restrictions on a set of actuators. This idea is based on principles
taken from knowledge-based system design (Kendal and Creen, 2007). The benets of this type
of design are the inherent parallelism, which treats all rules in the system as separate tasks, all
of which can be processed simultaneously.
The structured English statement which follows reveals the generic structure for our safety
policies. The safety policy object (SP) contains a number of variables, which are compared
against to determine whether the associated actuators should be restricted or allowed to operate
normally. Sensor functions (SF) provide high-level information about sensor readings, as well
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as a condence level that quanties how condent the sensor function is that its output value
is correct. For example, the object distance sensor function could output a value of 300 mm
with a condence level of 0.9, meaning that it is 90% condent that the nearest object is 300
mm away. The method used to calculate the required condence level for each safety policy is
described in detail in Section 5.3.2.
1 IF r obo t s t a t e = SP . r e qu i r e d r o b o t s t a t e
2 AND s a f e t y s t a t e = SP . r e q u i r e d s a f e t y s t a t e
3 AND comparison o f SF . va lue i s i n s i d e SP . acceptab le bounds
4 AND SF . c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l >= SP . r e q u i r e d c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l
5 THEN al low ac tua to r s
6 ELSE r e s t r i c t a c tua to r s
7 FINALLY return s a f e t y r a t i n g based on SF . c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l
It has been argued that context awareness in a safety-critical system is a crucial way of
maintaining both the availability of the system to complete tasks and its safety (Giuliani et al.,
2010; Pipe et al., 2011). This has been implemented in our rule based approach with the use
of a `robot state' object that holds all state information about the robot, which may be of use
when making safety decisions. A similar state object called the `safety state' is used exclusively
by the safety policies. This state is employed as a form of memory within the collection of safety
policies. An example use is for one policy to set a safety state when a human has been detected.
This can then be used in other safety policies to identify a human is in the robot's area, even if
it cannot be detected all the time. A timer can be used to reset the safety state if a human is not
detected within a certain time frame. Additionally, the `robot state' object holds the robot's
current and prior locations. This is important contextual information, which can be used to
prevent or allow safety policies executing when the robot is in a certain location. For example,
in a kitchen positioned in front of a human user.
An example safety policy is shown below. This policy is based on a requirement from the
robot standards guide ISO 10218-1 (ISO 10218-1, 2006). The requirement states that while
operating at reduced speed, the speed of the robot is limited to 250 mm/s.
1 IF r obo t s t a t e . speed mode = reduced speed con t ro l
2 AND end e f f e c t o r s p e e d <= 250 mm/s
3 AND con f i d e n c e l e v e l >= 0.6
4 THEN al low ac tua to r s
5 ELSE r e s t r i c t a c tua to r s
6 FINALLY return s a f e t y r a t i n g based on c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l
The following safety policy example, based on an ISO 13855 requirement (ISO 13855, 2010),
is used to maintain a separation distance between the robot and a human user. This example
and the previous one show that it is possible to explicitly represent requirements taken directly
from safety standards. This opens up the possibility that safety standards could not only be used
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as requirement guidelines, but also as specications for actual safety constraint implementation.
However, it must be noted that many robotic safety standards rarely specify requirements in
terms of quantitative values, and instead give general guidelines on the qualities that the nal
system must possess. In fact the robot safety standard ANSI/RIA R15.06 (ANSI/RIA R15.06,
2009) has the same `operating at reduced speed' requirement described previously but no others
that could be implemented as a safety policy. With the growing interest in personal robotics
it may be that in the future we see a shift in robotic safety standards, from the current safety
guidelines, to more prescriptive and quantitative requirements. However, as these robots will
be required to operate in increasingly dynamic and hard to predict environments, it may make
dening quantitative requirements much more dicult.
1 IF r obo t s t a t e . operat ion mode = co l l abo ra t i v e ope ra t i on mode
2 AND human distance >= 100 mm
3 AND robot speed x robot s topp ing t ime +
4 protec t ive dev i c e min imum di s tance < human distance
5 AND con f i d e n c e l e v e l >= 0.75
6 THEN al low ac tua to r s
7 ELSE r e s t r i c t a c tua to r s
8 FINALLY return s a f e t y r a t i n g based on c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l
When a safety policy is executed, it either allows its set of actuators to operate normally or
imposes restrictions. These restrictions can be in the form of limitations on potential output
or as full suppression, preventing the actuators from operating. In both cases a safety rating is
produced, which can be used by the control layer to understand the nature of the restrictions, or
if none have been imposed, this value is based on the substitution of the sensor function output
and the corresponding safety policy comparison values.
The logic used in the safety policies allows only `AND' conditions and not `OR' conditions.
This was done so that each rule term in the policy can be evaluated until one returns false. If
an `OR' condition is required then a second policy should be used which contains the required
conditions. This allows the designer to build up Boolean functions in a sum-of-products form,
and implement any possible Boolean function. In this context a `rule term' is a statement which
compares two values. If more that one rule term is required then an `AND' is used to separate the
terms. Additionally, to aid in the understanding of the policies for the reader, state information
should come rst, as these dictate the context the policy will be activated in.
As has been discussed, safety policies can be used to implement a number of types of safety
process. Presently the main purpose of safety policies is to encode safety requirements identied
during hazard analysis. As safety requirements can vary in complexity, one or more policies may
be needed. It is important to note that safety requirements that specify changes in the robot
construction or to the way in which tasks are completed, cannot be made into a safety policy.
Safety policies can only be constructed from requirements that involve the robot software. The
process of composing a safety policy involves analysing a safety requirement to identify what
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sensor and state information is required and which actuators should be restricted. Some safety
polices may only depend on state information; this can be either safety states, as set by other
safety policies or robot states, set by the robot control layer. For those policies that use sensor
information, the nal step is to calculate the condence level that is required of the sensor
functions before the safety policy is activated. This calculation and an example safety policy is
given in the section that follows.
In this section the use of safety policies as a method for encoding safety requirements has
been introduced. It should be made clear that this part of the proposed methodology (see
Figure 5.3) is still under development. Although, as has been shown, it is quite possible to
encode clearly dened safety requirements, generally safety requirements are not well dened
and would require them to be further broken down into smaller well dened processes.
5.3.2 Safety Policy Required Condence Level Selection
As discussed in the previous section, condence levels are an essential component of the safety
policy design. The required condence level is a value of belief that what is being asserted in the
safety policy is true. The values can range from 0.0, which means there is 0% condence in the
assertion, and 1.0 which means that the value is 100% correct. However, it must be remembered
that for robots operating in the real world, condence can rarely be expressed in absolutes, and
instead depend heavily on the state of the environment. In this section we are only considering
safety policies which have a condence level component. At present those that do not use a
condence level depend only on state information.
As safety policies can be used to either restrict actuators or allow them to operate, condence
levels can be used in one of two ways. If the risk associated with a safety policy is high, then the
designer can choose to use a low condence level to restrict the actuator, or a high condence
level to allow the actuator to operate; this is reversed if the risk is low. In this context, the
risk associated with a safety policy is the risk caused by a potential hazard or hazards that are
avoided by the actions (restrictions or state changes) taken by the safety policy. The decision to
use a `restricting' or `allowing' safety policy, depends primarily on other safety policies, which
are also associated with the same set of actuators. In the cases where either type of safety policy
can be used, for example when the safety policy uses a safety state that is altered by another
safety policy, then the choice should be made based on which approach is more logical. This
subject is discussed further in Section 6.2.1.
To select appropriate condence levels for each safety policy, we devised a principled method
using the risk ratings identied during hazard analysis. These risk ratings, and the method we
have developed to calculate condence levels, is based on the risk classication matrix presented
in Section 5.1.3.1. This process involves interpreting the qualitative results of the hazard analy-
sis, to quantitative values required by the safety policies. In addition to this calculation, it was
decided that the minimum condence level for allowing an actuator to operate should be 0.5.
This was due to the conclusion that if the condence was less than 0.5, then there would be a
greater probability of the result being incorrect than correct.
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The condence level calculation for safety policies that allow actuators to operate is shown
in Equation 5.1, and the calculation used for safety policies which restrict actuators is shown in
Equation 5.2.
ca = s max(rh; rm; rf ) (5.1)
cr = 1  (s  (max(rh; rm; rf )) (5.2)
Where ca is the condence level for allowing actuators, cr is the condence level for restricting
actuators, rh is the risk to humans associated with the safety policy, rm is the risk to movable
objects, rf is the risk to xed objects and s is the potential severity caused as a consequence
of the hazard. The severity and hazard consequence values are detailed in a series of tables in
Appendix F.
The role of the condence level calculation is to prevent safety policies being used that are
highly hazardous, while making sure that those that are less risky are able to operate freely.
To this end, the severity values `None', `Low', `Medium', and `High' were chosen to describe
the level of risk. The terms `direct' and `indirect' are used to describe hazards that aect
humans and objects, either directly or as an indirect result of an initiating event. For example,
if the consequence of a hazard is a collision with a human, then this would be considered
a direct consequence. Whereas, if a hazard resulted in the robot knocking over an object,
which subsequently collided with a human, the human collision would be considered an indirect
consequence of the initial event. This is further rened using the terms `one' and `many' to
describe multiple or single humans or objects aected.
To calculate the risk values used in Equations 5.1 and 5.2, a weight value is assigned to each
severity value and hazard consequence. These weightings can be seen in the table of Appendix F.
There is a monotonic relationship between the weighting values, with larger values being assigned
to situations which are deemed more hazardous. For example, if the consequence of a hazard
aects both humans and other objects, then only the risk to humans is taken into account, as
this represents the highest risk. High risk hazards which require a condence level of 1.0 (100%)
are not allowed on the system and must be redesigned in accordance with IEC 61508 (IEC 61508,
2000). The weighting values were chosen by examining the types of hazard identied in both
the hazard check list (Appendix D) and the hazard analysis document (Appendix E). As this
analysis only considered a small subset of all the safety risks associated with a personal robot,
it is likely that these risk values will be improved with additional examples added over time.
As an example of using the safety policy condence level calculation, consider the situation
where a robot is tasked with placing an item on a table. This would require the robot to ap-
proach the table without making contact. Therefore, there would be a direct risk of coming
into contact with the table. For this example, the severity associated with this risk is low. The
results of the calculations for allowing and restricting the actuators are as follows:
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Allow actuator: 1 max(0; 0; 0:3) = 0:3 [min is 0:5 ) = 0:5]
Restrict actuator: 1  (1  (max(0; 0; 0:3)) = 0:7
A further example, which represents a greater risk, is navigating an environment containing
humans and stopping before a collision occurs. For this example there is a direct safety risk to
one human and the severity associated with the risk is medium. The results of the calculations
for allowing and restricting the actuators are as follows:
Allow actuator: 1:5 max(0:5; 0; 0) = 0:75
Restrict actuator: 1  (1:5  (max(0:5; 0; 0)) = 0:25
The hazard consequence and weightings matrix presented in Appendix F is a novel method
for assigning a level of risk to a safety function, which in turn represents one or more safety
requirements. Although, as has been stated, the actual values used in the matrix may require
ne tuning, a number of important developments have been made. The most interesting of these
is that the hazard consequence of a safety requirement that poses an unacceptably high risk is
highlighted as such. These types of risk could then be easily identied, and furthermore, as the
required condence level would be greater than or equal to 1.0, the safety policy would simply
prevent the associated actuators from ever operating.
5.3.2.1 Safety Policy Condence Level Selection Example
Given the following safety requirement, `Robot must move at reduced speed when carrying an
object and a human is present.', it is possible to construct a single safety policy (see below). This
requirement addresses a potential direct risk of harm to one human caused by the robot moving
too quickly while carrying an object. It does not pose a risk to more than one human (during
a single event) as any collision would activate other safety systems that would immediately
stop the robot, thus avoiding harm befalling multiple humans. Similarly there are other safety
systems which would stop the robot if an object is sensed in close proximity. Therefore, this
safety requirement, although important for the smooth operation of the robot, poses a relatively
reduced risk to the human. Using the severity and hazard consequence values presented in
Appendix F, it is possible to calculate the condence level for restricting the actuator as 0.25
and allowing the actuator as 0.75. This is based on multiplying the weighting of a direct risk to
one human (0.5) by a medium severity (1.5).
1 IF r obo t s t a t e . c a r r y i n g ob j e c t = true
2 AND human detected = true
3 AND con f i d e n c e l e v e l >= 0.25
4 THEN actuato r s . speed mode = slow
5 FINALLY return s a f e t y r a t i n g based on c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l
Chapter 5. Robot Safety Requirements: Identifying and Organising 78
This section has discussed how the condence level term of a safety policy is calculated. This
static value is based on the potential risk associated with the policy. This condence level is
only one side of the conditional proposition that makes up this rule term. The value which it is
compared against comes directly from the sensor function used by the safety policy. Details of
how the sensor function condence value is calculated is given in Section 6.3.1.
5.4 Online Hazard Analysis
To reduce the complexity of system interaction with the environment, designers often opt to
alter the environment over making changes to the system. This strategy reduces the diversity
of potential interactions between a system and its environment, by restricting the number and
density of features in the environment with which the system can interact. However, as personal
robots will be operating in unstructured domains, it will be neither practical nor desirable to alter
them in order to simplify the functionality of the robot; and hence robots will be required to cope
with the full complexity of dynamic interactions in the performance of their tasks (Ogorodnikova,
2008; Simpson and Stoker, 2002). The impact of this is that designers will need new methods
for identifying all the hazards associated with the robot system and its environment. One such
method, which will be considered in this section, is the concept of performing hazard analyses
on the robot, while it is operating in its target environment (Woodman et al., 2011).
For a personal robot to perform hazard analyses online, the system must be able to make
decisions based on the perceived environment. To determine the nature of the decision process,
we considered how safety engineers generally perform manual hazard analysis. This involved
both a careful study of dierent hazard analysis documentation (such as those discussed in
Section 2.2.2) and practical experience gained from performing hazard analysis for a real robot
(see Section 5.1). The following is a list of the essential skills / processes that are believed
necessary for performing hazard analysis:
 Hazard identication and classication
 Understanding how dierent entities (inanimate / animate) interact
 Understanding how the system under test functions
 Risk estimation
 Developing new strategies for mitigating risk
 Applying known strategies for mitigating risk
In addition to the points raised in this list, it is also clear that safety engineers take short-cuts
in their analysis and reasoning process. If this were not the case then it would not be possible
to analyse even a moderately complex system. This is due to the huge number of functions
within a safety critical system, the dierent ways in which these functions can be executed, and
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the impact on these functions from external factors. Understanding how safety engineers reduce
the analyst eort by means of reasoned short-cuts, could address one of the key challenges of
performing hazard analysis as an online process.
In Section 4.3.1 we discussed how safety engineers must consider worse case scenarios when
performing hazard analyses. These types of scenario, and less severe situations, are generally
given as specic examples of what may go wrong and the consequence it would have. For
example, for a personal robot we may consider the issues associated with carrying a hot drink
from one location to another. This task poses a number of safety risks, each of which would
need to be considered independently. However, as stated previously, personal robots will be
operating in dynamic environments, where the types and volume of hazards are not known at
design time. Therefore, by using an automatic process it may be possible to not consider the
exact scenario, but instead program the robot to recognise specic hazards, such as hot liquids,
sharp implements, babies, tripping hazards, etc. If the robot were able to identify these hazards
it could make a decision on how they pose a threat to the safety of the robot, how likely this
risk is, and nally how the risk could be avoided.
Closely related to the idea of worst case scenarios, is the reasoning process that humans intu-
itively go through as they navigate the world. One observation that was made while performing
the environmental surveys, was that humans have a tendency to behave dierently based on the
situation. In a safety context, this seems to manifest itself as a notion of being `extra careful'.
This heightened level of caution can happen when the human is handling or in the vicinity of
items that could be potentially hazardous. For example, carrying a hot drink, or a candle, using
an electric iron or handling dangerous chemicals. This also applies to how people modify their
behaviour when around other people who may be deemed vulnerable, for example the elderly,
children and people with certain disabilities. This behaviour of `elevated caution' based on a
given set of circumstances, is something that humans do either instinctively or learn to do over
time. However humans gain this ability, it is clear that the process is extremely complex. It
requires the human to identify items in the environment that are known to be hazardous, and
to make the connection between these items and their potential for causing harm. Humans are
also able to consider risk from other people's perspective, so they can deduce that although
something may not pose a risk to themselves, if they were in the other persons situation, then
it could. Although it might be argued that this type of reasoning is not necessary for personal
robots, it could equally be said that if this type of reasoning could be achieved, then the robot
would be better equipped for operating alongside humans.
Safety requirements are almost always stated in unambiguous terms. In the past this has
been essential to avoid any errors arising from system developers misinterpreting requirements.
In this chapter a scheme had been introduced that uses safety policies as a method for resolv-
ing the uncertainty of real physical perception against the certainty of the expressions of the
requirements. It is believed that the safety policies presented in Section 5.3.1 provide an appro-
priate structure for encoding safety requirements identied during hazards analysis. This ability
to encode safety requirements makes them ideally suited for use as part of an online hazard
Chapter 5. Robot Safety Requirements: Identifying and Organising 80
analysis system. This idea of using safety policies in a robot system will be discussed in detail
in the chapter that follows.
This section has presented the concept of performing hazard analysis on a personal robot.
By considering current analysis techniques a number of processes have been identied that are
necessary to perform safety analysis. It is reasoned that if these processes can be implemented
as part of a computer system, then it may be possible to automate some or all of the hazard
analysis process. Although implementing an online hazard analysis system is beyond the scope
of this project, this chapter has presented an in-depth look at a number of the key issues. In
Section 5.1 we looked at dierent hazard identication and classication methods. This was
followed by a proposal for a method for performing risk estimation (see Section 5.1.3.1). Finally
these methods were combined to form part of the information used in the safety policies.
5.5 Summary
This chapter has presented a number of techniques for identifying and organising safety require-
ments. A hazard check list has been introduced, which puts emphasis on identifying hazards
that may be found in unstructured environments. These environments were chosen as they were
good candidates for HRI and of a type that personal robots may be required to operate in the
future. As has been discussed, the environments being considered were so complex that it was
not possible to identify all potential hazards. Therefore, it is likely that the hazard check list
will be improved by careful analysis of further environments.
A methodology which integrates hazard analysis with the development of a robot control
system has been proposed. The methodology, which is represented as a ow diagram, establishes
a number of steps for identifying hazards, creating safety requirements and creating safety
policies, which can be integrated into a control system. These safety policies, introduced in this
chapter, are essentially a generic way to encode safety requirements. Although safety policies
do not necessarily need to represent any single safety requirement. An important part of the
safety policy is the condence level component. The condence level, which is based on the
risk associated with a safety policy, is used primarily to prevent the safety policy restricting the
robot when the perceived risk is low.
In Section 5.4 we considered if it is possible to perform hazard analysis automatically on
a robot while deployed in its working environment, and what the benets / disadvantages of
this capability would be. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no system that can
perform hazard analysis online automatically, and no research on the subject could be found in
the available literature. However, as part of this project a paper was published on this subject
(Woodman et al., 2011).
The chapter that follows presents a detailed analysis of the control system briey outlined in
this chapter. As has been explained, this is a new type of control system that makes extensive
use of safety policies introduced in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
Safety-Driven Control System Development
This chapter details the design of a novel control system, referred to as a `safety-driven control
system', that has been developed during this project. The control system builds on the initial
architecture design decisions discussed in Chapter 4. Using these initial designs, the challenge
has been how to eectively integrate the safety policy scheme presented in the previous chapter.
Until this point we have focused on issues associated with identifying hazards that may aect
personal robots. In this chapter we discuss how hazard analyses and the safety requirements
they generate can be used to drive decisions within a control system.
To aid readability, the development of the safety-driven control system has been divided into
this chapter and a supporting appendix (see Appendix G). In this chapter the theory behind
the design decisions for the control system is discussed. In Appendix G implementation details
for the control system are presented. However, it must be remembered that the system was
designed and implemented in stages. Therefore, references to implementation choices will be
made in this chapter, where there inclusion will aid the reader in understanding why certain
decisions were made.
6.1 Architecture Overview
All computer controlled machines depend on a number of safety functions of one form or another.
The idea behind our control system architecture is that these safety functions can be utilised to
form a knowledge-base from which active decisions or emergent behaviours can be generated.
This resource, as well as being used passively to evaluate possible control actions, can record the
state of the robot's environment in terms of safety. In capturing the state of the environment in
this way, a model of the robot's working area can be formed that shows where potential areas
of risk are located. This model is formed from a combination of safety policies and the sensory
data they evaluate.
As Figure 6.1 shows, the control system has been separated into three distinct layers. A
control layer, which is solely responsible for engaging actuators; a safety layer, which has priority
over restricting actuator movement; and a sensor layer which provides real-time data to the
other two layers. The moniker `safety protection system' is used to describe all the processes
Chapter 6. Safety-Driven Control System Development 83
that are shared between the safety layer, the sensor layer and the actuator interfaces. This
current design is a modication of an early design by Woodman et al. (2010). As can be seen,
the control system is divided up into a series of interconnected modules. The direction of the
connecting lines represents both relationships between modules and the direction data ows.
One of the key data paths is between the safety policies and the control mode selection module.
This link allows the control mode selection module to constantly look at the safety restrictions
that are being applied at any given time.
The diagram in Figure 6.2 shows a high-level overview of the safety-driven control system
architecture. The purpose of this diagram is to illustrate how the main components of the
system interact. As this diagram shows, both the safety protection system and the controllers
receive the same sensory data. There are also data channels between these two modules to allow
for the exchange of information. The suppression element of the diagram, represented by an `S',
is the only part of the control system where the safety protection system exerts inuence over
the controllers. This allows controller requests to switch actuators on to be prevented. It is also
worth noting that the safety protection system has no ability to switch actuators on and cannot
prevent the controllers switching actuators o.
The control layer is made up of a number of controllers which provide certain functions,
or modes of activity. An example function could be to move the robot to a specic location.
This function would carry out the actions until it either completed successfully or a restriction
was applied by the safety layer, potentially halting it mid-way. The restriction type can be
either a reduction in the actuator output or a complete suppression. In the latter situation the
controller would cease all activity, whereupon the control mode selection module would choose
another controller. This selection is based on the rules associated with the current state of the
safety layer, i.e. which safety policies are being applied. At present only one controller can be
selected at any given time. This restriction has been imposed, as it reduces any unpredictable
behaviour that may occur as a result of multiple control actions operating concurrently. The
main point to understand is that the controllers cannot perform an action which violates one or
more restrictions applied by the safety system.
The following section explores the design decisions made while developing the safety protec-
tion system. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the control layer, which shows how the
safety protection system is integrated with the control functions.
6.2 Safety Protection System
In the previous chapter, the safety policy, a method for describing safety requirements, was in-
troduced. From the outset every eort was made to make the safety policy description technique
generic, so that it could be integrated into a robot control system. In practice this involved a
number of other pieces of information, which provided the robot controller with enough knowl-
edge to not only avoid hazardous events, but also to operate appropriately when no hazard
exists.
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Figure 6.1: Control system architecture. This illustrates the relationship between safety and
control layers. Modules which run concurrently (using execution threads) are marked as these
are the best candidates for distributed processing.
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Figure 6.2: Safety-driven control system high-level diagram.
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As has already been discussed, the safety protection system is responsible for controlling the
safety of the robot. As it exerts control over the control layer, by means of suppression and
restrictions, it can be best described as the primary system controller, with the control layer
taking a secondary role. The design of the safety protection system is built on the notion of
safety policies (see Section 5.3.1), acting as rules in a type of knowledge-based system. These
safety policies combine sensor data and contextual information about the state of the robot
and the current task. Based on the output of these policies, the safety protection system can
intervene to restrict the control layer from activating one or more actuators, which could lead
to an unsafe event.
This remainder of this section looks at the main design decisions of the safety protection
system.
6.2.1 Design Principles
As the design of the safety protection system uses a hierarchical structure, with sensor inputs at
the top and actuator outputs at the bottom, a directed acyclic graph (DAG) was chosen as the
best method for representing the system (see Figure 6.3). This type of graph is topologically
ordered and has no cycles, meaning there is a ow of information from input nodes to output
nodes passing through a series of intermediary nodes which alter the data. This means we are
able to describe the relationships between sensors and actuators in terms of their connectivity
within a networked structure. The information captured is both qualitative, described by the
structure of the network, and quantitative, as values stored in the individual nodes. This allows
information of dierent types to be combined in a single representation. The implication of
this is that our safety protection system, which as previously stated is made up of all the safety
functions needed to keep the robot safe, can be fully described by a single network. This method
allowed us to create diagrams of the system structure, which made it possible to perform a visual
analysis to help identify any potential weaknesses.
All rule terms in a safety policy must be evaluated as true in order to be processed fully.
Therefore, as was described in Section 5.3.1, the conditions which can be evaluated quickly, for
example state information must be positioned at the beginning of the policy. Those conditions
which take more time, usually the sensor function values, must appear last. Each safety policy
is processed independently using a separate thread. This allows all policies to be processed in
parallel. By using state conditions it is possible to minimise the number of policies which are
processed fully at any one time. Presently we are choosing these states manually by carefully
examining the relationships between each policy. However, it is likely that this process could be
automated in the future.
An example safety protection system graph for a mobile robot is provided in Appendix H.
Although this is one of the more basic graphs, it remains dicult to understand without expla-
nation. Therefore, a simplied version has been provided in Figure 6.3 (for details of the system
modules that populate the safety protection system graph see Figure 6.1). As this example
illustrates, the graph is organised as a series of layers, each layer is composed of nodes of a
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Figure 6.3: Example safety protection system graph. Note: CL = condence level, V = value.
single type. The top layer represents the robot sensors (S), each of which can be connected to
one or more sensor functions (SF). These sensor functions interpret the sensor data and out-
put higher-level information, for example the position of an object. The output of the sensor
functions is given as a value (V) and a condence level (CL). As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the
condence level is a belief value based on how condent the sensor function is that its output
value is correct.
The sensor function information is passed to one or more nodes in the safety policy (SP)
layer. These safety policies are implemented using the safety policy rule format described in
Section 5.3.1. Finally, the safety policies are connected to one or more actuator (A) nodes, each
of which represents a single motion that an actuator is capable of. For example, a drive motor,
which is able to operate in forward and reverse, would be modelled as two actuator nodes. This
has been done to increase the availability of the system, so safety policies only intervene on
actions that would put the robot into an unsafe state. An example of this is to allow the robot
to move away from danger, but prevent it from moving towards it.
As with any complicated system it is important to make certain that the interactions between
the various sub-systems do not conict or compete to create unpredictable behaviour. Due to
the design of our system this issue is particularly focused on the safety protection system. To
avoid any safety policies which compete or conict, in the rst instance it is important that the
designers consider carefully the relationship between every safety policy. To aid in this eort a
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tool has been developed, which can automatically compare every safety policy with each other
(see Section G.1.1). The current version of this tool can only identify relationships between two
safety policies. For example, if two independent safety policies are activated when a human is
detected, but one restricts the wheels and the other allows them to move. In the future this
tool could be made to identify the dependencies across multiple safety policies (see Section 8.3),
although it is important to note that this would be a computationally intensive process.
We are also able to identify conicts in the restrictions that may occur while the system
is operating. This is achieved with a simple mechanism, which looks at each restriction being
applied. If a new restriction is contrary to a current restriction, then the robot will stop moving.
At present this is used as another level of safety and ideally it should not occur during normal
operation. It is important to note that it would be valid for two safety policies to act on a single
actuator at the same time, if this was not a conicting action. For example, one restriction tells
the actuator to `slow' and the other `stop'. In these types of situation to ensure safety the most
severe restriction is always chosen.
To establish the contribution to control theory that our safety-driven control system presents,
it is important to consider the interactions between the safety layer and the control layer. As has
been shown, the objective of the safety protection system is to provide a reference of safety that
the control mode selection can use to achieve the desired safe control of the robot. A closed-loop
is formed between the control layer and the safety policies, which monitors the sensors and state
of the robot and provides feedback in the form of restrictions. This is in addition to the control
layer having direct access to sensor information.
From its inception, we made certain to design the safety protection system with all the fun-
damental requirements that our research had shown a safety system would need. The following
sections describe the core design principles that we followed in developing the safety protection
system.
6.2.2 Supporting the Safety Engineering Process
The safety protection system aids the safety engineering process in two main areas. Firstly by
having a collection of safety policies all of the same generic type, it is straightforward to iterate
through them and verify that they all exist as the specication dictated. The second area, and
one which partly justies the creation of a separate safety system, is that metrics can be taken
and used in a quantitative assessment to identify weaknesses in the system. In the example
graph of Figure 6.3, it can be seen that sensor 4 has one connection to sensor function 3, which
in turn connects to ve of the six safety policies, which nally connect to all the actuator nodes.
This means that if sensor 4 failed, the dependent policies could not be evaluated and the system
would halt. This shows how areas of the system which may require added redundancy can be
identied. This concept will be explored further in the next section.
The ability to analyse the interdependences within a system is an interesting area of study,
not just for aiding the hazard analysis process, but also for identifying areas of high and low
activity within the system. This kind of information could be utilised to direct improvement
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eorts into those parts of the system which are most used, and potentially identify those parts
which are not required. This bears some similarity to the work of Nehmzow et al. (2004), who
demonstrated that it was possible to take an existing robot system, and create a model of that
system by learning how it functioned. With this model they were able to show how some of the
least important functions could be removed, with little to no eect on the system operation.
6.2.3 Redundancy and Diversity
A major concern for robot system designers are sensor malfunctions and failures (Swarup and
Ramaiah, 2009). This is a particular concern for those safety critical parts of the system which
depend on precise sensor data. Identifying which functions of the system are critical is usually
done alongside the hazard analysis process. Assigning a risk level to system functions is one
method for declaring the criticality. This method is used in the safety standard IEC 61508
(IEC 61508, 2000) as well as other functional safety standards. The process assigns a level of
risk to each function, which must be reduced to an acceptably low level before the system can
go into service.
An important method of reducing the risk of critical system functions, is to add redundant
sensors. Therefore we wanted to address this issue as seamlessly as possible in our safety
architecture. As the example in Figure 6.3 shows, we have addressed this problem with the use
of multiple sensor functions of the same type, SF4a and SF4b. An example of their use could
be for monitoring for the presence of a human. These sensor functions could be either identical,
using the same sensors and code, or diverse, utilising dierent sensors and processing the data
in a dierent way. Examining this example further, consider the safety policies SP4, SP5, and
SP6, as is shown in Figure 6.3 these all depend on the sensor function SF4. If these policies
were identied as high risk, then a high risk level could be assigned to SF4. To reduce the risk
level and the associated risk to the related safety policies, redundancy could be added to SF4
(as is shown in Figure 6.3). This would mean that SF4 would calculate its value twice using two
independent sets of sensors.
Further work is required to investigate how best to use the output from multiple sensor
functions of the same type. The two main approaches we have identied, involve either using the
value from the sensor function with the highest condence level, or combining the output in some
way. Initial trials using a sensor fusion technique described by Schorgendorfer and Elmenreich
(2006) has shown that a weighted average of multiple sensor function values, can both reduce
error while preserving the data diversity obtained from multiple sources. The condence level
output from each sensor function was used as a weighting to give more signicance to sensor
function values which had a higher condence level.
A potential problem of using the same sensor and state information in both the safety layer
and control layer is the risk of common cause failures (Ericson, 2005). These types of failure can
occur when all parts of a system designed to prevent a failure share a common point of reference.
For example a sensor which regulates the robot's speed in the control layer may also be used
in the safety layer to prevent speeds which are too high. If this sensor gave an erroneous value
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that was too low, it may cause an acceleration of the robot which is not detected by the safety
layer. Therefore it is crucial during the hazard analysis process that the designer identies all
potential common cause failures and adds diversity and/or redundancy as appropriate.
6.3 Handling Sensor Data
It was clear from the literature review that handling sensor data is one of the biggest challenges
for robotic devices. This is due to the fact that sensors essentially capture a history of what
the environment was like at a point in time, which is not necessarily what the environment is
like when the data is acted upon. Therefore, it is crucial to react to sensor data as quickly as
possible before the data becomes obsolete. However, it is also important that decisions are not
based on unreliable sensor data. The following list details a number of the common causes for
sensor data unreliability:
 Sensor precision tolerances (as documented by manufacture)
 Error caused by operating outside of approved environmental conditions
 Interference from other devices, both internal and external of the system
 Intermittent errors, caused by sensor malfunction
 No output or xed output, caused by broken sensor
In addition to the issues that can aect sensor data reliability, is the equally problematic
issue of processing the sensor data. Relatively simple sensors, such as ultrasonic distance sensors,
provide data which does not necessarily require much processing. Therefore, processing this data
introduces little to no error. In comparison, image processing can give widely varying results with
only slight changes to the input. Furthermore, image processing is computationally intensive,
which means that making decisions based on these results will take more time.
From the preliminary ndings, presented in Chapter 4, it was found that a common way
for interfacing with multiple sensors was crucial for a coherent control architecture. Therefore,
a method of sensor fusion was required. The approach we developed, involved combining one or
more sensors with the software code needed to process the data, into a module called a `sensor
function'. These sensor functions interpret the sensor data and output higher-level information,
for example the position of an object.
The following section examines the design of the sensor functions. Details are given on how
sensor data is combined and a level of belief calculated for the nal output.
6.3.1 Assigning Condence Levels to Sensor Data
Robot sensors and actuators are inherently prone to error. This means that any reasoning about
their use, either as data received or actions taken, must incorporate a degree of uncertainty. One
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of the recent trends in robotics research for handling uncertain information about the robot's
environment, is to assign a `danger index' to objects that the robot perceives could cause a hazard
(Nokata et al., 2002; Ikuta et al., 2003; Kulic and Croft, 2007). These indices are continuously
updated with the latest sensor readings, with the aim of increasing the robot's condence in its
own understanding. As the robot's condence increases, so does the reliance on that knowledge,
allowing the robot to continue to operate in the presence of potential hazards.
The amount of processing required to produce an accurate view of the world, necessary for
navigating safely, is potentially very large. Some have suggested using probabilistic graphical
models in the form of Bayesian networks for handling this complex data set (Marzwell et al.,
1994; Pipe et al., 2011). This involves using Bayes rule to combine all the robot data to produce
a reasoned output.
For the safety protection system we have chosen to use condence levels (sometimes referred
to as condence factors), which is a method often used in expert systems for dealing with
uncertainty (Hopgood, 2001; Kendal and Creen, 2007). This diers from Bayesian networks as
it does not require a priori probability to be assigned to each decisional part of the network.
Instead it allows us to assign a value of belief to sensor readings, which can be combined to give
an overall condence level for use in the safety policies. This value can then be compared with
the condence level required by the associated safety policies (see Section 5.3.2). It is important
to note that it is the sensor function output values we are assigning a condence level to and
not the sensor values.
Prior to developing our own condence equations, we considered a number of other techniques
for calculating sensor condence levels. These can be broadly categorised as those which use only
static information about sensor tolerances and error potential, and those that utilise previous
sensor data and readings from multiple sensors. An example which uses a combination of static
information and previous sensor data is described by Goebel and Agogino (1996). Their method
uses fuzzy logic to combine multiple sensor readings in order to identify uncertainty caused by
sensor noise. Another technique, which belongs to the latter category, is presented by Hossain
et al. (2008). Their novel approach uses multiple sensors which detect the same type of data.
Learning algorithms are used to compare the data over time to identify any dierences. A
condence value can then be produced in real-time by comparing the latest sensor values with
an expected value.
The main issues with the condence level techniques that we surveyed is that they do not
take into account the structure of our sensors and sensor function conguration. Therefore, it
was decided that initially it would be more benecial to use a simpler calculation that is easier
to understand and to diagnose any issues that arise. However, it was understood that in the
future as development continued a more comprehensive condence calculation will be required.
To calculate the condence level of the output from a sensor function, we compare a number
of samples in order to identify any errors. The number of samples taken is important, as too
few can result in errors not being detected and too many means that the rst samples are older
and less relevant to the later ones. Therefore, the strategy we used was to base the number
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of samples taken, on the condence level required by the safety policy that requests the sensor
function value. The proposed calculation is given in Equation 6.1.
n = 2(r=q) (6.1)
The number of sample values is expressed as n. The required condence level, as dictated
by the safety policy, is expressed as r, and q is the condence per query assigned to the sensor
function. Sensor functions which produce reliable results, for example bump detection, would
have a high condence level per query, whereas a sensor function with low reliability, such as
face detection, would have a low condence per query. At present the condence per query for
each sensor function is set and xed each time the robot is started. Choosing the value involves
a test campaign specically designed for each sensor function. For example the face detection
sensor function requires a number of detection samples taken from various angles. The control
system has been developed in such a way that in the future, information from various sensors
can be used to adjust the condence per query dynamically. For example, initial experiments
show that using information from light and distance sensors can improve the reliability of the
face detection sensor function. However, this was not fully implemented as the development
eort far outweighed the benet to the research.
In addition to the number of samples taken, there is also a time restriction within which the
sensor function values must be obtained. If the time it takes to retrieve all the required sensor
function values is greater than the typical time it takes to retrieve all values, then the condence
level 0 is returned. A ag is also set to identify that this sensor function is experiencing timing
issues. The required processing time is determined by the system designer and is attributed
against each sensor function. Additionally, if the value of the sensor function is equal to the
sensor functions known failure value, i.e. an error has occurred while calculating the sensor
function value (due to one or more sensor failures), then the condence level 0 is returned and
a ag is set for this sensor to identify the failure.
The condence level calculation is shown in Equation 6.2. The rst step of the calculation is
to multiply the required condence level by two to give the maximum possible condence level.
This is then subtracted from the sample standard deviation (see Equation 6.3) of all the samples
and divided by the number of samples. The sensor function condence level is represented as cs
and  is the standard deviation of the samples, calculated using Equation 6.3. Where n is the
number of sensor function samples, xi represents the sensor function values and x is the mean
of the sample values.
Standard deviation is used to measure the dispersion between a set of values; the greater
the dispersion the larger the standard deviation. This is used in the condence level calculation
to measure the error in the sample values. Another technique which we considered was the
variance of the sample, which is the sum of the dierence between a set of values. This gave
similar results to standard deviation when the samples values had low dispersion. However, it
was much more sensitive to large error values.
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cs = 2r   (=n) (6.2)
 =
sPn
i=1(xi   x)2
n  1 (6.3)
To calculate the actual value output of the sensor function, to which the condence level
is assigned, we used the median of the sample values. The mean and mode averages were
also considered for choosing the output value, however, we found that both were prone to give
extreme values if the sample contained one or more error values.
6.4 Control Layer
The control layer, as the name suggests, is responsible for handling all the control functions of
the system needed to complete the mission. As has been outlined in Section 6.1, the control
layer contains few safety processes. Instead these safety processes are contained within the safety
layer. The key feature of the control layer is how the decision process, used to drive the robot,
is based to some degree on restrictions applied by the safety layer. This means that unlike
traditional control systems, it could be said that the safety layer has a substantial inuence over
how the control layer behaves.
It is important to note that for the control layer to make safe decisions, the safety layer,
and most importantly the safety protection system, must not contain any errors. Therefore,
throughout this section we will make the assumption that the safety layer contains no errors.
The remainder of this section explains the components of the control layer and how they
interact with the safety layer. Examples are given showing how control routines are organised
into small tasks, each of which help the robot complete its overall mission goal.
6.4.1 Control Mode Selection
As has already been established, the control layer is made up of a number of controllers, which
carry out certain sub-tasks of the robot's main goal. The decision on which of these controllers
should be active at any one time is made by the control mode selection module. The implemen-
tation of the control mode selection module must be in precise adherence with the safety layer.
This means that no element of the control layer should try to violate any restrictions imposed by
the safety layer. This should be done, not as it poses a risk to the safe operation of the system,
but that not adhering to the safety layer would cause the system to become unresponsive when
the safety layer imposes a restriction that the control layer does not know how to handle.
To demonstrate how the dierent parts of the control layer operate we consider two simplied
algorithm extracts. The rst extract, which shows part of the control mode selection module,
is presented in Algorithm 1. The second extract, presented in Algorithm 2, shows a controller
which is called by the control mode selection algorithm.
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In Algorithm 1, rst the `MoveToObject' controller (see Algorithm 2) is called, this then
performs a number of functions, which rst identies an object and then moves the robot
towards it. This process can either be completed successfully, or if a safety policy imposes a
restriction, then the controller will return control back to the control mode selection module. At
this point if the controller completed its task successfully, the next controller would be selected,
for example the controller responsible for picking up objects. Although this would depend on
the robot's overall mission goal. This, and all other selections, would follow the same principle
as the one presented, and therefore have been omitted.
Algorithm 1 : ControlModeSelection
taskCompleted false
while taskCompleted = false do
returnV alue MoveToObject()
restrictions GetSafetyPolicyRestrictions()
if returnV alue = completed then
taskCompleted true
else if restrictions contains obstructionDetected then
NavigateAroundObstruction()
else if restrictions contains humanInV icinity then
NegotiateWithHuman()
end if
end while
Algorithm 2 : MoveToObject
if IdentifyObjectLocation() = true then
if OrientateToFaceObject() = true then
if MoveTowardObject() = true then
return completed
end if
end if
end if
return failed fThe controller could not complete. ControlModeSelection will subsequently
check if this is due to a safety policy being activatedg
If the controller fails to complete its process successfully, a list of the current safety poli-
cies imposing restrictions is examined. Based on these restrictions a new controller is selected,
which is responsible for avoiding the safety hazard that the safety policy addresses. In order
to identify each safety policy a unique id is assigned. In Algorithm 1 the safety policies are
`obstructionDetected' and `humanInVicinity', and the controllers are `MoveToObject', `Navi-
gateAroundObstruction' and `NegotiateWithHuman'. It is important to remember that these
two algorithms represent only a small extract of the overall system.
To process both the safety layer and the control layer in parallel, multiple threads of execution
are required to run simultaneously. This results in a potential issue where two or more processes
could be requesting data from the same resource (usually a sensor function). To overcome this
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issue we have implemented a `lock' mechanism, which prevents a thread requesting a sensor
function value to be calculated, while in the process of calculating the value for another thread.
As an example of how this works in practice, consider a sensor function that detects obstacles;
when a request is made to this sensor function, a lock is imposed that prevents any further
requests and noties the requester that a lock is currently in place. When the lock is released,
all sources that made the request can query the new result simultaneously. This avoids any
conicts between competing threads and reduces the overall processing eort.
6.5 Control System Assessment
The eect of removing the majority of safety functions from the control layer has greatly reduced
the complexity of control routines. However, as there are no real-world personal robots of the
type discussed in this chapter, we are unable to make any quantitative comparisons of processing
speed or computational eort. It could be argued that with layered architectures of the type
we have presented, it is possible to demonstrate the control system in two modes, one with the
safety layer operating and one with it not. It would then be possible to make some comparisons
of the eectiveness of the design. However, due to the design of our architecture, the safety
policies and the restrictions they impose are integral to the control system. Therefore, if the
safety layer were to be turned o the control system would simply not function as there would
be nothing for the control layer to query against in order to decide what actions it should take.
At this stage of development, the safety protection system, and the control system as a whole,
will be designed to always stop the robot if a situation is deemed unsafe or the level of safety
cannot be determined. As was discussed in Section 5.1.3, the ndings of the environmental sur-
veys and hazard analyses showed that the majority of safety risks can be minimised or removed
by stopping the robot from moving. Always stopping the robot if the level of safety cannot be
determined has the benet on the real-time constraints required of the control system. This is
due to how the safety protection system only allows actuators to operate if condence levels are
high enough. Therefore, if the system cannot process sensor data fast enough, condence levels
will not reach there required values, which will in turn activate certain safety policies, which will
prevent the robot's actuators from operating. This means that the system does not necessarily
need to operate within hard-real time deadlines.
Aspects of the behaviour of the control system was not fully anticipated prior to imple-
mentation and testing. Although the control system was designed to only allow the robot to
move when there was sucient condence that it was safe to do so (via the condence level
/ safety policy mechanism), it was not fully realised how this would impact system behaviour.
The design of the system is such that the control layer can freely control the movement of the
robot unless one or more safety policies prevents it. The result of this is that if the condence
level decreases, due to dierences in sensor readings (caused by changes in the environment,
the robot moving, or sensor precision / errors), then the robot will stop moving. The robot
will only continue to move when the condence level value has increased above the required
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threshold. As an example of why this behaviour is useful, consider a robot that is required to
reach a specic location and is being guided by a position sensor. If the position sensor is slow
to take readings, the robot will simply pause more regularly in order to build condence. This
also means that sensors that are unreliable, or produce imprecise results, can be used. However,
the sensor function that processes the sensor data, must be able to detect the imprecision in the
sensor output and adjust the condence level appropriately.
A potential issue of having a separate safety layer is that a delay is introduced between the
time it takes for the safety policy to identify an unsafe event and a restriction being applied.
However, this delay is under 0.5 seconds using a 2.8 GHz quad core processor, which did not
pose an issue for the types of tasks being considered in this thesis. Nevertheless, for others
implementing this type of architecture, it must be given careful consideration. The issue of
timing is discussed further in Section 7.3.3.
At this point in the thesis we have discussed how the safety policies and the mechanisms
which manage them have been designed to enforce safety over availability. It follows that the
safest result of any error, failure or unanticipated event is to stop the robot until the issue can
be resolved. This can result in the system mission being impeded. It is important to note that
this issue is not as a result of having many safety processes (in the form of safety policies), but
as a result of the level of caution imposed by each individual safety policy. The chapter that
follow highlight a number of ways availability can be improved.
6.6 Summary
This chapter has introduced a novel control system, referred to as a safety-driven control system,
which has been designed with safety at its core. The embodiment of this safety core, is the
safety protection system, which is responsible for handling safety processes. As this chapter
has discussed, the key principle of the control system design, is to separate safety processes
from control processes. In this respect the system development has been extremely successful,
with the majority of safety processes being handled exclusively by the safety protection system.
However, it could be argued that too much attention has been given to the safety aspects of
the system design, neglecting the role of the control layer (which is responsible for moving the
robot). This is a fair argument, although it was a deliberate action, as the review of literature
showed that little research had been done on methods for handling safety within a robot system.
Furthermore, the control layer has been considered in enough detail to demonstrate that the
principle of driving control decisions, based on restrictions applied by the safety protection
system, does indeed work.
To support this chapter, and to provide details of how the safety-driven control system can
be implemented in practice, a supporting discussion has been included in Appendix G. As
was mentioned at the start of this chapter, the implementation process revealed a number of
weaknesses of the design. These and other issues were addressed and subsequently used to revise
the initial designs.
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The chapter that follows presents details of the experiments carried out during this project.
Results are presented and a discussion is made of the ndings. Among these experiments are
a number of demonstrations, which show the safety-driven control system in action. These
include performance tests and experiments, which show how the system behaves in the presence
of perceived safety hazards.
CHAPTER 7
Experiments and Results
In this chapter we present a series of experiments that were conducted to validate the methods
proposed for this project. These experiments were designed to explore both specic parts of the
research work, and to demonstrate the work as a whole. In addition to the experiments, ndings
from research conducted that support the experimental results are also presented.
This thesis has concentrated on two key areas of robot safety. These are hazard analysis
and control system development. These experiments will focus primarily on the control system
methods and techniques developed during this research. The hazard analysis ndings, many of
which have been presented throughout this thesis, will be used mainly to support the control
system experiments.
Although this chapter presents the main experiments conducted during this project, ndings
from smaller experiments have been presented throughout this thesis. The main example of these
initial experiments were presented in the Preliminary Research chapter (Chapter 4). These
smaller experiments were also required at specic stages of the project to help guide decisions
on how the research should progress.
7.1 Simulated Part Sorting Robot
This section details the rst full scale test of the hazard analysis techniques developed during
this project. This involved rst dening a task that a personal robot could plausibly complete.
The task involved moving items around an environment while maintaining a predened level of
safety. To perform the tasks a MobileRobots PeopleBot was used. For these initial experiments,
a simulated robot was used instead of a physical robot, as this allowed us to explore the eect
of sensor and actuator errors on the safety of the robot.
Prior to performing the robot task experiments, the control system had to be developed. This
was done alongside the hazard analysis process. The outcome of these experiments ultimately
led to the creation of the methodology presented in Section 5.2.
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7.1.1 Robot Task Example: Part Sorting
To validate the proposed personal robot development techniques, we have devised a robot task,
which can be executed with or without human interaction. The idea behind this approach, is
that experiments can be performed in an industrial type setting, which almost always requires
complete isolation from humans. A human element can then be introduced to the experiment
without any major changes to the setup. This should mean that the aect a human has on the
system behaviour, can be more easily understood from the results.
7.1.1.1 Robot Sorting Task { Part 1: Isolation
The robot sorting task involves retrieving parts from a collection area and sorting them into
good or bad based on quality. Part 1 of the robot sorting task has the following requirements.
The robot must select a part from the part dispenser and place it on either a `good part' or
`bad part' conveyor. The robot should perform an on-board analysis of the part to determine
its quality. The distance from the part dispenser to the conveyors is 3 metres. The robot must
be completely autonomous and not tethered or xed in anyway.
To model the task requirements we used a scenario based technique called `hierarchical task
analysis', currently under evaluation at the Bristol Robotics Laboratory (BRL) (Harper et al.,
2011). Hierarchical task analysis, developed by Duncan and Annett in the late 1960s (Shepherd,
2001), is a method of task analysis traditionally used in human factors work for time-motion
studies. This involves analysing the way in which humans complete tasks, with the aim of
improving eciency. With this approach there is particular emphasis on task decomposition,
which means taking each element of a task and breaking it down to its simplest form (Shepherd,
2001). The approach of identifying task-based elements of a process, suggests that hierarchical
task analysis may be a promising technique for designing complex robot tasks which need to
be performed more dynamically when compared to traditional manufacturing robots. Although
we believe this technique has not been used before for describing personal robot tasks, we have
found it a useful method for task decomposition.
The diagram of Figure 7.1 shows it is possible, in principle, to use this technique for modelling
customer requirements in a clear and concise manner. In this diagram the robot's tasks are
decomposed hierarchically into sub-tasks; the sequencing of sub-tasks at each level is specied
as a plan. The sequence of nodes for each plan dictate the logical steps by which each task
should be performed.
Hierarchical task analysis would be performed in the early stages of a project in order to
record how each task should be completed. The diagrams produced would then be used in the
hazard analysis process to help safety engineers both understand the task process and identify
any hazardous situations that may arise as a result of the way in which a task is structured.
Although hierarchical task analysis diagrams proved sucient for hazard analysis purposes,
a number of ow diagrams where also produced to help with the implementation of the system.
These ow diagrams are provided in Appendix I.
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Figure 7.1: Hierarchical task analysis diagram of a part sorting robot.
7.1.1.2 Robot Sorting Task { Part 2: Human-Robot Interaction
Building on the requirements of Part 1, the task example Part 2 requires the robot to operate
cooperatively with a human user. The additional requirement is as follows. While the robot is
approaching the part collection area, it must be able to identify the location of the human user
and stop at a safe distance facing them. The user is then allowed to hold a part for inspection
in front of the robot. The robot must negotiate with the human and fully take hold of the part.
Finally, it should examine the part and take it to the correct good/bad conveyor, all the time
maintaining a safe operating speed and distance from the human. This process is presented in
Figure 7.2. Comparing this diagram with Figure 7.1, it can be seen that a high-level branch, with
the starting node `take part from human', and a new decision condition `If human detected and
robot not carrying part' has been added. These two elements full the new human interactive
requirements of the task.
To maintain safety when negotiating with the user, the robot base shall remain stationary
when in close proximity to a human. The safe separation distance should be in accordance
with the machinery safety standard ISO 13855 (ISO 13855, 2010). Additionally, when in close
proximity to the user, all actuators, which are not prevented from moving, should operate at a
reduced speed mode, in accordance with the robot safety standard ISO 10218-1 (ISO 10218-1,
2006).
7.1.2 Robot Sorting Task Safety Policies
Hazard analysis has been performed for the robot sorting task (Part 1 and Part 2) using the
method introduced in Section 5.2. The purpose of performing hazard analysis, was to evaluate
the methodology and determine if the hazard check list revealed safety risks that were not found
using traditional hazard analysis techniques alone.
It was clear from this analysis that the hazard check list was an important tool for identifying
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Figure 7.2: Hierarchical task analysis diagram of a part sorting robot with HRI.
a number of potential safety risks that were not identied using the traditional hazard analysis
approach. However, although the use of the hazard check list has been justied, it must be
remembered that at this stage it cannot cover every possible hazard.
The results of hazard analysis for the robot sorting task is presented in Appendix E. This
analysis identied a number of safety requirements which were then used to generate 22 safety
policies. These safety policies are presented in Table 7.1. Those safety policies that are based on
safety requirements identied using the hazard check list are marked with a `*'. Two examples
of these are the `Unscheduled weight change' and `Unintended movement' safety policies. These
both monitor changes to the robot which should not occur as part of the task, and may be
activated as a result of a human either pushing the robot or adding weight unexpectedly.
For each safety requirement that involves the control system, it was found that we could
satisfy the requirement by creating one or more safety policies, written in the standard format
discussed in Section 5.3.1. However, this is not advisable in some situations when real-time
operation is critical for safety. For example a watchdog timer that monitors the responsiveness
of the system to prevent processes from hanging. This is due to the large amount of parallel
processing which occurs as a result of having a separate process or thread for every safety
policy. However, in general this does not cause a safety risk as each safety policy must dene a
condence level, which has a time component so condence in the state of the world decreases
rapidly if new samples are not taken. Furthermore, by incorporating condence levels into the
safety policy design, we are able to address many of the safety requirements that are concerned
with environmental conditions aecting sensor accuracy.
During hazard analysis it was discovered that in order to complete the robot sorting task at
no point would two actuators need to be activated simultaneously. Although we did not apply
a restriction to prevent this, it is note worthy that a complex robot task like the one discussed
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Safety Policy Restriction Type No. Actuators
* Fire detection Abort All
Crash detection Abort All
* Maintenance mode activated Abort All
* Sudden drop detected Stop All
Human voice command `stop' Stop All
Collision with object Stop All
* Unscheduled weight change Stop All
* Unintended movement Stop All
Unable to reach object Stop 5
Obstruction imminent Stop 5
At table Stop 4
Taking object from human Stop 4
Picking up object Stop 4
Depositing object Stop 4
* Axes orientation Stop 3
* Floor moisture high Stop 3
Gripper pressure exceeded Stop 1
Approaching table Slow 3
Human detected Slow 3
Obstruction near Slow 3
Moving with object Slow 3
Approaching object Slow 3
Table 7.1: Safety policies used for part sorting task (ranked by restriction severity).
can be controlled in a sequential manner. This could potentially reduce the overall processing
eort required to monitor the robot's safety while in operation. This is discussed further in
Section 7.3.3.
7.1.3 Performing the Sorting Task
In this section results are presented for the robot sorting task. It was decided while developing
the simulated environment that the HRI part of the task would not be performed in simulation,
as the human would have to be automated. By automating the human the task would be
essentially reduced to robot-robot interaction. Therefore, a HRI task was performed with the
real PeopleBot robot, which is described in Section 7.2.2. It is important to note that although
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the simulated human was not used in theses experiments, it was implemented, along with a
humanoid robot (BRL BERT robot torso), for testing purposes.
Prior to performing the tasks, the simulated environment and MobileRobots PeopleBot had
to be created. As was discussed in Section 3.2.1, the MRDS software package was used to create
the simulation. All of the simulated entities and the means of controlling them were created
from scratch during this project. The two images provided in Figure 7.3 show the simulated
robot performing Part 1 of the robot sorting task.
Figure 7.3: Simulated mobile robot sorting parts. The simulation environment was made using
Microsoft Robotics Developer Studio.
The control system has been designed to capture all event information for the actuators and
safety policies. Therefore, it is possible to create graphs which illustrate the activations that
occur when the robot is operating. A selection of these activation graphs, for the robot sorting
task, are presented in Figure 7.4. For the actuators, a `1' value shows the actuator is turned
on and a `0' means it is turned o. For the safety policies, a `1' shows that the safety policy is
applying a restriction and a `0' means it is not. From this sample it can be seen that there are
many activations happening all the time, which are necessary to maintain the balance between
safety and availability.
The graphs presented in Figure 7.4, show only a selection of the data produced while the
system is operating. From these results it is possible to visualise how the activation of safety
policies cause the associated actuators to become inactive. Using this data it was possible to
identify areas of ineciency within the controllers. For example it can be seen that the actuators
that turn the robot are being constantly activated. It was subsequently found that this was due
to the accuracy threshold that was used for aligning the robot with its target location. To reduce
this constant adjusting of angle, this threshold was simply increased.
Although results demonstrating the robot carrying out tasks are presented in this section,
the simulated part sorting robot was used predominately to verify the hazard analysis process
and for system testing. The benet of performing system testing in simulation, is the high level
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Figure 7.4: Robot sorting task results: A selection of the 8 actuators and 22 safety policies that
make up the control system. For the actuator graphs, a value of `1' indicates that the actuator
is on and a `0' value indicates the actuator is o. For the safety policy graphs, a value of `1'
indicates that the safety policy is active and a `0' value indicates the safety policy is inactive.
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of precision and repeatability, which is not possible with physical robots. Details of the system
testing experiments that were conducted using the simulated part sorting robot are presented
in Section 7.3.1.
The remainder of this chapter examines the safety-driven control system in more detail. The
following section presents a series of experiments and demonstrations conducted with physical
hardware.
7.2 Physical Robot Demonstrations
The previous section showed that the safety-driven control system was capable of controlling
a simulated robot. In this section we demonstrate that it is equally able to control a physical
robot. The rst demonstration uses a tabletop mobile robot to pick up an object and place
it in a container. This was an early experiment and was used primarily to prove that the
control system could complete tasks as designed. The second series of experiments used the
MobileRobots PeopleBot to complete a number of navigation and interaction tasks. These
tasks, which included HRI, were used to evaluate the availability of the robot and to establish
the amount of time the system spent dealing with safety.
A further set of control system experiments will be presented in the section that follows.
Results will be presented which are used to evaluate key features of the control system design.
7.2.1 Pick and Place Mobile Robot
The Lego NXT mobile robot (see Section 3.1.3.2) was the rst physical robot to be tested with
the safety-driven control system. To demonstrate the implementation of the control system, a
simple pick and place task was conceived. The task involved the robot picking up a ball from
a stand and depositing it in a container at the opposite end of the robot arena. The images of
Figure 7.5 illustrate the task setup. As these images show, the robot's working area, or arena, is
bordered by a 34 mm wide black strip. This was used to indicate the boundary which the robot
should not cross. A camera was positioned above the arena and was used to track the robot's
position. The experiment was conducted on a table, which was surrounded by three walls. The
front-edge of the table was open, meaning that the robot could potentially fall to the oor.
Although the robot and its actions could not pose a real safety risk due to its small size, a
number of possible safety events that could happen during the task were given elevated levels
of risk. This was done so that the level of safety could be more easily compared with the
risks associated with a larger robot. Therefore, the three main safety risks that the robot may
encounter while carrying out the task, were given the following levels of safety. Dropping the
ball was assigned a low level of risk, collision with the walls or other objects was given a medium
risk, and falling o the table was given a high level of risk. Dropping the ball was allowed during
the task, collisions were to be avoided, and falling o the table was not allowed to occur under
any circumstance.
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(a) Collecting ball. (b) Depositing ball.
Figure 7.5: Lego NXT mobile robot experiment.
Two sensors were used to prevent the robot falling o the table. The most reliable of these
was a light sensor, which was used to detect the black border surrounding the robot's working
area. This sensor was combined with a safety policy that was responsible for stopping the robot
if the border was detected. This sensor was also able to detect the edge of the table if the robot
managed to cross the black border strip. The second sensor, used to prevent the robot falling
from the table, was an ultrasonic distance sensor. This was used to detect both near obstacles
and the drop from the table to the oor. This was achieved by angling the sensor in such a
way that on a at surface it gave a reading of 320 mm. If this value was lower, then the robot
would be coming into proximity of other objects, if the value was higher, then the robot would
be pointing over the edge of the table surface. Additionally, a microphone was used to detect
loud noises, and an accelerometer was used to stop the robot if its angle changed unexpectedly.
As with all the protection devices, safety policies were dened that specied the acceptable
behaviour of the robot.
The initial plan was to only use the Lego NXT mobile robot to demonstrate the eectiveness
of the safety-driven control system. However, the robot performed better than expected and the
simple design of the task lent itself to further experimentation.
It was found during testing that by altering the required condence levels of the safety
policies, the robot could perform the task in dierent durations and with varying levels of
success. Based on this observation the following hypothesis was conceived: `If the required
condence level is raised, then the robot's task success rate will increase'.
To test this hypothesis an experiment was conducted whereby the safety policy's required
condence level was increased by a percentage and then the robot was made to carry out the
pick place task. The required condence levels were increased in stages by 5% of the base
value. To make sure the results were reliable, the task was performed 10 times for each increase.
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The reason that the task was performed 10 times and the condence levels were increased in
5% increments was based on the considerable time it took to set up, perform and record the
experiments. The experiment used 9 safety policies, 2 of which used only state information and
7 used information from sensor functions coupled with a condence level.
The success of the task was based on whether the robot managed to pick up the ball and
place it in the container. The design of the robot meant that it could only pick up the ball from
the specially made stand. Therefore, if the robot dropped the ball or knocked it o the stand
then the ball was eectively lost to the robot. However, as the time it took to complete the task
was also important, if the robot lost the ball it was programmed to complete the task as if it
managed to pick up the ball successfully.
The results of the experiment are presented in Table 7.2. As these results show, with the
condence levels unchanged the robot is able to complete the task successfully 30% of the time,
in an average time of 98.4 seconds. Increasing the required condence level by 10% improved
the success rate to 50%. However, the average time increased substantially to 170.7 seconds.
The highest success rate was found by increasing the condence level by 20%, this gave a success
rate of 90% with an average time of 296.1 seconds, which was over 3 times the average duration
of the rst trial. Finally, it was found that increasing the required condence by 25%, prevented
the navigation part of the robot controller being able to move close enough to the ball collection
area. This was due to the sensor function that determines where the robot is in relation to the
ball. As the robot moved closer, the sensor function precision was not high enough to produce
the required level of condence. Therefore, the robot was unable to reach the ball area and
complete the task.
Condence Time Quartile Ranges Standard Success
Level Increase (mean average) Q1 Q2 Q3 Deviation Rate
0% 98.4 91.05 98.90 104.23 6.86 3
5% 145.0 137.08 145.85 154.25 10.02 5
10% 170.7 157.20 171.20 182.70 13.51 7
15% 192.0 178.14 191.50 207.50 15.79 7
20% 296.1 284.85 299.10 305.85 16.53 9
25% 1 { { { { 0
Table 7.2: Mobile robot task completion results (based on 10 trials for each percentage increase).
Shows the average time taken (in seconds) to complete tasks and the task completion success
rate.
A number of observations made during the experiment revealed how the control system be-
haved in certain situations. These observations build on the control system behaviour discussion
made in Section 6.5. It was found during the experiment that the control system could tolerate
varying levels of battery power, which when low would aect the actuators speed and precision.
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However, moving slowly and imprecisely did not aect the robots ability to complete tasks. This
is due to the controllers constantly looking at the position sensor information and adjusting the
actuators as necessary. If the robot moved too fast, and the position sensor was not able to take
reliable readings, then the condence level decreased. This in turn results in the the associated
safety policies slowing or stopping the robot, until a high enough number of reliable sensor read-
ings are taken to increase the condence level. It is important to note that for the mobile robot
experiment (and for all physical robot experiments) the robot's battery was fully charged prior
to starting each trial.
This experiment revealed the importance of the required condence level value chosen for
each safety policy. The results show that using condence levels that are too low, will cause
the system to behave incorrectly and more importantly unsafely. Conversely, if the required
condence level is too high then the system is unable to operate. Therefore, this raises the
question of how to choose the most appropriate condence level for each safety policy. To
address this question further experimentation was needed, the results of which are presented in
the section that follows.
7.2.1.1 Pick and Place Simulation
Following on from the experiment presented in the previous section, a further similar experiment
was conducted in simulation. The purpose of this experiment was to both analyse the impact
that sensor error has on the control system, and to investigate strategies for selecting the most
appropriate safety policy condence level value. The hypotheses being tested were: `If the
precision of sensor values is lowered, then the robot's task success rate will decrease' and `If the
precision of sensor values is increased, then the time taken to complete tasks will decrease'.
The experiment was conducted in simulation as it allowed for many more results to be taken,
as once the simulation is started condence levels can be adjusted automatically and the scenario
restarted with no human intervention needed. Furthermore, dierent levels of error could be
applied to each sensor, and the sensors could also be used with no error, something which is not
possible with physical systems.
The MobileRobots PeopleBot robot was used for this experiment, as it possesses similar
actuators to the Lego NXT mobile robot, with the addition of an actuator that moves the
gripper up and down (which was disabled for this experiment). The experiment used the same
simulated environment as that presented in Section 7.1. The task involved the robot moving
from a location precisely 2 metres in front of a table, upon which sat a small object. The robot
would then approach the table and pick up the object, after which the robot would reverse 1
metre. As with the previous experiment, if the robot knocked over the object and was unable
to pick the object up, it would complete the task as if it had picked up the object successfully.
This was important to allow task duration time to be compared across all experiment trials.
As with the experiment of Section 7.1, the task was carried out a number of times, with the
safety policy's required condence level being increased by 1% of the base value each time. The
condence level was increased until it reached a point where the robot was unable to move. The
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robot is prevented from moving, as the safety policies that restrict certain actuators, require
a higher level of condence than the sensor functions are able to produce. In addition to the
condence level adjustment, a maximum error value was applied to each sensor's output. These
maximum error values were 0%, 1%, 2% and 3%. The error applied to the sensor's output
values was not constant, but instead a pseudo-random value between 0% and one of the four
predened maximum percentage values. To produce the pseudo-random values, the Microsoft
.NET random function was used. This value is generated using the subtractive random number
generator algorithm developed by Donald E. Knuth (Knuth, 1997). This approach of using a
random value was chosen, as if a constant error was applied to the sensors, then this would
essentially be the same as having a perfect sensor (no error), which is simply not calibrated
correctly. Finally, to make sure the results were reliable, the task was performed 100 times for
each error and condence level combination. Therefore, for this experiment the robot carried out
the task a total of 12,000 times. Although repeating the experiment 100 times took many weeks,
the process was automated and required no human input after the experiment was started.
The results of the experiment are divided into two sets of graphs; these are graphs which
show the time taken to complete the task, and a single graph which shows the robot's task
completion success rate. The graphs of Figure 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 shows the task completion
time for each change in required condence level. A graph is presented for each of the four
sensor error levels. These graphs use a box-and-whisker type plot, which allows 5 summaries of
the data to be presented. These are the maximum and minimum values, the lower quartile and
upper quartile values, and the median value. As these graphs show, the higher the sensor error,
the more time it takes to complete tasks. These graphs also show that if the sensors have no
error, then the time it takes to complete tasks increases at a much lower rate. However, for the
0% error graph (7.6), the task completion time does increase with the increase of the required
condence level. This is due to the additional samples of the sensor values, which are needed to
build the required condence level.
The graph in Figure 7.10 shows the success rate of the robot completing the task for each
of the four sensor error levels. As the task was performed 100 times, the maximum success rate
was 100. As this graph shows, the success rate for completing the task increases at the same
rate for all sensor error levels greater than 0%. However, a lower sensor error level is required to
attain the highest success rate. Additionally, a dashed line is included to illustrate the point at
which the required condence level was greater than the sensor functions could produce. As one
or more safety policies required a sensor function to produce a higher condence level, before
removing restrictions on the robot's actuators, the robot was unable to complete the task. This
is also the case for the graphs of Figure 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9.
The most important nding from the results, and one which proves an essential aspect of the
system design, is that increasing the required condence level, both increases the task success
rate and increases the resilience to sensor error (see Figure 7.10). It can also be seen that if the
sensors are not subject to error, and their output can be relied on as 100% accurate, then task
completion time is only marginally aected by the change in required condence level, and the
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Figure 7.6: Task completion time results for the simulated PeopleBot experiment. No error was
applied to the sensors.
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Figure 7.7: Task completion time results for the simulated PeopleBot experiment. To simulate
sensor error, each sensor's output was adjusted by a random percentage between 0% and 1%.
The dashed line (27% condence level increase) is the point at which the required condence
level was greater than the sensor functions could produce, which prevented the robot moving.
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Figure 7.8: Task completion time results for the simulated PeopleBot experiment. To simulate
sensor error, each sensor's output was adjusted by a random percentage between 0% and 2%.
The dashed line (24% condence level increase) is the point at which the required condence
level was greater than the sensor functions could produce, which prevented the robot moving.
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Figure 7.9: Task completion time results for the simulated PeopleBot experiment. To simulate
sensor error, each sensor's output was adjusted by a random percentage between 0% and 3%.
The dashed line (22% condence level increase) is the point at which the required condence
level was greater than the sensor functions could produce, which prevented the robot moving.
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Figure 7.10: Task success rate results for the simulated PeopleBot experiment. Each of the
dashed lines represent the point at which the required condence level was greater than the
sensor functions could produce, this resulted in the robot stopping and not being able to complete
the task.
success rate is not aected at all. However, it is important to note that as this experiment is
conducted in simulation, no external factors that could prevent or delay the robot completing
its task are present.
As was discussed in Section 7.2.1, if the required condence level is increased too much,
eventually the sensor functions are not able to produce a high enough condence level to satisfy
the safety policies. Therefore, it can be concluded that increasing the required condence level
to the maximum value where the robot can still continue to operate, would be considered the
point at which the robot system is at its safest, while still being able to complete tasks.
This experiment demonstrated a common issue that was identied throughout this project,
which was how to reconcile the often opposing requirements of performing useful tasks while
remaining safe. As was shown with this experiment, if the level of caution is too high then
the robot will either be extremely slow or unable to operate at all. Conversely, if the level of
caution is too low, the added freedom the robot is given to complete tasks would also increase
the probability of an accident. This issue of safety over availability is discussed further in the
section that follows.
7.2.2 Navigation and Negotiation Experiments
In this section a series of navigation and negotiation experiments are conducted using a physical
MobileRobots PeopleBot (for hardware details see Section 3.1.2). The experiments were intended
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to demonstrate the amount of time the robot was unavailable due to safety processes restricting
the actions of the robot. The hypothesis being tested was: `If the perceived risk is increased, then
percentage of time the robot is unavailable increases'. This builds on the discussion presented in
the previous section. However, here the focus is on navigating around obstacles and negotiating
with humans.
The experiment involved the robot moving from a starting point to a nishing point 5
metres away. It was conducted at the Bristol Robotics Laboratory in a large open arena. The
experiment comprised three tasks, which were intended to represent increasing levels of risk. A
description of the tasks are as follows:
Task 1: Move from point A to point B.
Task 2: Move from point A to point B, avoiding obstacle at half-way point.
Task 3: Move from point A to point B, negotiating with human at half-way point. The robot
should take object from human and carry it to point B.
The three tasks are illustrated in Figure 7.12. The negotiation part of the experiment (Task
3), involved the robot moving from point A to point B. At the half-way point a human was
located, which the robot must identify and acknowledge, either with an audible or visual signal.
The robot must then turn to face the human, at which point the human should place an object
in the robot's gripper. When the robot has hold of the object, it must wait until the human has
moved to a safe distance and then turn and continue to point B. The robot must behave safely
at all times, which means an enhanced level of safety when operating in close proximity to the
human. A sequence of images taken from a video of the negotiation part of the experiment are
provided in Figure 7.11.
For each task the same robot hardware is used, running an identical set of safety policies.
Although the human detection policies were not necessarily required for Tasks 1 and 2, they
were included to keep the experiment consistent. Additional safety policies were used to identify
obstacles and the end position (point B). Finally, a number of controllers were used to navigate
around obstacles and negotiate with the human user.
The design of the tasks are such that they represent a progressive level of safety risk and
complexity. Therefore, it was anticipated that the robot's availability to complete tasks, com-
pared to its time spent dealing with safety, would vary between tasks. However, it was unknown
to what degree the system would be aected.
Each task of the experiment was conducted 5 times, which was considerably less repeats
than the simulation experiments. However, much time was required to set up each run of the
experiment and the robot was limited by it's battery life.
During each stage of the experiment, actuator and safety policy activation events were cap-
tured. This allowed for an analysis of the time the robot spent handling safety and the time
the robot was available to carry out the task. The graphs in Figures 7.13, 7.14 and 7.15 present
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Figure 7.11: Sequence of images taken from a video of the navigation and negotiation experiment.
The images illustrate the HRI part of the experiment (Task 3).
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Figure 7.12: Navigation and negotiation tasks. (Task 1: Move from point A to point B. Task 2:
Avoid obstacle. Task 3: Negotiate with human.).
these results. As can be seen, the activation values range from 1.0 to -1.0. The following list is
provided to help understand what these values represent:
 1.0 = Actuator on (no restrictions from safety policies)
 0.0 = Actuator o (controller responsible, not safety policies)
 -1.0 = Actuator suppressed (one or more safety policies stopped actuator)
 less than 1.0 and greater than 0.0 = Actuator on (with safety policy restriction)
As was the case with all the robot control experiments, only one actuator was ever active at
any one time. Therefore, it was possible to collate all the actuator activation results so it could
be represented as a single line on the graph. This was important, as if the results of all actuators
were presented, the graph would be dicult to understand. Although multiple actuators could
have restrictions applied at the same time, the graph shows only the restriction applied to the
actuator that is running. Where the actuator event is shown to be o, this means that all
actuators are o. Where the event is showing a suppression, this indicates that a controller was
using the actuator when the safety protection system suppressed (stopped) its output.
From the graphs alone it was dicult to make any useful observations. Therefore, the results
were further analysed and a set of timing information was calculated. This timing information
is presented in Table 7.3 and is intended to support the graph results. The timing information
presented in the table shows the percentage of time the actuators spent in any one state. The
percentage is based on the total time it took to complete the task. For these results, the actuator
could be in one of four activation states. These were, active with no restrictions, active with
restrictions, o as set by a controller and suppressed as set by a safety policy.
It is important to remember that throughout the task, the safety protection system is con-
stantly active and checking for perceived conditions that violate the safety policies. As the table
of results show, for Task 2, the safety protection system is preventing the actuators potential
output 56.93% of the time (restrictions + suppression). For Task 3, this is reduced slightly to
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Figure 7.13: Actuator activations and restrictions graph { Task 1: Basic.
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Figure 7.14: Actuator activations and restrictions graph { Task 2: Obstacle avoidance.
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% Time in Quartile Ranges Standard
Actuator State Q1 Q2 Q3 Deviation
Actuators Active (no restrictions)
Task 1 59.10% 58.00 59.3 59.83 1.48
Task 2 32.31% 30.75 32.80 33.70 1.66
Task 3 18.99% 18.95 19.00 19.00 1.90
Actuators Active (with restrictions)
Task 1 27.27% 27.20 27.40 27.55 0.62
Task 2 52.31% 51.80 52.85 52.89 0.79
Task 3 41.77% 41.50 41.90 41.98 1.10
Actuators O
Task 1 11.36% 10.50 11.50 11.73 0.77
Task 2 10.77% 10.60 11.00 11.38 0.83
Task 3 30.38% 30.00 30.00 31.60 2.09
Actuators Suppressed
Task 1 2.27% 2.10 2.15 2.44 0.24
Task 2 4.62% 4.00 4.8 4.88 0.61
Task 3 8.86% 9.00 9.05 9.09 0.69
Table 7.3: Actuator activation times for the navigation and negotiation experiments. Shows the
average percentage of time spent in dierent actuator states.
50.63%. However, the time the actuators are suppressed is almost double that of Task 2, and
almost four times that of Task 1. Furthermore, the results show that for the HRI task (Task
3), when the actuators are active, there are no restrictions applied for only 18.99% of the time.
For Task 1, the robot actuators are active with no restrictions for 59.10% of the duration of the
task.
The table of results show that for Task 1 the actuators were o for 11.36% of the time.
This was due to the controllers pausing to build condence levels. Interestingly, during Task 2
(avoid obstacle), the actuators were o for less time than Task 1. This was due to the obstacle
avoidance controller, which was operating while the actuators were being restricted by the safety
protection system. These restrictions made the robot move slower, which in turn gave more time
for the sensor functions to build condence levels, without the robot needing to stop.
Task 3 of the experiment, which required negotiating with a human, could not be conducted
as desired. This was due to the diculty of reliably identifying a human. As has been discussed
throughout the thesis, a number of approaches for human identication have been used during
this project. Including, face recognition, skeletal tracking and body temperature. However,
none of these techniques could be applied to the task. This was due to issues with identication
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while the robot was moving; identifying humans from a side view; and identication over large
distances and close up. Therefore, for this task the same sonar distance sensors, which were
used to detect obstacles in Task 2, were also used to detect for the presence of a human. This
problem with reliably identifying humans limited the number of HRI experiments that could be
conducted during this project.
One potential issue identied with this experiment is that the results are heavily reliant on
the human and obstacle sensor functions. Therefore, if more precise algorithms and sensors were
used, the results may be dierent. The following section presents the nal series of experiments,
which examine in isolation key features of the control system design.
7.3 System Execution Testing
This section analyses key parts of the safety-driven control system in more detail than the
previous experiments. The motivation behind these experiments is to demonstrate how the
control system performs normally and in the presence of faults.
7.3.1 Handling Controller Faults
To demonstrate the eectiveness of the safety protection system in preventing the controllers
from violating one or more safety policies, and potentially causing an unsafe event, we have
conducted experiments using fault injection. In this context a fault is a request to activate an
actuator, which is currently being restricted by one or more safety policies. Ideally controllers
should not produce these types of activations, as they should be designed to rst check the state
of the actuator for any applied safety policies before making action requests. The hypothesis
tested in this section is: `If a controller requests an actuator to activate while a safety policy is
suppressing it, then the safety policy will prevent this request, and the actuator will not move'.
Fault injection, also known as fault insertion testing, is a widely used experimental validation
technique for demonstrating the fault tolerance of a variety of systems (Svenningsson et al.,
2010). Work by Lussier et al. (2007), has shown the eectiveness of using fault-injection for
validating an implementation of the LAAS architecture. In their work they examined the impact
of adding dierent levels of redundancy to the planner element of the system, by rst injecting
faults and then analysing how the system behaved in the presence of these faults.
An experiment was conducted using a simulated MobileRobots PeopleBot developed with
MRDS. The robot sorting task was used for the experiment, which involved picking up an item
from one location and depositing it in another location. While the task was being carried out, a
fault was injected into a controller which requested the activation of the actuator that moves the
robot forward. Although all actuators are treated equally, and therefore any could have been
used in the experiment, we chose the forward actuator as this type of movement has the most
hazards associated with it. The results from the experiment are presented in Figure 7.16.
As the results show, 72 seconds into the task a forward actuator request is denied. This
request was injected into the controller while the safety policy that stops the robot running into
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Figure 7.16: Robot sorting task results: Demonstrating that a forward request injected into a
controller (at time 72 seconds), while the safety protection system is restricting the actuator,
can be detected. Only the safety policy `At Table' is shown as it is responsible for restricting
the forward actuator at the time the request is made.
Chapter 7. Experiments and Results 119
the table (where the object to pick up is located) was active. The role of this safety policy is to
disable the forward actuator if a table is detected in front of the robot. If this request was not
suppressed, then the robot would have collided with the table.
As has already been alluded to, the safety-driven control system is both behavioural, in
terms of how the system can react to safety restrictions, and planned based, in terms of how
planning is used to determine how tasks should be completed. To validate systems that have
reactive elements, traditional methods tend to analyse the systems' mechanisms and not the
behaviour. In this context, the mechanisms can be thought of as the system functions, whereas
the behaviour is the ways in which the system functions interact during operation. A study
by Swarup and Ramaiah (2009) observed that analysis of system behaviour in order to identify
violations in safety constraints will become an increasingly important aspect of safety-critical
system verication, as the complexity of systems continue to increase. By removing safety
functions from the control layer we have reduced its complexity and therefore the verication
eort required. These processes still need to be veried within the safety protection system.
However, as discussed in Section 6.2.1, this can be tested in isolation and potentially be exported
for use on other hardware without requiring any changes.
The results from our fault-injection experiment show that the safety protection system is
capable of suppressing actuator requests that may invalidate a safety policy and cause an unsafe
event. Although these results are to be expected as the safety policy will always activate when
an obstruction is detected preventing the robot moving forward. The purpose of this experiment
is to demonstrate the importance of the safety protection system and how the controllers do
not necessarily need to be fault free. What the results clearly show is that it is possible to
detect when a controller attempts to invalidate a safety policy. This opens up the possibility
that controllers could be made more adaptable by, for instance, using this event information
as reinforcement to change how they behave in certain conditions. For example, if a safety
policy is activated unexpectedly when a controller is avoiding an obstacle, it could use this
information to adjust its control routine. Over time this could allow the robot to navigate
around its environment more eciently. This type of learning could be applied to any type of
task, for example it could equally be applied to learning which type of verbal communication
is most appropriate in a given situation to get the desired response from the user. Finally, as
we have demonstrated, the fact that controllers do not need to be fault free to keep the system
safe, gives more scope on how changes to controllers and the control mode selection module can
be made.
7.3.2 Detecting Sensor Faults and Failures
Building on the results presented in the previous section here we discuss how sensor faults and
failures are handled by the sensor functions. As before, fault injection is used to simulate how
the control system behaves in the presence of a fault.
This section details two experiments that were conceived to test the hypotheses: `If faults
are applied to a sensor's output, then the sensor function condence level will decrease, which
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can be detected by a safety policy' and `If a sensor stops outputting values, then the sensor
function condence level will decrease, which can be detected by a safety policy'.
The experiments used a single ultrasonic sensor from the MobileRobots PeopleBot (for hard-
ware details see Section 3.1.2). The ultra sonic sensor detects the distance of the nearest object
it is pointed at and outputs a value in millimetres. A sensor function was then created which
sampled the sensor value and outputted it as its own value. In many cases sensor functions are
more complicated than this, manipulating data taken from multiple sources. However, to make
the experiment clearer a simple sensor function was used.
To demonstrate how the sensor function aected the control system, a safety policy was
devised. This safety policy (shown below) compared the sensor function value, named `obsta-
cle distance', with the minimum acceptable distance, in this case 200 mm. If either the obstacle
distance value fell below 200, or the condence level fell below 0.7, the forward actuator was
stopped.
1 IF ob s t a c l e d i s t a n c e < 200
2 AND con f i d e n c e l e v e l >= 0.7
3 THEN forward ac tuato r . speed mode = stop
4 FINALLY return s a f e t y r a t i n g based on c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l
Each of the experiments were conducted 10 times and the mean average was used to plot
the results. The rst experiment injected two faults into the sensor output. The result of this
is shown in the graph of Figure 7.17. These faults, one at 7500 ms and another at 12500 ms,
were produced by means of a software function initiated by clicking the computer mouse. The
dashed line at the condence level 0.7 identies the point at which the safety policy is triggered.
As can be seen on the graph, the condence level drops signicantly when faults occur, which in
turn triggers the safety policy. After a number of further samples are taken, the condence level
increases to the same level prior to the fault being detected. The condence level value has been
truncated to 0, as the safety policies only use values greater than or equal to 0. However, the
condence level calculation (see Section 6.3.1) produces negative numbers when there is a large
variance in the sensor function output. This data can be used by the control layer to understand
the degree of variance of the sensor functions used in a safety policy.
For the second experiment we considered a total sensor failure. This meant that the sensor
produced no output that could be read by the system. The result is shown in the graph of
Figure 7.18. The failure occurred at 6450 ms and again was triggered manually by means of a
software function. As a result of the sensor not producing any real output, the sensor interface
outputs an error value of -1.0. As part of the sensor function process, all sensor values are
checked for errors. Therefore, when this error value is detected, it triggers the sensor function
to output its error value, which in this case is also -1.0. As was discussed in Section 6.3.1,
when a sensor function identies an error, the condence level is not calculated and instead the
condence level 0 is returned. Additionally a ag is set to identify that the sensor has failed.
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Figure 7.17: Obstacle distance output { Faults injected at 7500 ms and 12500 ms.
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Figure 7.18: Obstacle distance output { Failure at 6450 ms.
Both sets of results demonstrate how the condence level is an integral part of a safety policy.
By specifying a level under which actuators are restricted the safety protection system is able
to manage sensor faults and failures which may lead to an unsafe event. The following section
considers timing issues that arise from using safety policies and condence levels.
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7.3.3 Timing Issues
The design of the experiments discussed in this thesis do not require the robot to operate quickly,
nor do they require actions of the robot to be performed in parallel. This was not a conscious
decision and may have come about from using the hierarchical task analysis model described in
Section 7.1.1. As each action of the robot (moving forward, closing gripper, etc.) was performed
sequentially, we found that delays caused by safety policies needing to take multiple sensor
samples to build condence did not unduly impact the robot's task mission.
To demonstrate the eect of processing safety policies we have examined the human detection
safety policy presented in Section 5.3.2. This safety policy was chosen as it takes the longest
time to process. This policy is responsible for detecting the presence of any humans that may
be standing in front of the robot. If a human is detected then the actuators for moving forward
are restricted. The time taken to identify a human standing in front of the robot is 44 ms, and
the number of samples required to conrm the presence of the human is 4. In addition to the
processing time of the safety policy, is the overhead of the other polices and control functions
executing concurrently. This equates to an average time (based on 20 trials) of 218 ms, from
the human standing in front of the robot, to the safety policy restricting the actuators. The
wheel speed of the robot is restricted to 0.15 m/s, this means that potentially the robot can
travel 0.0327 metres (32.7 mm) in the time it takes to restrict the actuators. For the type of
mobile robot we are using, this delay between a hazard entering the vicinity of the robot and the
restriction being applied presents only a low risk. However, this could present a potential issue
for robots which require faster movement. For example a humanoid robot with high-functioning
arms.
These timing issues could be alleviated by distributing the processing across multiple com-
puter systems, using more accurate sensors and faster processing algorithms for computationally
intensive problems such as human detection.
7.4 Perception and the Safety of Personal Robots
This thesis has discussed many of the challenges facing robot developers in creating a personal
robot that can operate at an acceptably safe level. This has required both considering what an
`acceptably safe level' is, and how it can be achieved.
One of the conclusions of this thesis is that, based on the current state of technology, it
is not possible to produce an autonomous personal robot of the type outlined in this thesis,
which can operate safely in a dynamic environment. This, possibly controversial conclusion,
was reached due to the particular safety requirements of a personal robot, which are unlike any
other safety critical system. However, it is realistic to assume that a semi-autonomous robot,
with the human user taking a much greater role in the control of the robot, could carry out useful
tasks in certain situations. For example, if the robot was unable to move due to a perceived
hazard, the human user could take control of the robot, and guide it to the point where the
robot no longer perceived the hazard. In a situation where the human is controlling the robot,
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the consequence of the robot's actions could be considered the responsibility of the human user.
In this section we will consider the safety requirements that are specic to personal robots
and the issues which need to be addressed, and technologies developed, before they can be
fully resolved. This discussion builds on some of the observations made in Section 4.3.1 and
Section 5.4.
7.4.1 Understanding and Reasoning
In Section 5.4 we introduced the concept of online hazard analysis. As the name suggests, this
involves conducting hazard analysis automatically on the robot, while it is operating in its target
environment. It was argued that this type of analysis process will be required for a personal
robot, if it's to handle all the complexities of an unstructured dynamic environment.
As has been argued, for a robot to operate safely in a dynamic environment, it will need a
high level of perception and some understanding of the dierent entities it encounters. This will
require the robot to identify all the objects in its vicinity, including people and the structure
of the building e.g. door ways, steps, etc. At present, the technology for identifying individual
objects is limited, which seems to not be an issue with sensors, but an issue with interpreting
sensor data. At the time of writing this thesis, the majority of research into personal robotics is
concerned with navigation and obstacle avoidance. Furthermore, little progress has been made
on identifying common objects found in public environments (although research is ongoing), and
none of this research is looking at ways to identify if any of these objects could be considered
hazardous. The Willow Garage PR2 robot, one of the most sophisticated personal robots,
has demonstrated that it can create 3D models of its environment while navigating (Hornung
et al., 2012). However, this model is used only for path planning and individual objects in the
environment can not be recognised.
The environmental survey results (see Section 4.3) revealed a number of scenarios where
a personal robot may nd it dicult to operate. In these situations pure obstacle avoidance
would not be sucient, as the robot would continually encounter objects in close proximity,
which would prevent the robot from moving. However, it was observed that for many of these
obstacles, the robot could safely come into contact, or near contact, without causing a safety
risk. This of course depends on the type of object, for example there would likely be little risk
in coming into contact with a pot plant or a window curtain.
The ability to identify and categorise hazards, although seemingly important for personal
robots, is not sucient by itself. For example, a thermal camera could be used to detect
hot objects, which would be of benet if you simply wanted to avoid hot objects. However,
most items in an environment can be considered hazardous in certain situations, and in other
circumstances pose little or no risk. Therefore, as was stated in Section 5.4, it seems that where
the robot is located and what task it is carrying out, is important information for decision
making. The robot must be able to take what it knows about particular objects and reason how
it may pose a risk, both in its current state and with robot interaction.
The type of reasoning process discussed in this section does not yet exist, and there is no
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reason to assume it will be developed in the near future. This is because in essence it is a strong
AI (articial intelligence) problem, which is extremely hard to achieve. Furthermore, it seems
reasonable to predict that even with this type of reasoning system, the robot will not be 100%
safe. Therefore, there will always a trade o between risk and reward. This is the case in the
aerospace industry, where the convenience of travel, and the comparable safety of other forms
of transport, is greater than the risk to passengers of injury or death. Although beyond the
scope of this project, it seems clear that a risk / value calculation should be considered when
developing personal robots. In this context, the `value' may not just be to the individual or
individuals, but to society as a whole.
The section that follows considers the issues with operating in environments designed for
humans, and how this may aect the design requirements of a personal robot.
7.4.2 Operating in Environments Designed For Humans
As personal robots will be required to operate in public spaces, it seems logical to consider
how humans operate in these environments. Modelling personal robots on humans is something
that was not necessary for industrial robots, as the environment could be adjusted to t the
requirements of the robot. Furthermore, industrial robots generally do not need to interact with
humans or handle objects designed specically for humans.
Humans have evolved many innate survival tactics that keep themselves and those they wish
to protect safe. However, they must also learn and adapt safety skills for whatever environment
they are placed in. For humans it is clear that surviving in an urban environment requires
dierent skills to those needed for an environment such as a desert or jungle. This ability to
adapt to dierent environments is something which has evolved in many types of organic life
over millions of years. Furthermore, the complex reasoning processes and ability to conceptualise
a situation, which humans can use to keep themselves safe, requires complex thought that at
its highest level is something which is unique to humans. One argument for why it is believed
personal robots will need this type of complex sensing and reasoning process, is that if we
consider humans with moderate cognitive or sensory deciencies, it can often be the case that
they are unable to function safely without supervision; and the more extreme the impairment
the less likely the human will be able to behave safely. Although of course humans are very
dierent to robots, in this case it is a reasonable comparison as personal robots will be required
to operate in human environments and complete human-type tasks.
In Section 4.3 results were presented from a number of environmental surveys. One of the
observations made during the survey of the cafe, was that humans tend to operate in close
proximity to each other, and often come in contact while navigating their surroundings. It was
clear that in this environment a robot would not be able to operate, as the chance of collision
would be so high, the robot would be in a constant state of avoidance. It is also important to note,
that the cafe, like many public spaces, adheres to strict health and safety regulations. Therefore
much of the environment will have been structured to reduce the risk to patrons. However, in
other environments, such as people's homes, this type of structuring may be minimal and vary
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radically between locations.
Humans make continual alterations to the environments they occupy. This can be a minimal
change, such as moving small objects, or more substantial changes, such as moving furniture. If
personal robots are to continue operating in these ever changing environments, they will need
to be able to adapt. Even seemingly innocuous changes such as opening a window or turning
on a light, may also cause problems for some robot sensors. These types of issues are something
which has not been a problem for developers in the past, as a key requirement of traditional
industrial robots, is that humans are not allowed to interfere with the robot and the operating
conditions must remain constant.
It is also important to consider the ways in which humans may interact with the robot.
These interactions may occur as part of the robot's operating task, or at unscheduled times as
dictated by the user. Examples of these unscheduled interactions are: the user cleaning the
robot, removing or adding items to the robot or moving the robot manually (if it is causing an
obstruction). As was discussed in Chapter 5, the majority of interactions between the robot
and the human are potentially hazardous. However, unscheduled interactions are particularly
problematic, as they can interrupt the normal task sequence and potentially confuse the robot.
Subsequently this could cause the robot to perform untimely actions, which out of sequence
could be dangerous.
In this section we have discussed the current state of personal robot safety research and
presented a conclusion on some of the issues that still need to be resolved. Many of these
issues are unique to personal robots, in particular when compared to more traditional industrial
robots, it is clear that operating in close proximity to humans, presents a major risk factor
that needs to be addressed before personal robots can be made available to the general public.
These conclusions are based on the experimentation and literature survey carried out during
this project.
7.5 Summary
This chapter has presented ndings from a number of experiments that were carried our during
this project. The design and fundamental aim of these experiments has been to explore and
answer the research questions set out in the introduction (Section 1.2). This ultimately meant
demonstrating two key aspects of the work. First, that the hazard check list could improve
traditional hazard analysis techniques for identifying safety risks associated with personal robots.
Secondly, that the safety-driven control system could eectively control a personal robot safely.
The environmental survey, created at the beginning of this project, proved essential for
understanding the types and volume of hazards that a personal robot may encounter. These
ndings were used to create the hazard check list, which was ultimately integrated into the
hazard analysis process. Hazard analysis was carried out using a modied HAZOP process
complemented with the hazard check list. This combined method proved successful, as it was
demonstrated that more hazards were identied than using the traditional hazard analysis tech-
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nique on its own. However, it was concluded that these results would likely be improved if the
hazard check list considered more environments.
Results have been presented demonstrating a personal robot using the safety-driven control
system to successfully complete tasks. However, the degree to which the control system can
maintain safety of the robot is still in question. This is due mainly to the robot hardware, which
was not of high enough precision. Although there are much more advanced robots commercially
available, such as the Willow Garage PR2 (Rooks, 2006), it is unlikely that even this state of the
art robot system would have the required sensory technology to perceive all potential hazards
associated with a complex dynamic environment. Furthermore, it was not possible to make any
comparisons with other personal robot control systems, as there are currently none available.
However, it is clear that the safety protection system can take safety requirements from the
functional hazard analysis process and encode them in such a way that they are explicitly
represented in the system as safety policies. Finally, it has been shown that these safety policies
are indeed capable of driving decisions in the control layer, simply by enforcing restrictions on
the actuators.
The chapter that follows presents the nal conclusions of the thesis. The achievements of
the project are assessed and a critical discussion of the way in which the work was carried out is
given. Finally, a number of proposals are presented for how this research could be taken forward
in the future.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
This nal chapter summaries the work presented in this thesis and gives an overview of the
research. The main achievements are discussed and the novel contributions to robotics are
highlighted. This is followed by a critical assessment of the research, where any deciencies or
weaknesses are addressed. Finally a number of proposals will be presented on how the work can
be taken forward in the future.
8.1 Thesis Overview
The research presented in this thesis set out to investigate novel approaches for the safety
of human-robot interaction (HRI). In this thesis we have presented a number of development
techniques, which aim to improve the safety of personal robots. The approach we have taken
has been based on a study of existing techniques, which revealed that those currently used
in robotic development, have signicant limitations for designing safe personal robots. This
leads us to propose a methodology where a high-level safety system is developed as part of the
hazard analysis process. As described, this safety protection system is used to both verify the
implementation of the safety requirements and to act as a real-time safety manager, preventing
the controllers from performing unsafe actions.
The development costs for safety-critical systems, such as those used in the rail, nuclear
and aviation industries, can be signicant. For personal robots there is no evidence to suggest
that development costs of safety systems will be any less signicant. Therefore it is clear that
reducing the eort required to identify and implement safety systems will in turn reduce the
costs. The methodology we have developed allows the designer to systemically identify hazards
and implement those safety requirement solutions that are associated with the control system.
The result of this process is that the safety protection system, which in addition to being part
of the working system, can also be used to analyse the generated safety policies and identify any
inconsistencies.
A criticism of traditional hazard analysis techniques that was observed during the literature
review, is that they generally overlook hazards not associated directly with the system mission.
For personal robots operating in unstructured environments, this is a real problem. This is due
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to the large number of hazards associated with things such as, obstacles, people, animals, etc.;
and also environmental conditions, such as lighting and air movement. To help overcome these
issues a hazard check list was created. The aim of this check list is to aid robot designers in
identifying hazards that are not directly associated with the robot's task. The hazard check list
was developed by carefully examining a number of environments that a personal robot may be
required to operate in, and noting all the hazards that were present. In order to consistently
perform analysis of the environments, an environmental survey methodology was developed. As
has been discussed in the thesis, it is likely that the hazard check list will benet from the
ndings from additional environments and dierent types of robot application.
A personal robot development methodology has been proposed, which brings together the
hazard analysis and control system work developed during this project. To test the viability of
the methodology, a number of robotic tasks were considered. Hazard analysis was performed,
producing a number of safety requirements. From these requirements, safety policies were de-
vised and implemented to form the safety protection system. Finally, the controllers were created
and the control mode selection module was synchronised with the safety policies.
To demonstrate the safety-driven control system in operation we have presented a series of
results showing how safety and control events are generated over time. From these results it
is possible to visualise how the activation of safety policies cause the associated actuators to
become inactive.
To establish the degree of fault tolerance achieved by our control system, we performed
two dierent experiments using fault injection. The rst of these experiments considered how
erroneous control actions are handled in the control layer. A fault was injected into one of the
controllers in the form of a request, which activated the forward drive actuator. This involved
running the system normally and at a time when a safety policy was active, sending a command
to the actuator interface from the control layer to switch the forward actuator on. As we
have discussed, we are able to both prevent hazardous actuator requests and identify the time
and frequency that they occur. The second of these fault injection experiments looked at how
sensor faults and failures are managed in the control system by means of condence levels. This
experiment used the same method of fault injection, simulating both an intermittent fault and
a complete sensor failure.
The section that follows presents a critical discussion of the work presented in this thesis
and looks at how some of the key decisions were made.
8.2 Critical Assessment
At each major stage of this research there was a deliberate pause, to look back over the work
that had been done and plan how the work should progress. Naturally, by focusing on some
areas other areas could not be given as much consideration. In this section a critical assessment
of the research methods is made. Although much of the thesis has discussed the strengths
and weaknesses of each component of the project, here a critical eye is cast on the developed
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technologies and their impact on personal robot safety.
As was observed throughout this thesis, the eld of personal robotics safety is relatively
understudied. A few examples have been found in the literature of robot control systems that
have been developed with safety in mind, such as that produced at LAAS (Bensalem et al.,
2009) and as part of the PHRIENDS project (Alami et al., 2006). However, these control
systems were not available during this project, and the literature did not provide enough details
to recreate the systems or make any direct comparisons. Therefore, it has not been possible to
make quantitative comparisons with other robot control systems. However, although the safety-
driven control system could not be compared with other similar control systems, it is clear from
the experimental work that it can be used to control a personal robot. Furthermore, it has been
shown that the safety protection system, made up of a collection of safety policies, can be used
to drive control decisions.
It could be argued that a failing of this project, is that the control part of the safety-driven
control system did not receive as much attention as the safety part. For example, the research
could have considered more rened methods for selecting controllers and looked at further ways
that safety processes could be used to aid decision making. Although the control aspect of the
control system was of critical importance, the focus of the project work had to be primarily
on handling safety. This, as was observed during the literature review, was the area of work
where the most impact could be made. Although there is always more work that can be done,
it is believed that the control side has been considered in enough details to demonstrate the
principles of the safety-driven control system.
The use of simulation environments proved to be an essential tool for both testing and exper-
imentation. With simulation, is was possible to test many dierent control system designs much
faster than with robot hardware. Initially, it was thought that simulation was only appropriate
for testing purposes and not for running experiments. This was due to the argument that the
simulation could not model the types of unstructured environments that were being considered
in this project. However, as testing in simulation commenced, it soon became apparent that
the simulation environment could be made to replicate some of the randomness found in the
real world. This was achieved by placing objects in varying positions, varying the weight and
dimensions of certain objects and crucially, adding pseudo-random sensor errors. Additionally,
it was also possible to change the properties of the environment, so that for example surfaces had
less friction, which in turn made it more dicult to pick up objects and caused wheel slippage.
Although with these changes it was possible to make the simulation more realistic, it did ulti-
mately prove to not be entirely necessary. This is due to the nature of the experiments, which
were more focused on demonstrating that the developed control system functioned correctly,
and was capable of completing tasks appropriately.
In Appendix G (Section G.1.1) a software tool was introduced for coding safety requirements
using a GUI. This tool allows a user to create safety policies by simply selecting sensors and
actuators from drop down boxes and specifying the type of restrictions that should be applied
when a particular condition is satised. If this software tool is considered in isolation, it could be
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argued that it is a simple prototyping tool for describing safety requirements. Many prototyping
tools exist for software development, and they are used primarily for aiding the design process
and in some cases creating the structure of the software code. However, where this software tool
is dierent is that it actually generates all the safety policy code and all the code needed to run
the safety protection system.
8.3 Future Work
From the inception of this project, the application for the developed safety methods has been
for personal robots. However, much of the work is applicable to other application domains,
including those not related to robotics. The concept of safety polices, developed in this thesis,
could potentially be used in any system that makes use of one or more software safety systems. It
may also be interesting to see if there are any benets in separating safety and control processes
for other types of system.
There is a huge scope for future work that could build on this project. The remainder of
this section considers the most important and interesting of this future work.
Selecting the most appropriate controller: The most pressing future work will be to ex-
plore, and develop further, the control layer of the safety-driven control system. This will
involve considering in more detail how safety processes are handled and utilised within
the control layer. The interaction between the control layer and the safety processes takes
place mainly within the controllers. The control mode selection module is responsible
for orchestrating these controllers. Additional research is needed to investigate the best
way of determining which controller should be selected at any given time. Currently the
selection process is some what xed, controllers are either chosen in a set order to allow
the robot to complete its mission, or are chosen in the event of one or more restrictions
being applied by the safety protection system. Although this approach adds a great deal
of exibility, the control mode selection is presently only using the current restrictions and
the current task information to make a decision on which controller to select. It is believed
that by incorporating history data, which details what controllers were selected and what
the sensory data was at the time, with context information about the robots location and
the location of other entities in the robots working area, it could improve the control mode
selection process.
Safety protection system verication: System verication is an essential process for deter-
mining whether a system complies with its specication. Although verication for the
system as a whole is important, the design of our control system means that the safety
protection system is arguably more important. This is due to all the safety processes be-
ing contained within the safety protection system. Therefore, if this is incorrect it could
lead to a dangerous situations. However, if the control layer is incorrect, then the safety
protection system will stop the control layer from operating and put the robot into a safe
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state. To improve verication of the safety protection system, future work is required to
further develop the safety policy analysis tool discussed in Section 6.2.1. Presently this tool
can only identify relationships between two safety polices that share the same resource.
Therefore, if there is a conict that involves three or more safety policies, this will not
be detected. The ability to detect conicts between all related safety polices, would both
improve the verication process and help identify mistakes in the system specication.
Learning techniques for improving the control system: The idea of using learning to im-
prove the control system has been proposed in this thesis. However, it was not possible
to explore this idea in detail, as it did not t within the scope of the work. Learning
could be potentially useful for adjusting safety policies to cope with new environments
and to adapt control processes to work around safety restrictions, increasing availability.
Presently there are no learning mechanisms within the control system design, although
the system makes extensive use of functions that adapt to changing conditions. In this
thesis we have described how the system can react to changes in environmental conditions,
both actual and perceived. However, these can be considered as behavioural routines as
the system is simply reacting to changes within a pre-dened safe threshold. To move
outside this threshold it is key for the system to learn new information. The main issue we
face with developing learning mechanisms is how to make internal changes to the safety
protection system without causing inadvertent unsafe events. For humans, errors and mis-
judgements are all part of the learning process (Leveson, 1995). However, in the majority
of circumstances it will be unacceptable to allow the robot to reach a state where it could
cause a hazard, particularly if these hazards put humans at risk.
Internal simulator: An interesting piece of future work was conceived while developing the
simulations for the experimental work. The idea is that the simulation could be used as
an internal real-time task evaluator for a physical robot. This would involve the robot
perceiving its environment, modelling it in simulation and then trying out various sim-
ulated scenarios, evaluating each for possible hazards. The robot could then choose to
complete the task in a safe and ecient way. Based on the success of the chosen scenario,
reinforcement could be fed back into the simulation in order to improve its results.
Online hazard analysis: The concept of performing hazard analysis on a robot while deployed
in its target environment was discussed in Section 5.4. As was observed, it seems likely
that in the future personal robots will have to perform a degree of risk assessment and
safety analysis in order to continue to operate in ever changing environments. As a natural
progression to the research described in this thesis, future work is needed to understand
how human safety analysts can take short-cuts in their reasoning while performing analy-
ses, in what is otherwise a branching-time problem. This should provide a valuable insight
into how a robot can or should perform this type of analysis as part of an online process.
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8.4 Final Comments
This thesis has put forward the argument that robots intended for applications such as domestic
or personal care will be required to perform a wide variety of complex tasks involving sophisti-
cated sensory processing and action generation. Therefore, the number and diversity of possible
interactions with the environment, and other dynamic entities such as humans, could be much
higher than the number required of many contemporary applications. It is foreseeable that in
the future, robots will be required to operate in close contact with humans in ever changing
environments. These anticipated robotic applications will require the use of adaptive learning
or evolutionary computational processes, which change over time in order to continue providing
their functions throughout the operational life of the robot. The implication of adaptation fea-
tures of robot operation is that the manual performance of safety analyses at design time is likely
to become infeasible. Since the number of interactions between the robot and its environment
is much greater, the eort required for the analysis will be increased. Therefore, it is likely that
analysis processes will become impractical without automation, which at the present time does
not exist.
We believe that the research presented in this thesis provides a logical process for developing
and analysing the safety of a personal robot. In addition, by using safety policies a designer
has the exibility to add or adapt safety systems in order to change how the robot reacts in
any given situation. Finally, the ability to explicitly encode safety requirements and verify they
are correctly implemented within the control system could be used to support the robot's safety
case and provide evidence for safety certication.
The ndings presented in this thesis have shown that it is essential for safety that a robot
can understand its environment and identify potential hazards. This argument is based partly
on the observations of how humans behave, and more crucially, on the reasoning that if the
robot is not aware of its surrounding and the varying risks that dierent objects and situations
pose, then any decision the robot makes must be based on the belief that it is operating at the
highest level of risk. To operate with any other belief would mean the robot would be eectively
operating under the understanding that its actions are not as safe as they could otherwise be.
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APPENDIX A
Entity Creator
Figure A.1: Entity creator { Table.
Figure A.2: Entity creator { Object.
APPENDIX B
Safety Architecture Designs
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Figure B.1: Architecture design { Process sensor data sequentially.
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Figure B.2: Architecture design { Subsumption type architecture.
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Figure B.3: Architecture design { Only allow lower-layer to execute when upper-layer is idle.
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Figure B.4: Architecture design { Decision unit decides if lower-level can execute.
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Figure B.5: Architecture design { Post task events so they can be read by all other layers.
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Figure B.6: Architecture design { Post task events and parallel execution.
APPENDIX C
Environmental Survey
Home (living room)
Level of risk 
(approx.)
Glass aquarium low to high
Chairs and sofa low
Trailing cables from consoles medium to high
Hot drink on small table high
Large rug (7 mm step from floor height) low to high
2 x windows low to medium
4 way power extension, on floor, facing up (2 empty sockets) low
Tall book shelf low
Curtains trailing on floor low to medium
In daylight windows cause drastic change in lighting.  At night fixed lighting causes areas of shadow low to high
Metal carpet transition strip between rooms low to medium
Under stairs area slopes from ceiling height to the floor low to medium
Electric fire on far wall low to high
Portraits on the walls (could this cause a problem with recognising people?) low to medium
Noise levels vary depending on if the windows are open low to medium
No thermostat so the temperature can carry greatly (especially if windows are opened) low
Chair reclines, so foot rest can project into the main living space low to medium
Wi-Fi router and wireless telephone in room low
Large plant in corner of room low
Smoke alarm in hallway (property has no gas) risk reduction
Expensive electrical items (television, games console) none (cost)
Expensive to replace carpet, rugs, furniture (also expensive to clean) none (cost)
Light coloured walls, would mark easily none (cost)
Power outlets on three walls low
Occupant is free to smoke, and has complete access to the entire location medium to high
Occupant has complete access to the entire location low
The number of occupants can go up, but not quickly as with the café low to medium
Magazines on floor low
Single entrance and exit low
Large television (would change lighting and faces and people could be displayed) low
Music system, television and games console would produce voice sounds low to medium
Clothes horse with damp washing (this would not be present all the time) low
Often only one person present (No other people to raise alarm if something untoward happened) medium to high
Cushions on floor low
Café (seated area)
Level of risk 
(approx.)
Different table heights low to medium
Different seating heights low to medium
Steps down from seating area to entrance high
Carpeted and non-carpeted areas low to medium
Metal carpet transition strip between rooms (4 mm step) low to medium
Entrance of shop is glass.  No windows on other 3 walls low
Customers with prams and wheel chairs required seating changes (customers moved seating) low to medium
Multiple collisions between customers and staff witnessed medium to high
Serviettes dropped on floor (could cause problem with obstacle detection) low
People's ages ranged from very young (months old) to elderly medium to high
Children walking around seating area medium to high
Babies in baskets placed on tables, chairs and floor high
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Volume of people varied greatly. Large influx of people during lunch (no seats free during lunch time) high
20+ hot drinks, milk jugs on tables high
Food and drinks dropped on floor medium to high
Wet floor sign in middle of floor low to medium
Staff identifiable by uniform risk reduction
Noise levels varied (some screams and other loud noises from children) low to medium
High humidity and temperature near drinks preparation area low to medium
Fire extinguishers available risk reduction
No restriction on customers clothing or items such as back packs, hand bags and suit cases low to medium
Customers with wet clothes and umbrellas low to medium
Fire exit at rear of store risk reduction
Expensive items on tables (mobile phones, wallets) none (cost)
Expensive items on floor (handbags, shoes, clothing) none (cost)
No smoking allowed risk reduction
Walls, floors and furniture is durable none (cost)
Walkway not wide enough for a wheelchair and a person (person must step into table area) low to medium
Customers carrying large trays of hot drinks and food high
Customers hard of hearing and impaired eye sight low to medium
Lots of people present to identify issues and report to staff risk reduction
As with all businesses a first aider would be present at all times risk reduction
Customers and employees behave differently (experience, familiarity with environment) low to medium
large mirrored panels on rear wall low to medium
Electronics Factory (shop floor)
Level of risk 
(approx.)
No elderly people, no people under 16. risk reduction
Everyone in building has to be given permission to enter risk reduction
Generally a lot of people.  At lunchtime could be no people (sudden surge after lunch) medium to high
Wide walkways, from one end of the shop floor to the other (no winding routes) risk reduction
Dangerous chemicals and fumes from soldering medium to high
Dangerous tools (knives, soldering irons, etc..) medium to high
Areas restricted by signs (both on the walls and the floor) low
No windows, all lighting from florescent strip-lights risk reduction
Noisy environment (fans and machinery) low
Fitted with sprinkler system and fire extinguishers risk reduction
Fire exits must not be blocked (robot could not wait near fire exit) low to medium
Expensive equipment and products being manufactured none (cost)
Walls, floors and furniture is durable none (cost)
Main ceiling height is 8 metres (approx.) none to low
Lots of people present to identify issues risk reduction
First aider present at all times (on-site medical centre) risk reduction
On-site health and safety supervisor (performs daily health and safety checks) risk reduction
Automated guided vehicles used in warehouse (employees aware of automated robots) risk reduction
No food or open drinks containers allowed on shop floor risk reduction
Rules on clothing and safety equipment such as safety glasses and gloves (where appropriate) risk reduction
Professional culture, employees are used to working and behaving safely risk reduction
Rows of benches obscure clear sight across shop floor at a level under 1.5 metres (approx.) low
Note: Risk levels are given as an indication of the perceived level of risk when surveying the environment.  The actual risk 
would vary significantly based on context and other factors.  Risks which are deemed low could be in reality extremely high in 
certain situations.
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Condence Level Calculator
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APPENDIX G
Safety-Driven Control System
Implementation
This appendix focuses on the implementation of key parts of the safety-driven control system and
describes why certain development decisions were made. Whereas Chapter 6 gave an abstract
description of all of the components that make up the system, this appendix provides enough
implementation detail that if needed other developers could recreate the software.
To properly evaluate the safety-driven control system design, it was necessary to implement
the system as faithfully as possible. As with the majority of software systems, the initial imple-
mentation revealed a number of issues with the design. This meant a continual reconciliation
between the design requirements and what could be achieved in practice. Modications to the
design were only made if it was found that improvements could be made in speed, exibility or
intelligibility. It must be noted that at no point was the design modied to reduce the coding
eort, if this in turn had an impact on the desired improvements mentioned previously.
G.1 System Design Overview
This section gives an overview of the software produced during this project. The programming
languages used to build each part of the system are discussed, and a justication is made for their
selection. Finally, an overview of each piece of hardware used for testing purposes is presented.
G.1.1 User Interface
The software development centred around a single user interface that was used to congure the
robot, start-up control routines and monitor the system's input and output. The diagram in
Figure G.1 illustrates the relationship between the user interface, the control system and the
robot. The decision to only use one user interface meant that development time was greatly
reduced. If more than one developer was working on this project, it would have been more
ecient to divide the software into a number of separate applications. The user interface is
divided into 5 tabs, each displaying specic information about the robot. Appendix J shows a
screen shot of all the tabs, a summary of each are described in the following list:
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Real / Simulated
Robot
User Interface Control System
Figure G.1: Relationship between user interface and control system.
Main Tab Allows the user to select the robot project they wish to open and the control routine
that the robot should execute. (The robot project dictates the type of robot and its
capabilities. Whereas, the control routine species what the robot should do. A robot
project can have multiple control routines.) After selecting the robot project, the user is
presented with a list of the actuators, sensor and sensor functions that the robot requires.
The user must then click the `Connect Everything' button, which will start the process
of connecting to the robot hardware and performing tests to check that the equipment is
working correctly. A status box provides details of the connection process. Any hardware
or software function that fails the testing phase is highlighted. The user is not able to start
the robot's execution routine, until all hardware and software functions pass testing. In
addition, this tab provides an interface for the user to manually test each actuator, sensor
and sensor function in isolation.
Conguration Tab Provides an interface, where the user can create safety policies. The user
is able to add actuators, sensors, sensor functions and safety states to the current robot
project (selected from the Main Tab). These can then be used as part of the rule terms
that make up safety policies. Control states can be used in safety policies from this tab.
However, unlike the safety states, they cannot be created from the tab, as they are dened
explicitly in the control system source code.
Dynamic Graph Tab Shows the safety protection system for the current robot project. Prior
to a control routine being started, this tab allows the user to analyse the structure of the
safety protection system by hovering the mouse pointer over individual sensors, sensor
functions, safety policies and actuators. By doing this, each connection that belongs to
the selected element and in turn its connections are highlighted. While a control routine
is being executed, this tab shows the activation of each element of the safety protection
system in real-time.
Safety Events Tab Provides a history of all the activation events captured while the robot is
executing a control routine. This activation data is updated in real-time. Currently the
graph shows two lines, one for safety events and one for control events. Although each
individual safety policy and control type is being recorded, it is not possible to display all
this information in real-time, due to the processing impact on the rest of the system.
Query Tab Allows the user to query the safety protection system for the current robot project.
These queries reveal information about the state of the system given certain conditions.
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Figure G.2: Hardware used while developing safety-driven control system.
The user is able to select from drop-down boxes, dierent safety policies, sensors, sensor
functions, actuators and states to build a query. By executing these queries the user can
nd out the eect certain conditions have on the system. For example, it is possible to see
if a particular sensor function value will activate any safety policies and whether this will
result in actuator restrictions.
G.1.2 Hardware Overview
Many dierent hardware devices were considered while developing the control system. These
include various robots, sensors and other peripherals. A description of the key hardware used
during experimentation was discussed in Chapter 3. The diagram in Figure G.2 shows a complete
list of all the hardware that was tested with the safety-driven control system. For each piece of
hardware, new code was written to interface it appropriately with the system. This process is
discussed in more detail in Section G.3.3.
By using a diverse selection of hardware, which required a wide range of solutions to interface
them with the control system, it was believed that many real-world issues that could aect
the system would be revealed. This was found to be true and a great benet to the system
design. One example was how to use information captured from cameras, which required a lot
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of processing and high availability. When compared to sensors such as an ultrasonic sensor,
which requires little processing, it was clear that dierent handling solutions were required.
G.1.3 Software Decisions
Selecting the programming language that was used to implement the robot software required,
careful consideration. As initial designs suggested a modular hierarchical approach would be
required, the decision was made to use an object-orientated programming (OOP) language. This
type of programming language uses a data structure called an `object'. These objects consist of
a set of data elds and methods, which are stored in a le called a `class'. Using inheritance,
these classes can form either the parent or child of other classes, thus improving organisation
and reducing the amount of code that needs to be written.
As execution speed was also a key consideration, there was only three general purpose lan-
guages available that we could use. These were, C#, C++ and Java. Of these three, C++ has
the fastest execution speed. However, much of the sample code available for Microsoft Robotics
Developer Studio (MRDS) is written in C#, therefore it was the logical choice.
One of the initial design decisions for the robot software was to create self contained software
packages for handling each piece of robot hardware. This technique was inspired by the way
MRDS uses services to organise communication between dierent software components. For
example, for both the MobileRobots PeopleBot and the Lego NXT, a separate piece of software
was created that handed both sensor information and control requests, to and from the control
system. This allowed the system processing to be distributed across the multiple cores available
on the computer CPU. If the control system was to directly access the hardware, then more
complex code would have been required to distribute the processing. Furthermore, by creating
separate software packages, it is possible to distribute the processing across multiple computers.
The Python language was also used throughout this project. Although this language has an
execution speed, which is considerably slower than C#, it is an excellent tool for rapid software
development. Furthermore, there is a large and active community, which support many software
libraries that are not available for other programming languages. In this project it was used
to create the 2D robot arm simulation (discussed in Section 4.2.3), provide an interface to the
Lego NXT controller and provide access to the PC microphone output.
Before coding commenced, a decision was made to name all classes, functions and variables,
with clear descriptive words. This meant avoiding acronyms and abbreviations where their use
would cause confusion. To illustrate the coding style used throughout the software, a selection
of code listings are provided in Appendix K.
G.2 System Design Diagrams
During the development process we found design diagrams an invaluable tool for visualising
system connections. These connections could be between dierent sub-systems or between soft-
ware modules. The type of information we were concerned with, was for example, how data and
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Figure G.3: Safety-driven control system class diagram.
control signals are passed around the system. A number of our preliminary design diagrams are
given in Appendix B and were discussed in Section 4.1.1.
The most up-to-date denition of the safety-driven control system is shown in the class dia-
gram of Figure G.3. This diagram is based on the high-level control system diagram introduced
in Chapter 6 (Figure 6.1). The class diagram shows the structure of the control system and
how each module is connected. The direction of the arrows between these connections denote
the data ow direction and relationship between modules. For example, The `Sensor Function'
module has access to the `Sensor' module but no access exists in the opposite direction.
Each module shown in the class diagram of Figure G.3, represents an individual class. The
`Main' class contains the entry point of the control system, which is the rst point of execution
when the software is started. The `User Interface' class provides functions that allows the user
to control the system via the main class. As can be seen, the system is organised into three main
layers, each of which is orchestrated by a single class. These are the `Safety Layer', `Control
Layer' and the `Actuator Layer' classes. Another important module is the `Knowledge Base'
class, which allows the control layer and safety layer access to the safety polices, state information
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and sensor function data.
To illustrate the complex relationships between the control layer and the safety protection
system, we used a type of relationship diagram called a call graph. A number of examples of
these are given in Appendix L. These diagrams proved useful for describing how class functions
should be accessed and the direction data is passed.
G.3 Implementation Decisions
This section presents details of the safety-driven control system implementation. Where appro-
priate pseudocode is provided to illustrate how the software functions (a few of the larger code
listing can be found in Appendix K) and a discussion made of the key design decisions. As
previously stated, the aim of this appendix is to provide enough detail so that other researchers
could reproduce the system, either in part or in its entirety.
As Chapter 6 explained, the safety-driven control system is divided into two main compo-
nents, the safety protection system and a control layer. Both these parts of the system use
common interfaces to access the sensors and actuators. In turn, these sensors and actuators
both use a common interface to access the hardware. This section starts by looking at these
interfaces; this is then followed by a discussion on how they are utilised by both the safety
protection system and control layer.
G.3.1 Sensor Interfaces
For each sensor that was used on the robot a sensor class was created. These sensor classes
required unique code for handing specic parts of the sensor. However, much of the required
code was common between all the sensors. Therefore, a parent abstract class was created. This
abstract class contains all the data elds and functions that are common to all sensors. This
process of abstraction is used throughout the implementation, with the result of greatly reducing
the amount of code duplication and making classes much simpler to create.
Each sensor class contains a number of attributes which dene the working values that the
sensor may produce. These attributes are the `typical', `minimum', `maximum' and `failure'
values. An extract of a non-contact temperature sensor is shown in Class Extract 1. In addition
to the working values, a reference to the sensor hardware interface is given. This interface links
the class to the actual sensor where values can be read from.
Class Extract 1 : ThermalSensor.Constructor()
global typicalV alue 24
global minV alue  70
global maxV alue 380
global failureV alue  999
Sensor functions, as has already been discussed, take one or more sensor inputs and processes
the data to produce new information. This process requires rst checking the sensor data for
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errors. This is done by comparing the current sensor values to make sure they are inside the
predened boundary values and not equal to the failure value. Presently we do not specify
boundary or error values for the safety functions, as is done with the sensors. There may be
some future situations when this is required, but as of yet it has not been deemed necessary.
The main role of the sensor functions is to produce a value and condence level based on
sensor inputs. This process is shown in Class Extract 2. For a full discussion on how the
condence level is calculated see Section 6.3.1.
Class Extract 2 : SensorFunction.GetValue(requiredConfidenceLevel)
fIn the future to provide more accurate results this function will need to take information
from the robot's state, current task and data from other sensors most importantly the sensor
error informationg
medianV alue 0
confidenceLevel errorV alue
standardDeviation  1
maxConfidenceLevel requiredConfidenceLevel  2
numberOfSamples (requiredConfidenceLevel=confidenceLevelPerQuery)  2
fThe array `sampleValues' contains a history of the sensor function outputg
ProcessSensors() fProcess sensor data and add latest results to sample arrayg
fIf the required number of sample values are available, then calculate outputg
if numberOfSamples > 0 and numberOfSamples < sampleV alues:length then
lock sampleValues fPrevent other threads altering arrayg
reducedSample GetSubArray(sampleV alues, numberOfSamples)
fAverage latest sensor function values to produce outputg
medianV alue CalculateMedian(reducedSample)
fCalculate condence level for latest sensor function valueg
standardDeviation CalculateStandardDeviation(reducedSample)
confidenceLevel maxConfidenceLevel   (standardDeviation=numberOfSamples)
end lock
end if
fRestrict sensor function condence level to maximum valueg
if confidenceLevel > maxConfidenceLevel then
confidenceLevel = maxConfidenceLevel
end if
return medianV alue, confidenceLevel
A critically important, but deceptively simple function, available to the controllers using the
sensor functions, is shown in Class Extract 3. This function forces the calling function, generally
in a controller, to wait while the sensor function processes its output a number of times. The
aim of this function is to build the condence level value outputted by the sensor function.
By using this function call alone, a controller can pause its actions whenever the condence
level drops below a certain point. This can be used, for example, while moving the robot forward.
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Class Extract 3 : SensorFunction.PauseAndBuildCondence()
fPause the system while new sensor function samples are acquiredg
for count = 0 to sampleV alues:length do
ProcessSensors() fProcess sensor data and add latest results to sample arrayg
Pause(sampleT ime) fPause executiong
end for
If the condence level for the sensor function that detects obstacles drops below a certain point,
this function can be used to pause the controllers current routine, while the sensor function
takes further samples. This is dierent to how controllers interact with safety policies, as this
does not necessarily need to be used in hazardous situations.
G.3.2 Actuator Interfaces
Actuators are handled much like sensors, with each actuator sharing common code with all other
actuators. As was described in Section 6.2.1, actuators are not directly referred to, instead we
consider only the motion of the actuator. For example, a motor powering the robot wheels could
be capable of moving forward and in reverse. Therefore, in our system a class would be required
to describe both these motions. In addition, actuators can be grouped together so that a single
class can describe multiple actuators, if the actuators produce the same motion. For example
two independent wheel actuators, which propel the robot forward, could be controlled using one
class object.
An extract of an actuator class for the PeopleBot robot forward wheel motor is shown in
Class Extract 4. Each actuator class species a number of working values for the type of action
that can be applied to the actuator when it is switched on. For example, the PeopleBot wheel
actuator can take `speed' and `distance' values. Each of these values are assigned `minimum',
`maximum' and `typical' values. The `typical' value is often used as the starting value for the
actuator. The `minimum' and `maximum' boundary values are more important, as they are
used to restrict the values given to the actuator from the controllers. Ideally, values outside
the maximum and minimum should not be sent to the actuator. If they are sent, this can be
detected and used as a signal that one or more controllers are not behaving appropriately, in
which event these controllers can be suspended or the system shut down.
Class Extract 4 : PeopleBotForwardActuator.Constructor()
numberWorkingV alues 2
SetWorkingValues(`speed'; 55; 65; 60)
SetWorkingValues(`distance'; 0; 200; 10)
To switch actuators on and o, two functions are provided. These functions can only be
accessed by the controllers and the safety protection system (which can only call the `o' func-
tion). As the code extract in Class Extract 5 shows, the `ActuatorOn' function takes input
values such as speed and distance. Prior to switching on the actuator, the function checks that
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no restrictions are currently being applied. If no restrictions are present, then the values passed
to the function from the controller are analysed, and if necessary restricted to acceptable values.
These values are then passed to the actuator hardware interface, which switches the actuator
on. Finally, the event of switching the actuator on is recorded and a Boolean value is returned
to the controller indicating if the actuator was switched on successfully.
Class Extract 5 : PeopleBotForwardActuator
function ActuatorOn(value1, value2)
if not restriction = stop then
fApply restrictions to input values (if any exist)g
restrictedV alue1 CalculateRestrictionValue(`speed'; value1)
restrictedV alue2 CalculateRestrictionValue(`distance'; value2)
ForwardMotorsOn(restrictedV alue1; restrictedV alue2) fTurn on the actuatorg
CaptureFiredEvent(1) fRecord that the actuator has been turned ong
return true
end if
CaptureFiredEvent(-1) fRecord that the actuator could not be turned ong
return false
end function
function ActuatorO()
ForwardMotorsStop() fTurn o the actuatorg
CaptureFiredEvent(0) fRecord that the actuator has been turned og
end function
The method of applying and removing a restriction to an actuator is shown in Listing K.1
(Appendix K). These restrictions can only be applied or removed by a safety policy. When a
safety policy applies a restriction, it must specify the type of restriction. These restriction types
are `Stop', which prevents the actuator being switched on, `Min', `Max' and `Min Max', which
restrict the minimum and maximum allowed values, and `Allow', which removes any current
restrictions. In addition the `None' restriction type, which cannot be set by a safety policy, is
used to indicate that no restrictions are currently applied.
As is shown in Class Extract 4, before a request to switch an actuator on is sent to the
hardware interface, the requested value is rst checked against any current restrictions. This
process can be seen in Listing K.2 (Appendix K). As well as restricting the value based on
current restrictions, this function also makes certain that the values are within the maximum
and minimum allowed values for the actuator. Currently the process will restrict all values
outside the actuator boundary values, no matter how large. Therefore, the actuator will always
be switched on. However, it would be straightforward to not allow the actuator to be activated
and have this event reported to the requesting controller.
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G.3.3 Hardware Interface
To provide a common way to access actuators and sensors we have created a number of hardware
interfaces. Although the term hardware is used, exactly the same method is used to connect
simulated robot devices.
Class Extract 6 presents an extract of the PeopleBot hardware interface. As the listing
shows, this interface is a layer between the PeopleBot controller and the actuators and sensors.
Class Extract 6 : PeopleBotHardwareInterface
fConnect to the hardware controllerg
function Connect()
if peopleBotController.connected = false then
peopleBotController.ConnectRobot()
end if
return peopleBotController.connected
end function
fDisconnect robot from clientg
function ShutDown()
peopleBotController.ShutDownRobot()
end function
fStop the actuators, but keep robot connectedg
function StopAllActuators()
peopleBotController.SendCommandMessage(RobotOpCodes.stopAll)
end function
fOpen gripper by a certain amountg
function GripperOpen(speed; degrees)
peopleBotController.SendCommandMessage(RobotOpCodes.gripperOpen, speed; degrees)
end function
fStop gripper openingg
function GripperOpenStop()
peopleBotController.SendCommandMessage(RobotOpCodes.gripperOpenStop)
end function
fEach actuator has an on function and a stop functiong
Two example actuator functions are given in Class Extract 6. The function named `Grip-
perOpen' is complemented with a function named `GripperOpenStop'. These two functions are
called directly from the actuator class `GripperOpenActuator'. The `GripperOpen' function
takes two parameters, one for speed and one for number of degrees to open the gripper. On call-
ing this function a request to open the gripper is sent to the robot hardware via the PeopleBot
controller. This request is sent using a messaging system developed during this project, and is
discussed in more detail in the section that follows.
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G.3.3.1 Hardware Communication Scheme
A number of hardware devices, including the Lego NXT controller, required the use of a dierent
programming language from that used to create the control system. To allow these devices to
communicate with the control system, we created a set of common operations that specied
every type of interaction that the control system has with connected devices. Each of these
operations were assigned a unique code, a sample of which is given in Table G.1.
Operation Byte Code Parameters
Open gripper 0x12, 0x01 amount to open
Table detection sensor 0x24, 0x20 table distance (-1.0 if no detection)
Stop all actuators 0x10, 0x01 none
Control error 0x99, 0x01 error message
Table G.1: Hardware operation codes sample.
Each operation is specied as two bytes. A byte is generally the smallest data type used in
high-level languages and is supported natively in all the languages we used. By using a pair of
bytes it is possible to specify 65,536 dierent operations. Each operation is sent as a message,
which consists of an operation code, the length of the message and a number of parameters.
Examples of these operation codes are given in Table G.1. The messages are used to perform all
hardware interaction, for example the control system could send a message to a controller with
the instruction to open the gripper, with a parameter specifying how much it should be opened
by.
To exchange messages between dierent systems, we used the ubiquitous communication pro-
tocol TCP/IP. This was the most obvious choice for exchanging data, as it is well supported and
has in-built error checking, so we can be condent that messages are not going to be corrupted
en route. Another benet of exchanging messages in this way, is that it makes it possible to
communicate across networks, meaning that the robot could be running on a computer separate
to the control system.
G.3.4 Safety Protection System
The safety protection system is the core of the control system, and is responsible for the overall
majority of safety systems. Therefore, its design and implementation is of paramount impor-
tance.
As has been discussed, the safety protection system is essentially a collection of safety poli-
cies, which individually describe how the system should behave in certain situations. As Class
Extract 7 shows, the structure of the safety policies is relatively simple. It contains a list of rule
terms, which determine when the safety policy is activated and a list of actuators and states
that are aected on activation.
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Class Extract 7 : SafetyPolicy.Constructor(policyName)
name policyName fIdentication name for this safety policyg
fCreate arrays which will be populated with safety policy rulesg
ruleTerms emptyArray
actuatorLinks emptyArray
stateLinks emptyArray
Each rule term, which makes up a safety policy, consists of two values and a comparator. As
the name suggests, the comparator is used to evaluate the two values, producing either a `true'
or `false' output. The structure of the rule term is shown in Class Extract 8. The comparison
values can be one of the following types: `boolean', `condenceLevel', `oat', `int', `robotState',
`safetyPolicyState', `sensorFunction' or `string'. The `sensorFunction' type refers to the value
produced by a sensor function. Whereas the `condenceLevel' type refers to the condence level
of all the sensor functions used in other rules of the same safety policy.
Class Extract 8 : RuleTerm.Constructor(ruleId; ruleInput1; ruleInput2; ruleComparator)
global comparators [equal; not; less; greater; lessEqual; greaterEqual]
global ruleTermTypes [boolean; confidenceLevel; f loat; int; robotState;
safetyPolicyState; sensorFunction; string]
id ruleId
input1 ruleInput1
input2 ruleInput2
comparator  ruleComparator
Each safety policy is processed in a separate thread. This means that all safety policies
are monitored continually and in parallel. Class Extract 9 shows the process of monitoring
safety policies and applying restrictions. As can be seen, each rule term of the safety policy
is evaluated in turn. If any one of these rule terms evaluates as false, the safety policy stops
processing the remainder of the rule terms and starts processing the rst again. As was explained
in Section 6.2.1, this is done to reduce processing eort. Ideally, the rule terms that can be
processed quickly, such as those using state information, should come rst in the list of rule
terms.
The function for processing rule terms is shown in Listing K.3 (Appendix K). This involves
simply evaluating the two comparison values in an `if' statement. The output of the evaluation
is then returned to the calling safety policy.
G.3.4.1 Storing Safety Policies
The design of the safety policies, which make up the safety protection system, are such that they
can be described with a constructed language that can be read by a human without decoding
the text rst. This means that for any given robot system a safety protection system can be
constructed and stored in a text le. This le can then be loaded when the system is started.
An example of a safety protection system descriptor le is shown in Appendix M. The YAML
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Class Extract 9 : SafetyPolicy.ProcessSafetyPolicy()
fMonitor safety policy constantly until robot is shutdowng
while monitorPolicy = true do
fIf all processed rules return true restrict actuators and apply statesg
restrictActuator  true
for each ruleTerm in ruleTerms do
if ProcessRuleTerm(ruleTerm) = false then
restrictActuator  false
fStop processing rule terms as one has evaluated as falseg
break
end if
end for
if restrictActuator = true then
fRecord the time the safety policy is appliedg
safetyPolicyAppliedT imeStamp GetTime()
fRestrict actuators linked to safety policyg
RestrictActuators()
fApply the states linked to the safety policyg
ApplyStates()
end if
Pause(shortDelay)fPause execution to prevent threads from blockingg
end while
language is used to store the safety policy information. This language promotes a human-
readable format while allows data to be structured in both hierarchical and non-hierarchical
blocks. XML was also considered as it shares many of the qualities of YAML. However, the
primary benet of YAML is that it provides a referencing scheme, which allows data to refer to
other pieces of data or groups of data within the same le. This is much like referencing a table
within a database.
Of the many benets of encoding safety policies as plain text, is that they can be scrutinised
by safety engineers independently to the control system. It also provides another piece of
evidence for the safety certication process, but unlike some system documents, this is not
an abstract representation of the system, but an explicit record of how safety is implemented
throughout the system.
G.3.5 Control Layer
The control layer is made up of a number of controller modules, and a control mode selection
module. Each controller represents a mode the robot can be in at any one time. For example
the `MoveToCollectionArea' controller (Listing K.4, Appendix K) is used to navigate the robot
to the collection area. The control mode selection module is responsible for orchestrating the
controllers. This means both selecting controllers in the right sequence to complete a predened
task and selecting controllers to avoid any potentially unsafe situations identied by the safety
policies.
Appendix G. Safety-Driven Control System Implementation 177
The discussion of the control layer implementation was started in Section 6.4.1. Two algo-
rithms that were presented (Algorithm 1 and 2), which outlined how the control mode selection,
controllers and safety policies, interact while the system is operating, allowing the robot to
perform its task.
For each main task that a robot is required to do, a control mode selection module is needed.
Only one control mode selection module can be running at anyone time, and presently the control
software must be restarted before another is can be selected. An extract of the control mode
selection module for a `sorting' task (discussed in Section 7.1) is presented in Class Extract 10.
As this example shows, the main task is divided into a number of subtasks. Each of these
subtasks is responsible for executing a controller and handling any restrictions that may prevent
it from running. The main processing task executes these subtasks in the appropriate order to
complete the overall mission.
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Class Extract 10 : ControlModeSelectionPartSorting
fUsed to check if main task has completedg
mainTaskCompleted false
function ControlModeSelectionPartSorting()
fConnect controllersg
end function
fProcess all subtasks that make up the main taskg
function ProcessTasks()
while processTasks = true
if TaskMoveToCollectionArea() = true then
if TaskPickupObject() = true then
if TaskMoveToDepositArea() = true then
if TaskDepositObject() = true then
mainTaskCompleted true
end if
end if
end if
end if
Pause(shortDelay)fPause execution to prevent threads from blockingg
end while
end function
fSubtask for moving the robot to the collection areag
function TaskMoveToCollectionArea()
taskCompleted false
if moveToCollectionArea.Process() = true then
taskCompleted true
else
if GetCurrentRestriction() = humanDetected then
fRun subtask for negotiating with humang
TaskStopForHuman()
else if GetCurrentRestriction() = obstructionDetected then
fRun subtask for avoiding obstaclesg
TaskAvoidObstacle()
fRepeated for other safety policiesg
else
fNo restriction, may need to handle this situation in the futureg
end if
end if
return taskCompleted
end function
fSubtask for picking up an object from the collection areag
function TaskPickupObject()
fAll other subtasks use the same structure as TaskMoveToCollectionArea()g
end function
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An example of a controller designed to rst locate a specic location in the robot's envi-
ronment and then move the robot to that location, is shown in Listing K.4 (Appendix K). As
this example shows, the main processing of the controller (and all other controllers) is executed
in the `Run' function. Using data from the sensor functions, the robot rst performs a search
of the local area for its target location. Once located the robot moves to that location. If at
any point any actuators required by the controller are restricted, preventing the controller from
completing its task, the controller will terminate and return control to the control mode section
module. At this point the restrictions will be evaluated and a new controller selected.
The remainder of this appendix looks at the hardware and simulation environment that was
developed alongside the control system. A number of issues where encountered when interfacing
the control system with the robot hardware and simulation. The most important of these are
discussed and solutions for addressing the issues are presented.
G.4 Simulation Environment
As previously discussed, Microsoft Robotics Developer Studio (MRDS) is being used as the
preferred simulation environment. The technical capabilities of the simulation environment
meant it was possible to create a virtual MobileRobots PeopleBot and a humanoid type robot
(based on BERT) with approximately the same physical characteristics of the real robots. In
addition, a number of other physical entities were modelled such as tables, chairs, and walls and
oors that were combined to make entire buildings.
There are currently two ways to write programs for MRDS, the rst is to use a conventional
programming language, in this case C#, and the second is with Microsoft's Visual Programming
Language (VPL). With VPL the developers must use a graphical user interface (GUI) to drag-
and-drop dierent pre-constructed components, conguring each as required. Although for many
projects this may be suitable, for our control system implementation is was not. This was due
to the requirement for communication between an existing piece of software, which contained
the control system, and the simulation.
Much of the development work done in simulation was identical to that for the real hardware.
MRDS has a number of dierent types of actuator and sensor components that can be attached
and interfaced with the robot, much in the same was as it is done on the hardware. This made it
relatively straightforward to create wrappers for the sensors and actuators, that were compatible
with the same control system implemented on the physical hardware.
G.5 Physical Hardware
This section discusses the main hardware that was used for both testing and experimental
purposes. This builds on the discussion in Chapter 3, with a focus more on implementation
decisions taken while interfacing with the specic hardware.
Many other robots and sensor devices were also considered, these include the WowWee
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Rovio, OWI Edge Robotic Arm and Lynxmotion AL5D robotic arm. Although these devices
were not used for experimentation, they did highlight some important issues. For example the
Lynxmotion AL5D robotic arm, which uses servo motors, demonstrated the potential risk of
using motors which require power and a control signal to keep the arm from falling.
G.5.1 MobileRobots PeopleBot
The decision to use the MobileRobots PeopleBot was based primarily on its size and ability to
carry objects over 5 kg. Of the robots available to this project, this was the only one which
could be used to perform HRI tasks that could be useful in the real world (see Figure G.4).
Figure G.4: MobileRobots PeopleBot { Human-robot interaction.
Controlling the PeopleBot using the supplied library proved to be problematic, as no direct
access is given to the sensors and actuators. A solution was found to this problem, although it
did require an extra layer of communication between the robot and the control system, which
added a slight delay. Although there were issues with the software, physically the robot is built
extremely well. Furthermore, the robot is designed with additional space where equipment can
be attached. The extra equipment that was attached was a Microsoft Kinect, a Nintendo Wii
remote, a microphone, a camera, speakers, and a laptop, which provided an interface with the
other equipment.
G.5.2 Lego NXT
The Lego NXT construction kit provided an excellent set of sensors and actuators that could be
interfaced through a central controller. As was discussed in Section 3.1.3, by adding a number
of other sensors, such as a camera and a Nintendo Wii remote, it was possible to construct a
robot with comparable functionality to the MobileRobots PeopleBot.
The ocial development tool for writing programs for the Lego NXT is named `NXT-G'.
This is a graphical programming environment, which allows users to build programs using a
point-and-click method. This was not suitable for our project, as with the PeopleBot robot,
it was essential to have direct control of the sensors and actuators. Therefore, an open source
Appendix G. Safety-Driven Control System Implementation 181
Microphone
Microsoft
Kinect
Non-contact
thermal sensor
Camera
Lego NXT
gripper
Figure G.5: Sensor test bench (shown with and without actuators).
library named `nxt-python' (Wanners, 2010) was used instead. At the time this project was
started, this was the most mature library available that did not require changing the NXT
controller's rmware. However, there were some design problems we had to overcome. The
main issue was that if two requests were made to the NXT controller simultaneously, it would
crash and have to be reset manually. Simultaneous requests occurred as we were using multiple
threads of execution to check the state of all the sensors and to drive the actuators. To overcome
this problem, we created a queue, which all requests were added to before being sent sequentially
to the NXT controller. Although this solved the problem with the controller crashing, it did
however introduce unacceptable delays in the system, when requests to switch actuators o were
sent. For safety this is the worst type of timing issue, with even a 1 second delay potentially
causing a serious safety risk. This issue was solved by checking each request type and then
promoting actuator-o requests to the front of the queue. This problem with the NXT controller
highlighted the benet of having separate input and output channels.
G.5.3 Sensor Test Bench
In order to evaluate dierent methods for combining sensor readings and calculating condence
levels in sensor functions, we built a test bench composed of a number of sensors. These sensors
were a camera, a microphone and a non-contact temperature device. This desktop setup, shown
in Figure G.5, proved much more convenient for testing dierent parts of the system compared
to using sensors xed to the robot. This also avoided lengthy start-up times of the robot and
the need for continually recharging batteries.
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As well as general diagnostic testing to make certain the system behaved as designed, the
test bench was used to explore how the available sensors could be exploited to provide useful
safety information. One of the best examples developed using the test bench, and subsequently
became one of the most critical safety devices, was using a microphone as a collision device.
This was not used on its own to detect collisions, but in addition to other sensors. The idea
behind using a microphone is that if the robot collided with an object, it would cause a loud
noise, in which event the robot could be stopped. Although loud noises could occur for other
reasons, it seems prudent to pause the robot and check for other signs of danger. In addition, it
can also be used to detect loud noises produced by a human, as it is believed that if a human
wanted to stop the robot urgently, their instinct would be to raise their voice, or make contact
with the robot. The benets of using a microphone in this way, is they are cheap, and often
integrated into other devices, such as cameras and computers. Processing the microphone input
can also be done in a number of ways. The most simple would be to monitor the sound level
and then produce an event if it reached a certain level. More sophisticated analysis could also
be used to detect sound wave signatures, which could be used to make diering decisions based
on the nature of the detected sound.
This sensor test bench was also combined with a robot gripper constructed from Lego NXT.
This allowed for a full range of tests to be performed, with and without interfacing with actuators.
G.6 Summary
This appendix has discussed the key decisions taken while implementing the safety-driven control
system, introduced in Chapter 6. A number of system diagrams and code extracts have been
included, which as well as revealing how the system is implemented, should help other researchers
re-produce the software.
Many challenges were overcome in turning the initial system designs into a functioning
software solution. These included choosing the most appropriate programming language, in-
terfacing with dierent types of hardware devices and maintaining availability throughout the
system, particularly for the most safety-critical parts.
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APPENDIX H
Safety Protection System Example
Figure H.1: Safety protection system graph { Mobile robot.
APPENDIX I
Robot Tasks: Flow Diagrams
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Figure I.1: Flow diagram { Part sorting robot task.
Set ‘human_present’
(For 3 mins)
Stop robot
Ask ’Do you have a 
part for me to sort?’
Human detected
Is current task = 
‘collect_part’?
No
Yes
Acknowledge human 
presence
Is user response 
‘Yes’?
Yes
No
Output ‘I will now 
continue my duties’
If no reply after 30 
seconds
Continue current task
Extend arm
Output ‘Please place 
object in gripper’
If object placed in 
gripper within 1 
minute
True
Output ‘Thank you, I 
will now sort this 
part’
Set current task = 
‘deposit_part’
Output ‘No object 
received. Will now 
retract arm’
Retract arm
(Loop until arm fully 
retracted)
Output ‘Warning, 
arm extending’
Has item been placed 
in gripper?
No
Yes
Stop arm
Output ‘Thank you. 
Will now retract arm’
Retract arm
Navigate around 
human
False
Figure I.2: Flow diagram { Part sorting robot task with HRI.
APPENDIX J
Safety System User Interface
Figure J.1: User interface tab { Main.
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Figure J.2: User interface tab { Conguration.
Appendix J. Safety System User Interface 188
Figure J.3: User interface tab { Dynamic graph.
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Figure J.4: User interface tab { Safety and control events.
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Figure J.5: User interface tab { Query.
APPENDIX K
Code Listings
During this PhD, 115,000 (approx.) lines of code was written, organised into 256 les, using 4
dierent programming languages. The code listings included in this thesis, consist of the most
critical / novel parts of the project, and are representative of the coding style used throughout.
Listing K.1: Actuator.ApplyRestriction()
1
2 // Restriction types
3 public enum ActuatorRestrictionTypes { None, Stop, Min, Max, Min_Max, Allow };
4
5 public bool ApplyRestriction(string safetyPolicyName, ActuatorRestrictionTypes
restrictionType, object restrictionValue, float restrictionDuration)
6 {
7 if (restrictionType == ActuatorRestrictionTypes.Allow)
8 {
9 // Remove the restriction, overriding any durations
10 return RemoveRestriction(true);
11 }
12
13 // Apply restriction if new duration is greater than current restriction
14 if (restrictionDuration > (this._restrictionDuration -
TimeSinceRestrictionSeconds))
15 {
16 ActuatorOff();
17 this._restrictionTimeStamp = System.DateTime.Now.Ticks;
18 this._restriction = restrictionType;
19 this._restrictionDuration = restrictionDuration;
20 this._restrictionSafetyPolicyName = safetyPolicyName;
21 return true;
22 }
23
24 // Actuator restriction could not be set
25 return false;
26 }
27
28 public bool RemoveRestriction(bool overrideTimeRestriction)
29 {
30 if (_restrictionTimeStamp > 0 || overrideTimeRestriction)
31 {
32 if (TimeSinceRestrictionSeconds >= _restrictionDuration ||
overrideTimeRestriction)
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33 {
34 this._restriction = ActuatorRestrictionTypes.None;
35 this._restrictionDuration = 0;
36 this._restrictionSafetyPolicyName = "";
37 this._restrictionTimeStamp = 0; // Reset restriction time stamp
38 return true;
39 }
40 }
41 return false;
42 }
Listing K.2: Actuator.CalculateRestrictionValue()
1 // Check the requested actuator value and restrict if necessary
2 public float CalculateRestrictionValue(int inputValueIndex, float inputValue)
3 {
4 if (_restriction == ActuatorRestrictionTypes.Stop)
5 {
6 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] = _actualWorkingValues
._stopValues[inputValueIndex];
7 }
8 else if (_restriction == ActuatorRestrictionTypes.Min_Max)
9 {
10 if (inputValue > _restrictionMaxValue)
11 {
12 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] =
_restrictionMaxValue;
13 }
14 else if (inputValue < _restrictionMinValue)
15 {
16 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] =
_restrictionMinValue;
17 }
18 else
19 {
20 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] = inputValue;
21 }
22 }
23 else if (_restriction == ActuatorRestrictionTypes.Min)
24 {
25 if (inputValue < _restrictionMinValue)
26 {
27 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] =
_restrictionMinValue;
28 }
29 else
30 {
31 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] = inputValue;
32 }
33 }
34 else if (_restriction == ActuatorRestrictionTypes.Max)
35 {
36 if (inputValue > _restrictionMaxValue)
37 {
38 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] =
_restrictionMaxValue;
39 }
40 else
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41 {
42 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] = inputValue;
43 }
44 }
45 else
46 {
47 // No Restriction
48 if (inputValue > _actualWorkingValues._maxValues[inputValueIndex])
49 {
50 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] =
_actualWorkingValues._maxValues[inputValueIndex];
51 }
52 else if (inputValue < _actualWorkingValues._minValues[inputValueIndex])
53 {
54 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] =
_actualWorkingValues._minValues[inputValueIndex];
55 }
56 else
57 {
58 _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex] = inputValue;
59 }
60 }
61 return _actualWorkingValues._currentValues[inputValueIndex];
62 }
Listing K.3: RuleTerm.ProcessRuleTerm()
1 public bool ProcessRuleTerm()
2 {
3 // Check if the values are both the float data type
4 if (_input1 is float && _input2 is float)
5 {
6 if (_comparator == Comparators.Equal)
7 {
8 if ((float)_input1 == (float)_input2)
9 {
10 // If values are equal return true
11 return true;
12 }
13 }
14 else if (_comparator == Comparators.Greater)
15 {
16 if ((float)_input1 > (float)_input2)
17 {
18 // If the first comparison value is greater than the second return
true
19 return true;
20 }
21 }
22 ... // Same for all other comparators
23 }
24 ... // Same for all other restriction types
25
26 // Return false if the compaison does not evaluate as true
27 return false;
28 }
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Listing K.4: ControllerMoveToCollectionArea
1
2 public class ControllerMoveToCollectionArea : Controller
3 {
4 public Controller()
5 {
6 ... // Connect to sensors, sensor functions and actuators
7 }
8
9 // Move to an object which is located on top of a table
10 public bool Run()
11 {
12 // Sensor function values
13 SensorFunction.ValidValue validValueLocation;
14 float[] areaLocation;
15
16 // Status flags
17 bool collectionAreaIdentified = false;
18 bool collectionAreaReached = false;
19
20 // Find collection area
21 while(collectionAreaIdentified == false)
22 {
23 validValueLocation = _sfCollectionAreaLocation.GetValidValue(
_requiredConfidence);
24 if (validValueLocation.IsValid == true)
25 {
26 areaLocation = validValueLocation.ValueAndConfidence.
ValueAsFloatArray;
27 if(areaLocation[0] > -1 && areaLocation[1] > -1)
28 {
29 collectionAreaIdentified = true;
30 }
31 else
32 {
33 // Collection area not found
34 PerformLocalSearch();
35 }
36 }
37 // Check if any stop restrictions have prevented this controller
executing
38 if(ActuatorsStopRestriction() == true)
39 {
40 return false; // Controller has failed to complete
41 }
42 Thread.Sleep(200); // Delay to prevent blocking
43 }
44
45 // Move to collection area
46 while(collectionAreaReached == false)
47 {
48 validValueLocation = _sfCollectionAreaLocation.GetValidValue(
_requiredConfidence);
49 if (validValueLocation.IsValid == true)
50 {
51 areaLocation = validValueLocation.ValueAndConfidence.
ValueAsFloatArray;
52 if(MoveTo(areaLocation[0], areaLocation[1]))
53 {
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54 collectionAreaReached = true;
55 }
56 }
57 // Check if any stop restrictions have prevented this controller
executing
58 if(ActuatorsStopRestriction() == true)
59 {
60 return false; // Controller has failed to complete
61 }
62 Thread.Sleep(200); // Delay to prevent blocking
63 }
64 // Controller has executed successfully (no restrictions)
65 return true;
66 }
67 ...
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Figure L.1: Call graph { MRDS Robot operating in industrial enviroment.
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Figure L.2: Call graph { Lego NXT robot arm sorting parts.
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Figure L.3: Call graph { Lego NXT mobile robot sorting parts using vision.
APPENDIX M
Example Safety Protection System
Descriptor File
1 ---
2 robot: NXT Arm - Sort Parts
3 type: domestic
4 actuator:
5 - id: &id1 1
6 type: ---
7 name: NXTArmClockwise
8 - id: &id2 2
9 type: ---
10 name: NXTArmAnticlockwise
11 - id: &id3 3
12 type: ---
13 name: NXTArmUp
14 - id: &id4 4
15 type: ---
16 name: NXTArmDown
17 sensorFunction:
18 - id: &id9 1
19 type: ---
20 name:
ObjectDistance_ReflectedLight
21 - id: &id5 2
22 type: ---
23 name: ObjectDistance_Ultrasonic
24 - id: &id6 3
25 type: ---
26 name: VoiceCommand
27 - id: &id7 4
28 type: ---
29 name: LoudNoise
30 - id: &id8 5
31 type: ---
32 name: ThermalNonContact
33 - id: 6
34 type: ---
35 name: NXTArmTurnPosition
36 - id: 7
37 type: ---
38 name: NXTArmUpDownPosition
39 - id: &id10 8
40 type: ---
41 name: NXTRobotLocation
42 safetyPolicyState:
43 safetyPolicy:
44 - id: 1
45 type: ---
46 name: Human Detection
47 actuators:
48 - actuatorLink: *id1
49 actuatorValueName: speed
50 restrictionType: Stop
51 restrictionValue: ---
52 restrictionDuration: 4
53 applyWhen: True
54 - actuatorLink: *id2
55 actuatorValueName: speed
56 restrictionType: Stop
57 restrictionValue: ---
58 restrictionDuration: 4
59 applyWhen: True
60 - actuatorLink: *id3
61 actuatorValueName: speed
62 restrictionType: Stop
63 restrictionValue: ---
64 restrictionDuration: 4
65 applyWhen: True
66 - actuatorLink: *id4
67 actuatorValueName: speed
68 restrictionType: Stop
69 restrictionValue: ---
70 restrictionDuration: 4
71 applyWhen: True
72 states:
73 ruleTerm:
74 - id: 1
75 name: Distance
76 comparator: Less
77 input1Type: SensorFunction
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78 input1: *id5
79 input2Type: Float
80 input2: 30
81 - id: 2
82 type: ---
83 name: Voice Command
84 actuators:
85 - actuatorLink: *id1
86 actuatorValueName: speed
87 restrictionType: Stop
88 restrictionValue: ---
89 restrictionDuration: 0
90 applyWhen: True
91 - actuatorLink: *id2
92 actuatorValueName: speed
93 restrictionType: Stop
94 restrictionValue: ---
95 restrictionDuration: 0
96 applyWhen: True
97 - actuatorLink: *id3
98 actuatorValueName: speed
99 restrictionType: Stop
100 restrictionValue: ---
101 restrictionDuration: 0
102 applyWhen: True
103 - actuatorLink: *id4
104 actuatorValueName: speed
105 restrictionType: Stop
106 restrictionValue: ---
107 restrictionDuration: 0
108 applyWhen: True
109 states:
110 ruleTerm:
111 - id: 1
112 name: StopCommand
113 comparator: Equal
114 input1Type: SensorFunction
115 input1: *id6
116 input2Type: String
117 input2: stop
118 - id: 3
119 type: ---
120 name: Crash Detection
121 actuators:
122 - actuatorLink: *id1
123 actuatorValueName: speed
124 restrictionType: Stop
125 restrictionValue: ---
126 restrictionDuration: 4
127 applyWhen: True
128 - actuatorLink: *id2
129 actuatorValueName: speed
130 restrictionType: Stop
131 restrictionValue: ---
132 restrictionDuration: 4
133 applyWhen: True
134 - actuatorLink: *id3
135 actuatorValueName: speed
136 restrictionType: Stop
137 restrictionValue: ---
138 restrictionDuration: 4
139 applyWhen: True
140 - actuatorLink: *id4
141 actuatorValueName: speed
142 restrictionType: Stop
143 restrictionValue: ---
144 restrictionDuration: 4
145 applyWhen: True
146 states:
147 ruleTerm:
148 - id: 1
149 name: Loud Noise
150 comparator: Greater
151 input1Type: SensorFunction
152 input1: *id7
153 input2Type: Float
154 input2: 1000
155 - id: 4
156 type: ---
157 name: Heat Detection
158 actuators:
159 - actuatorLink: *id3
160 actuatorValueName: speed
161 restrictionType: Stop
162 restrictionValue: ---
163 restrictionDuration: 4
164 applyWhen: True
165 - actuatorLink: *id4
166 actuatorValueName: speed
167 restrictionType: Stop
168 restrictionValue: ---
169 restrictionDuration: 4
170 applyWhen: True
171 states:
172 ruleTerm:
173 - id: 1
174 name: Heat Detection
175 comparator: Greater
176 input1Type: SensorFunction
177 input1: *id8
178 input2Type: Float
179 input2: 30
180 - id: 5
181 type: ---
182 name: Part Detection
183 actuators:
184 - actuatorLink: *id3
185 actuatorValueName: speed
186 restrictionType: Stop
187 restrictionValue: ---
188 restrictionDuration: 4
189 applyWhen: True
190 states:
191 ruleTerm:
192 - id: 1
193 name: Part Detected
194 comparator: Less
195 input1Type: SensorFunction
196 input1: *id9
197 input2Type: Float
Appendix M. Example Safety Protection System Descriptor File 201
198 input2: 400
199 - id: 6
200 type: ---
201 name: Deposit Area Detection
202 actuators:
203 - actuatorLink: *id4
204 actuatorValueName: speed
205 restrictionType: Stop
206 restrictionValue: ---
207 restrictionDuration: 4
208 applyWhen: True
209 states:
210 ruleTerm:
211 - id: 1
212 name: Deposit Area
213 comparator: LessEqual
214 input1Type: SensorFunction
215 input1: *id10
216 input2Type: Float
217 input2: 0
218 ...
